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ABSTRACT 
The need for reform in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) acquisition and management 
of services acquisitions has been recently highlighted by the Government Accountability 
Office and by top leadership within the DoD acquisition community.  However, problems 
with the acquisition of business-to-business services have not been limited to purchasing 
in the public sector; industry has also struggled with the effective acquisition of business-
to-business services as the complexities and unique nature of services render the 
definition of requirements and the specification and measurement of contractor 
performance to be problematic.  Despite these difficulties, little research has been 
conducted to examine the determinants of sourcing performance in services acquisitions.  
This study uses structural equation modeling to examine the relationships between 
service quality and its determinants in the U.S. Air Force’s acquisition of business-to-
business services.  Data were collected by surveying a sample of contract administrators 
assigned to services acquisitions.  The results of statistical analysis suggest that 
requirement definition sufficiency and government–contractor communication strongly 
affect the contract outcomes of service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance.  
A non-positive relationship is also found between the extent of compliance with 
regulations and statutes and the quality of the service rendered.  Other results include a 
significant relationship between the level of commitment by the internal customer and the 
sufficiency of the requirement definition as well as the deleterious effects of personnel 
turnover on compliance with regulations and statutes.  While the results present several 
practical implications for the DoD’s acquisition and management of service contracts, 
this study also makes contributions to service quality theory in business-to-business 
contexts.  A new service quality framework is proposed for customer-defined services, 
along with a revised scale for measuring service quality in business-to-business 
applications. 
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Over the past several decades, the United States has transitioned from a goods-
based economy to a services-based economy.  As of 2005, services accounted for more 
than 78% of the country’s gross domestic product and employed 80% of the country’s 
workforce (Coalition of Service Industries [CSI], 2007).  Federal spending on services 
has also sharply increased.  Most recently, the Department of Defense (DoD) reported 
obligating $212 billion on service contracts during 2009, an amount that accounted for 
more than 50% of the DoD’s 2009 contract spend (Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2010a, 2010b).  In that year 
alone, the DoD utilized more than 100,000 contract vehicles to acquire services from 
32,000 different service suppliers (USD[AT&L], 2010b).   
Despite these substantial increases in spend on contract services, the size of the 
DoD’s acquisition workforce has decreased in recent years.  As seen in Figure 1, the 
DoD’s spend on services acquisitions in real dollars grew more than 100% between 2001 
and 2008, increasing from $92 billion to slightly more than $200 billion, while the DoD’s 
contracting workforce grew only 1% and the DoD’s total acquisition workforce shrank 
nearly 3% (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2009b).  The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) contends that the DoD carried out this downsizing without 
regard to retention of the specific skills and competencies needed to accomplish the 
Department’s mission (GAO, 2007a), such as the skills required to manage increasingly 
complex service contracts.   
At the same time that demand for services has rapidly increased within the DoD, 
so have the demands on service contract administrators.  Some of this burden can be 
attributed to the uniqueness of services—the properties of intangibility, heterogeneity, 
perishability of output, and simultaneity of production and consumption—all 
characteristics that differentiate services from the acquisition of goods (Ellram, Tate, & 
Billington, 2007).  Because of these attributes, it is more difficult to control quality 
levels, more difficult to evaluate quality, more difficult to manage service personnel, and 
2 
more difficult to manage time, which is the process of synchronizing the resources 
required for service delivery with the time of consumption (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007). 
 
Figure 1.  Changes in DoD’s Contract Obligations and Contracting Workforce, Fiscal 
Year 2001 to Fiscal Year 2008 (From GAO, 2009a) 
This study intends to determine the explanatory structure of services sourcing 
performance, specifically that of service quality and contracting compliance within the 
U.S. Air Force.  Although significant research has been conducted in the area of service 
quality, the relationships between contract administration functions and service contract 
outcomes have yet to be examined.  This is not surprising given the number of variables 
potentially involved and the complexity of their interaction.  However, the need for this 
knowledge has become increasingly more critical in recent years. 
 Year 2001 to Fiscal Year 2008 (From GAO, 2009a) 
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND GAP IN LITERATURE 
With service contract administration challenges mounting, the DoD has recently 
come under scrutiny by the GAO regarding the acquisition and management of service 
contracts.  In 2001, the GAO labeled the DoD’s acquisition of services as ―high risk,‖ 
stating that the department’s poor management of service contracts undermined the 
government’s ability to obtain value for the taxpayer’s dollar (GAO, 2001a).  Additional 
findings in the 2001 report highlighted the DoD’s difficulties in defining requirements as 
well as in providing sufficient contractor oversight and adequately staffing contracting 
professionals.   
A second GAO report in 2001 reiterated findings concerning DoD and federal 
deficiencies in service contract management and made three recommendations: appoint a 
chief acquisition officer for each agency, improve training of the acquisition workforce, 
and increase the use of performance-based contracting (GAO, 2001b).  As defined by the 
Office of Federal Procurement and Public Policy (OFPP), performance-based contracts 
describe contractual requirements in terms of the government’s desired results and 
measurable outcomes, and they establish procedures to manage performance if it falls 
below established thresholds.  If appropriate, performance-based contracts can use 
incentives to motivate contractor efforts that otherwise might not be emphasized and to 
discourage waste and inefficiency.  At the time of the GAO report, in 2001, a mere 15% 
of federal service contracts were using performance-based contracting methods despite 
the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 20% goal (GAO, 2001b).  To date, 
improvements in acquisition training and in the implementation of the role of the chief 
acquisition officer have not been fully realized (see, for example, GAO, 2010b; Falcone, 
2010) 
The following year, in 2002, the GAO asked five of the major government 
agencies, including the DoD, to identify contracts that exemplified performance-based 
service contracting (GAO, 2002b).  The GAO reviewed 25 of these contracts and found 
that only 9 of 25 exhibited all of the attributes of performance-based service contracts as 
defined by the OFPP.  Of the remaining 16 contracts, 4 did not exhibit any of the 
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attributes.  It was evident, based on this study, that agencies were only partially 
complying with the OMB’s guidance to implement the use of performance-based 
contracting procedures. 
Also in 2002, the GAO released a study conducted on six leading companies that 
had instituted a strategic approach to the acquisition of services.  Brunswick Corporation, 
Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Exxon Mobile 
Corporation, Hasbro Incorporated, and Merrill Lynch & Company Incorporated have all 
successfully reengineered their business practices for acquiring services and, as a result, 
have netted cost savings as high as 15% while maintaining or even improving service 
levels (GAO, 2002a).  The GAO found similar key elements among the strategic 
approaches adopted by these companies; consequently, it recommended that the DoD 
incorporate these elements as a general framework for services acquisition reform. 
As seen in Figure 2, commitment to taking a strategic approach to services 
acquisition was central to the successful implementation of change within the six 
companies studied.  The companies first had to secure buy-in from top corporate 
leadership, who could communicate the urgency for change and establish acquisition 
goals and targets for the company.  The framework followed a logical order for process 
implementation: 
 Develop the strategic structure, processes, and roles; establish business 
relationships between all services stakeholders; identify service experts. 
 Support the people and processes involved; maintain open communication 
between parties; use metrics to reinforce process credibility. 
 Employ information systems to uncover the who, what, and where of 
spending; analyze spend data to identify opportunities for increased value. 
 
In this same study, the GAO compared the DoD’s current service acquisition 
environment to that of the six companies prior to their implementation of a strategic 
approach to services acquisition.  The report contended that the enterprise-wide, one-size-
fits-all solution adopted by these companies may not be suitable for the DoD, but stressed 
that the department develop a framework for services reform using a strategic approach 
modeled after successes in industry. 
5 
However, more than four years later, in November 2006, the GAO issued another 
report stating that the DoD still had not implemented a strategic approach to the 
management of service contracts (GAO, 2006b).  Rather, the GAO found that the DoD 
was reactively managing its service contracts, due in part to a lack of information on 
service requirements, volume, and composition.  The DoD concurred with these findings 
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD 
[AT&L]) issued a policy memorandum to strengthen the management of DoD services 
acquisition (USD[AT&L], 2006).  This memorandum called for reform at the strategic 
and tactical levels to ensure services acquisitions were enhancing the capabilities of the 
warfighter and to achieve specific objectives such as the use of performance-based 
measures, contract action reporting, and regulatory compliance.  Additionally, the 
memorandum implemented the changes required by Section 812 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which required the DoD to establish a 
management structure for the acquisition of contract services.   
 
Figure 2.  Key Elements of Strategic Approach Taken by Leading 
Companies (From GAO, 2002a)  Companies (From GAO, 2002a) 
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Despite these changes, the GAO still saw little improvement in the DoD’s 
acquisition and management of services.  In 2007, the GAO reported that the DoD 
increasingly relied on defense contractors for business-to-business services but lacked the 
key elements at the strategic and tactical levels to make service contracts a managed 
outcome (GAO, 2007a).  These results were reiterated in another 2007 GAO report 
(GAO, 2007b) which report questioned whether the DoD applies sound business 
practices to the acquisition and management of contracted services in the following 
competencies: 
 Defining requirements 
 Obtaining adequate competition 
 Managing contractors in a deployed (contingency) environment 
 Assessing contractor performance 
 Executing interagency contracts and task orders 
 
Recent legislation passed within the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 
required the DoD to submit to Congress an annual inventory of contracted services and 
also required the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance, with detailed implementation 
instructions, providing for periodic independent management reviews of the department’s 
service contracts.  The DoD’s resultant guidance memorandum required contract peer 
reviews at the DoD level for service acquisitions above $1 billion and placed the 
responsibility of conducting reviews within each component for all other service 
acquisitions falling below that threshold.  However, the GAO has recently contested the 
effectiveness of these policies, asserting that the same pattern of service acquisition 
mismanagement still exists within the DoD (GAO, 2009a).  In April 2009, the GAO 
published a testimony before Congress on the DoD’s progress toward improving its 
acquisition of contract services.  In this report, the GAO contended that the DoD has 
made little headway on its longstanding issues in service contracting (GAO, 2009a).  This 
report cites many of the same issues as previous reports and focused on the department’s 
challenges employing sound business practices such as defining requirements, selecting 
contract type, and adequately overseeing contractor performance. 
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The DoD has also been highly scrutinized for its lack of compliance with 
contracting-related statutes and regulations.  Recent reports have highlighted compliance 
issues ranging from a lack of required documentation, such as determinations and 
findings for the use of time and materials contracts (GAO, 2007c), to issues meeting 
competition requirements (Department of Defense Inspector General [DoD-IG], 2004, 
2010a; GAO, 2004) and managing and definitizing undefinitized contractual actions 
(DoD-IG, 2010b; GAO, 2007d, 2010a).  Many of the other reports related to services 
acquisition have focused on the application of performance-based services acquisition 
(PBSA) procedures, such as a recent GAO report (2009b) that identified challenges faced 
by the DoD in applying PBSA procedures to professional and management support 
contracts and task orders. 
Why is the DoD experiencing so much trouble with the acquisition and 
management of contract services?  Recent literature has uncovered similar problems for 
firms purchasing business-to-business (B2B) services in the commercial marketplace.  
Like the DoD, firms are spending increasingly more on outsourced services, but the 
resources dedicated to manage those services have not kept pace (Ellram et al., 2007).  
Additionally, overworked services acquisition personnel often use supplier-provided 
information to determine the cost structure and cost drivers of acquired services (Ellram 
et al., 2007).  An opportunistic service firm can take advantage of this circumstance to 
reduce the resources applied to perform the service at the expense of the purchasing firm. 
To address these issues, Ellram et al. (2007) called for firms who purchase B2B 
services to take six steps to improve services supply management.  First, firms should 
conduct a spend analysis to determine on what services company resources are being 
spent, who the services customers are within the firm, the level at which services 
acquisitions are approved within the organization, the structure of services management 
personnel, and their relationships to service performance.  The second step is for firms to 
segment their services spending based on the value to the organization and on the level of 
risk, in part to determine the appropriate level of interaction between the users 
(requesters) of the service and the service supply personnel.  Similarly, in the third step, 
firms should allocate resources toward the management of the service requirements in a 
manner consistent with economic return.  For example, in developing requirements 
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documents, a firm should use more of its own resources on high-risk, high-importance 
services than on those that provide very little value or present little risk to the 
organization.  Fourth, Ellram et al. (2007) called for firms to increase the professionalism 
of their services management personnel.  In addition, in the fifth step, firms should 
measure effectiveness and ensure proper business controls through the use of supplier 
audits, information technology, and the incorporation of concrete performance 
requirements into contracts.  Finally, Ellram et al. (2007) argued that, as a sixth step, 
firms should recruit and place their best talent into services supply management. 
 However, a general lack of knowledge by public and private purchasers in the 
subject matter incorporated into several of these steps results in unique challenges.  For 
example, purchasing organizations know neither how many resources are appropriate to 
allocate toward the acquisition and management of services nor how to measure the 
effectiveness of services.  Furthermore, in order to improve the performance of service 
contract management within the U.S. Air Force, or within the DoD as a whole, the 
determinants of performance need to be identified.  Once they are known, leaders in 
public procurement can more effectively allocate resources toward those factors that have 
the greatest impact on performance and avoid the inefficient use of resources on those 
factors that have little or no impact. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to address existing gaps in the literature gap and 
to offer service contract practitioners within the U.S. Air Force a comprehensive model to 
use in improving the acquisition of services and increasing compliance with federal, DoD 
and Service acquisition regulations.  This study will answer the following research 
questions: 
Research Question 1: What are the determinants of services sourcing 
performance? 
Research Question 2: Which determinant(s) have the greatest impact on the key 
contract outcomes of service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance? 
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Research Question 3: How can service quality be validly measured in a business-
to-business context? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research provides a quantitative examination of the determinants of service 
sourcing performance using structural equation modeling (SEM).  SEM is a multivariate 
statistical method that extends confirmatory factor analysis to test causal relationships 
between combinations of manifest and latent variables.  Latent variables are those 
variables that are not directly observable, but that are inferred from a set of manifest 
(observed) variables.  They are often measured through the application of a pre-defined 
scale when a survey is utilized for the data collection.  In general, both latent and 
observed variables that are unexplained in a model are considered to be exogenous.  
Exogenous variables have one or more causal paths that lead from them to endogenous 
variables.  Endogenous variables are explained in the model and have one or more 
hypothesized causal paths leading to them from other endogenous or exogenous 
variables.  In path analysis and in SEM, an endogenous variable may be both explanatory 
and explained within a model, when such a variable is dependent on certain endogenous 
or exogenous variables while explaining one or more other variables.  Indeed, the ability 
to model a series of dependent variables is a unique strength of SEM.  In this study, 
endogenous variables consist of the service acquisition outcomes of service quality and 
compliance with regulations and statutes as well as the sufficiency of the requirement 
definition.  Several exogenous latent and manifest variables are also used in the study and 
stem from theories presented in the literature review. 
Existing literature was used to develop hypotheses, a conceptual model, and a 
survey, all of which were later pre-tested and refined through interviews with practicing 
contract administrators.  The final survey was deployed online to a population of U.S. Air 
Force contract administrators.  Usable responses were collected from 240 participants and 
survey data were initially analyzed using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis.  
Finally, the structural model was tested for overall model fit as well as for the 
significance of individual causal paths; a trimmed and final structural model is presented 
in this thesis for parsimony and future replication. 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
A literature review is first presented in Chapter II.  Recent literature concerning 
service quality is discussed and brief overviews are provided on several applicable 
theories, including agency theory, the resource- and competence-based views of the firm, 
and relational exchange.  The research methodology, including development of a 
conceptual model, sampling, and survey design, is located in Chapter III; the results of 
the data collection and analysis are located in Chapter IV.  Finally, managerial and 
theoretical implications and several recommendations for future research are discussed in 
the concluding chapter, Chapter V. 
F. SCOPE 
Literature addressing service quality has generally been limited to examinations 
of practices within the setting of commercial industry.  However, due to limits on time 
and resources, the scope of this research was restricted to the study of services sourcing 
performance within the U.S. Air Force.  Furthermore, this study is focused on services 
contracting within the United States and excludes overseas contracting activities because 
cultural and business norms, as well as standards for the application of contracting 
procedures, may differ in other countries.  The services acquisitions analyzed in this 
study were conducted using the relevant mandatory rules and procedures for contracting 
within the DoD, including the procedures established in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 
and any applicable U.S. Air Force supplements.  Such a study in a government context is 
appropriate because the standardized rules and procedures can better exclude the type of 
systematic bias that is commonly found due to widely differing contract management 
processes across commercial firms. 
G. MANAGERIAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
A study that identifies the determinants of key service contract outcomes can offer 
tremendous utility to practitioners.  First, the development of a model for services 
sourcing performance may assist in the effective assignment of contract procurement and 
administration resources to service contracts.  It may also provide a framework that can 
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be used to assess the effectiveness of regulations and statutes on the quality of contracted 
services.  Some of the findings (e.g., a strong relationship between the commitment of the 
internal customer and the sufficiency of the requirement definition) suggest that a 
paradigm shift in the assignment of upstream resources—such as those assigned by 
requiring activities—may be fundamental to improving service contract outcomes.  
Further findings suggest that adequate communication between the contractor and 
government acquisition personnel is fundamental to achieving the government’s desired 
level of service performance and to achieving full compliance with acquisition statutes 
and regulations.  The amount of turnover of acquisition personnel was also found to be 
directly related to the reported level of compliance; acquisitions with more than 100% 
turnover across the life of the contract or with more than 42% turnover annually were 
found to be significantly less compliant with statutes and regulations.  Furthermore, low 
buyer experience was found to be significantly related with lower levels of service 
quality, as was the amount of compliance with regulations and statutes. 
In addition to the managerial implications, this study addresses a theoretical need 
for additional research of service quality in B2B contexts; a field where previous research 
on the determinants of service quality has been sparse.  A new framework is proposed in 
this thesis for the sourcing of B2B services; a framework which is based on the works of 
Kong and Mayo (1993) and Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry (1985).  This framework 
presents the gaps that exist between buyers and suppliers in B2B service acquisitions 
when service requirements are defined by the purchasing organization.  Additionally, a 
more relevant measure of service quality was needed for studies of B2B services; many 
previous researchers have simply excluded measurement dimensions from an existing 
B2C service quality scale without additional consideration to the unique aspects of B2B 
service acquisitions.  As such, a new service quality scale is proposed in this study that 
incorporates the measurement of the service supplier’s responsiveness to the buyer’s 
requirements, a dimension that is particularly applicable to measuring quality in the 
acquisition of services that are not available off-the-shelf and when performance 
requirements are defined by the purchasing organization. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this study uses structural equation modeling to identify several 
determinants of service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance through a 
quantitative analysis of survey data.  With the literature gap and problem statements 
identified, the following chapter discusses the theories that are relevant to this study and 
introduces the research hypotheses. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Multiple theories are often relied upon to explain B2B exchange.  The following 
theories are relevant to services procurement: service quality theory, relational exchange 
theory, agency theory, the resource-based view of the firm, and the competence-based 
view of the firm.  Hypotheses for this study are proposed in each section of this chapter 
and are later summarized in the conclusion. 
B. NATURE OF SERVICES 
Quality is an immensely important yet fleeting measure for firm success 
(Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984) in that is not easily articulated by service providers or by 
customers (Takeuchi & Quelch, 1983).  This is especially true when it comes to the 
quality of services because they differ drastically in nature from goods, primarily through 
the four characteristics of intangibility, heterogeneity, perishability, and inseparability 
(Ellram et al., 2007). 
First, the intangible nature of services renders specifications and customer 
expectations to be imprecise (Ellram et al., 2007).  A purchaser of office furniture may 
have little trouble articulating customer requirements for a desk and may be able to 
employ several senses to determine the quality of a good.  However, it may be impossible 
for an individual requiring an appendectomy to establish a desired level of performance 
for the surgical procedure.  This is due not only to a knowledge gap between the provider 
and receiver of the service but also to the little physical evidence that exists of the service 
provided. 
Second, services are, by nature, heterogeneous.   This is especially true of services 
with a high labor content (Parasuraman et al., 1985) because performance will vary 
between providers and will likely differ between customers and with time.  Like 
providers, customers lack a homogenous definition of service quality for any specified 
service.  Because of this, and because consistency in levels of performance from service 
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personnel is difficult to attain, the level of quality that a service provider expects to 
deliver may vary greatly from the level of quality that the customer expects to receive 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985). 
Third, services are frequently perishable; unlike goods, services cannot be held or 
stocked in inventory.  While inventory policies for goods allow firms to buffer future 
demand with safety stock, service providers must change service capacity to meet 
demand fluctuations (Ellram et al., 2007).  The perishability of services also presents 
challenges for inspection; service delivery or outcomes for many services can only be 
inspected or evaluated at the time the service is performed.  For example, security guard 
services cannot be rendered for a previous period of time nor can the services be easily 
inspected or evaluated after the period of performance is complete. 
Fourth, the production and consumption of services are often inseparable.  During 
the production of a good, such as a television set, quality can be engineered into the end 
product at a factory and then delivered intact to the customer.  The customer’s input into 
the quality of the television will have little or no impact on the good produced.  
Alternatively, quality in a service environment often occurs through interactions between 
the customer and the service provider (Lehtinen & Lehtinen 1982).   These interactions 
become even more influential on quality for services in which higher degrees of customer 
input are required (Parasuraman et al., 1985), such as with real estate or cosmetology 
services. 
C. SERVICE QUALITY 
Parasuraman et al. (1985) performed an examination of literature surrounding 
service quality and suggested the following three underlying themes to defining service 
quality: 
 ―Service quality is more difficult for the consumer to evaluate than goods 
quality.‖ (p. 42) 
 ―Service quality perceptions result from a comparison of consumer 
expectations with actual service performance.‖ (p. 42) 
 ―Quality evaluations are not made solely on the outcome of a service; they 
also involve evaluations of the process of service delivery.‖ (p. 42) 
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Parasuraman et al.’s (1985) analysis and measurement of these themes include the 
notion of expectation-disconfirmation theory, or the gap between customer expectations 
and perceptions of actual performance.  Other researchers also consider that the delivery 
of quality services means minimizing the expectation-disconfirmation gap on a consistent 
basis (Lewis & Booms, 1983) and that multiple forms of service quality may exist.  For 
example, technical quality, which is what the customer actually receives from the 
performance of the service, may differ from the method of service performance, defined 
as functional quality (Gronroos, 1982).  Alternatively, Lehtinen and Lehtinen (1982) 
offer a three-dimensional view of service quality consisting of physical quality, 
interactive quality, and corporate quality, the last of which they define as the customers’ 
perceptions of the service firm’s image. 
Parasuraman et al. (1985) developed a conceptual model of service quality 
(Figure 3), hereafter referred to as the Gaps Model, which was developed from an 
exploratory investigation and is based on the gaps between corporate executives’ 
perceptions of service tasks and quality and their expectations of the same.  The first gap 
presented in this model is a gap between the consumer’s expectations of the service and 
the service provider’s perception of the consumer’s expectations.  Parasuraman et al. 
(1985) found that service provider’s perceptions of consumer expectations were often 
accurate; however, discrepancies exist.  The second gap is the difference between the 
service provider’s perceptions of consumer expectation and the translation of those 
perceptions into corporate specifications for service quality.  This gap can often be 
attributed to the uncertainty of demand for a service, but Parasuraman et al. (1985) also 
theorized that it is due to a lack of total commitment among management to deliver 
quality services.  The third gap is the difference between the corporate specifications for 
service quality and the actual service performance.  In the authors’ investigation, 
executives of service-delivery firms routinely stressed the critical function of service 
employees.  Therefore, the depth of this gap is contingent on the difference between the 
performance of the firm’s service delivery employees and the specifications established 
by the firm.  The authors’ fourth gap is the difference between advertized (i.e., promised) 
service delivery and actual service performance.  This gap, relating the use of media to 
the expectancy-disconfirmation paradigm, suggests that a consumer will have a lower 
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perception of service quality if the firm advertizes an inaccurately high level of service 
quality through external communications.  Finally, Parasuraman et al. (1985) conclude 
that the fifth gap, which is the total difference between the consumer’s expected level of 





























Figure 3.  Gaps Model (From Parasuraman et al., 1985) 
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The exploratory research of Parasuraman et al. (1985) also included an 
investigation into the consumer’s view of service quality, in which they uncovered the 
following 10 common determinates: 
1. Reliability–consistency of performance, dependability 
2. Responsiveness–timeliness of service delivery, readiness of employees 
3. Competence–possession of requisite knowledge and skills 
4. Access–approachability of contact personnel, ease of contact 
5. Courtesy–politeness, respect, friendliness 
6. Communication–extent that the customer is informed 
7. Credibility–reputation of firm and employees, honesty, trustworthiness 
8. Security–freedom from danger, risk, or doubt 
9. Understanding/knowing the customer–comprehending customer needs 
10. Tangibles–physical evidence of service performance 
Later, Parasuraman et al. (1988) categorized the 10 determinates into five 
dimensions: tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy.  Factors 
shaping the customer’s expectations of service quality may include the customer’s past 
experience, personal needs, and word-of-mouth communications.  They developed a 44-
item scale for the measurement of service quality in which 22 items measure customer 
expectations of service quality and the same 22 items are repeated to measure customer 
perceptions of quality from actual service delivery.  It is important to note a paradigmatic 
limitation of the Gaps Model. Going back to the first gap, the presumption is that the 
service provider must anticipate the consumer’s expectations.  Hence, there is some 
uncertainty.  Yet this presumption does not apply to many services.  For example, 
customized services in which customers and service providers communicate expectations 
and capabilities prior to exchange (e.g., swimming pool installation), deviate from this 
paradigm. 
In contrast to the Gaps Model, Cronin and Taylor (1992) argued that the 
expectancy-disconfirmation theory is actually a measure of satisfaction and not a measure 
of service quality.  They concluded, using an empirical study, that service quality directly 
affects customer satisfaction, which, in-turn, affects the customer’s future purchase 
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intentions.  From this relationship, they theorized that perceived service quality is, in fact, 
a long-term evaluation, whereas the gap-based model measures customer satisfaction, a 
short-term, transaction-based measure.  They advocated for an alternative performance-
based paradigm that measures service quality using a performance-only, unidimensional 
score rather than the gap-based multidimensional model introduced by Parasuraman et al. 
(1985).  Cronin and Taylor’s position is based on the notion that the level of service 
quality should meet customer needs first and foremost, rather than simply meet customer 
expectations.  
While the works of Parasuraman et al. (1985, 1988) and Cronin and Taylor (1992) 
have significantly advanced service quality theory, their research has been limited to 
applications of service quality in business-to-consumer (B2C) contexts.  Kong and Mayo 
(1993) recognized a need for a deeper theoretical foundation of service quality in B2B 
contexts and attempted to address it through the development of an alternative 
framework, hereafter referred to as the B2B Gaps Model.  This framework was 
developed as an extension to Parasuraman et al.’s (1985) Gaps Model and involves 
account services rendered between channel members (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) in 
a supply chain for physical goods.  The first gap in the B2B Gaps Model (Figure 4) is the 
difference between the management’s perceptions of consumer expectations and the 
actual expectations of the consumer and channel member.  The second and third gaps are 
retained directly from the Gaps Model; the second gap is the difference between 
manager’s perceptions of consumer expectations and the translation of these perceptions 
into service quality specifications, and the third gap is the difference between the 
translated quality specifications and the actual service delivery.  The fourth gap in the 
B2B Gaps Model is an extension of the fourth gap from the Gaps Model, which is the 
difference between the service marketer’s external communications to consumers 
regarding the service and the actual service delivery.  The B2B Gaps Model extends this 
gap by acknowledging that supplier communications to consumers likely differ from 
those to channel members.  The final gap is simply the difference between service 




































Figure 4.  B2B Gaps Model (From Kong & Mayo, 1993) 
While the B2B Gaps Model developed by Kong and Mayo (1993) addresses the 
importance of the channel member (e.g., a retailer) in B2B supply chains, its frame of 
reference is services rendered between channel members (e.g., a manufacturer and a 
retailer) rather than satisfaction of customer demand.  In practice, many organizations 
acquire services in which service requirements and acceptable levels of performance are 
defined by the customer, as is standard practice in public procurement.  In these 
instances, the channel member role depicted in the B2B Gaps Model is often performed 
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by an acquisition professional in the buying organization such as a program manager, 
who oversees the procurement from the early planning phases to the evaluation of 
suppliers, selection and award, payment and performance, and finally to contract 
closeout.  Because this role is not considered in either Kong and Mayo’s (1993) or 
Parasuraman et al.’s (1985) frameworks, the supply chain process for the acquisition of 
customer-defined B2B is absent of supporting theory. 
In customer-defined B2B service acquisitions, organizational requirements are 
first crafted into requirements documents based on an agent’s perception of the 
organization’s needs.  A gap exists at the point in which there is potential for incongruity 
between the agent’s perception of the organization’s requirements and the organization’s 
actual requirements.  A second gap may occur between the agent’s perception of the 
organization’s requirements and the sufficiency with which those requirements are 
translated into service specifications, such as the description of the service(s) to be 
purchased and the expected level of quality. 
The use of customer-defined service specifications also complicates the role of 
the supplier in the B2B framework.  First, the customer’s requested service may differ 
from the supplier’s typical methods of service delivery and the standards of quality that 
the supplier customarily performs.  In some cases, a knowledge or capability disparity 
may exist between the supplier’s customary service offerings and the service 
requirements of the customers.  In other cases, the customer may request service levels 
that are substantially less than the service levels that the supplier typically offers.  As 
such, a gap exists between the supplier’s customary service and the resourcing of the 
supplier’s management or work breakdown structure (WBS).  The actual interpretation of 
the management’s vector by the supplier’s employees may present an additional gap, in 
which service delivery differs from the WBS or the management’s resourcing. 
Finally, in a customer-defined B2B framework, the role of the acquisition 
professional is central as a liaison between the customer and the supplier.  This 
individual, or group of individuals, has expectations of service delivery that may differ 
from the end customer’s service expectations.  For one, the acquisition professional may 
rely on outside sources of information to form expectations, such as research of the 
21 
marketplace, communications with the supplier’s employees before and after service 
performance and reviews of the WBS and other tools provided by the supplier’s 
management.  Internal sources also shape the acquisition professional’s expectations, 
such as the requirements documents and performance objectives. The difference between 
the level of service that this acquisition professional expects and the level of service that 
is actually performed is the final gap in the framework. 
As such, a new gaps model is proposed for B2B services in which service 
requirements are defined by the customer and the organization’s acquisition staff acts as a 
channel member between the supplier and the customer.  This model is presented in 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Proposed B2B Gaps Model for Customer-Defined Services 
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D. REGULATORY AND STATUTORY COMPLIANCE 
The government’s purchasers, administrators, and inspectors of services 
acquisitions are tasked with ensuring compliance to the multitude of federal regulations 
and statutes as well as to any additional regulations or procedures that may be required by 
the procuring agency in supplements to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 
collectively referred to as the Federal Acquisition System (FAR, 2005a; Riddell, 1985).  
For U.S. Air Force acquisition personnel, the Federal Acquisition System includes the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS), and the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS).  
Additional acquisition regulations that are outside of the Federal Acquisition System may 
include agency guidance, mandatory procedures, policy letters, and case law.  A review 
of FAR 1.102 states that the use of the Federal Acquisition System will satisfy the 
customer in terms of quality, among other objectives, as a guiding principle.   
However, the U.S. Air Force and the DoD have come under much scrutiny 
regarding compliance with procurement regulations and statutes (see, for example, GAO, 
2000, 2005a, 2005c, 2007a).   Not all cases of non-compliance are due to fraud, waste, or 
abuse; in fact, many cases are simply the result of unknowledgeable and inadequately 
trained personnel, an effect of large-scale increases in agency contracting without 
commensurate changes to hiring or training practices, termed ―corruption by 
incompetence‖ by Cohen and Eimicke (2008, p. 30).  Nonetheless, recent statistics about 
procurement fraud have been astonishing: DoD personnel alone accounted for 718 
criminal indictments and 565 criminal convictions in procurement fraud cases between 
fiscal years 2001 and 2005 (GAO, 2006a).  Whether caused by poor ethics, 
incompetence, or other factors, non-compliance with regulations and statutes undermines 
acquisition policy objectives and often thwarts those procedures established to ensure that 
the government receives the best value for the taxpayer dollar.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the compliance with regulations and statutes, the 
greater the service quality. 
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E. REQUIREMENT DEFINITION 
Purchasers of goods and services must clearly define contractual requirements in 
order to properly achieve acquisition objectives, as is evident in the gaps model that is 
proposed in this thesis for customer-defined services (Figure 5) and in the gaps models 
developed by Parasuraman et al. (1985) and Kong and Mayo (1993).  In these models, 
one or more gaps exist between the buyer’s expectations of the service and the supplier’s 
interpretation of the buyer’s expectations.  Because the supplier’s interpretation of the 
buyer’s expectations ultimately affects the level of service performance, the buyer’s 
perception of the quality of the actual service delivery is largely dependent upon how 
sufficiently the buyer’s expectations and the supplier’s interpretation of those 
expectations (expectations and disconfirmation) align.  Buyers of customer-defined B2B 
services often state service expectations in requirements documents that are incorporated 
into purchase agreements or contracts. 
Within public procurement, 10 U.S.C. 2305 requires purchasers to state 
government specifications in terms of function, performance, or design requirements.  
However, when acquiring services, specification and measurement of the required level 
of quality is often more complex than when acquiring goods (Brynste, 1996).  This 
dichotomy is prevalent within the DoD where recent reports have highlighted several 
instances of decreased acquisition outcomes due to insufficiently defined service 
requirements (GAO 2002b, 2007b, 2009b).  To address some of these issues, the 
USD(AT&L) has recently called for the strengthening of services requirements 
documents through the use of standardized work statements and the establishment of 
market research teams at the portfolio management level (USD[AT&L], 2010b).  Even 
with these additional tools, the added complexity of differing interpretations of 
requirements documents by the buyer and supplier renders the exact communication of 
the contents of the service and the desired service level to be nearly impossible.  Without 
a complete understanding of the buyer’s service requirement, a supplier may not perform 
tasks that the government expects to receive under the terms of the contract; may not 
meet the buyer’s expectations in terms of function, performance, and quality; or may not 
perform those functions necessary for the contract to adhere to regulations, statutes, and 
policy.  Furthermore, because the requirement definition represents the buyer’s 
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expectations of service levels, and the supplier’s performance is often largely dependent 
on interpretation of the requirements documents, the buyer’s perception of service quality 
is intrinsically linked to the sufficiency with which requirements are defined and 
communicated.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency 
of the requirement definition and service quality. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency 
of the requirement definition and regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Recent literature has indicated that an early involvement of suppliers into supply 
chains may produce positive outcomes for both buyers and suppliers (see, for example, 
Handfield, Ragatz, Petersen, & Monczka, 1999; Seshadri, 2005).  Briscoe, Dainty, 
Millett, and Neale (2004) examined strategies for the improvement of construction supply 
chains and found that the early involvement of suppliers resulted in increased integration 
into the supply chain, improvements to schedule, and a better understanding of client 
needs and objectives, among other benefits.  With respect to services acquisitions, 
Briscoe et al.’s (2004) conclusion represents a logical outcome as purchasing 
organizations step away from an introverted approach to procurement planning and 
capitalize on the expertise of suppliers that are often more experienced and 
knowledgeable in their respective industries than the purchasing organization’s buyers.  
As such, 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the extent to which the contractor defines 
requirements, the greater the service quality. 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the extent to which the contractor defines 
requirements, the greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
F. RELATIONAL EXCHANGE 
Relational contract theory, also called essential contract theory, was introduced by 
Macneil (1980), who contended that relationships, rather than discrete transactions, are at 
the core of contracts.  Discrete transactions are of a short duration, have a definite 
beginning and end, and involve anonymous parties.  Conversely, relationships are a 
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sequence of exchanges between parties that are known to each other, typically lasting a 
long period of time or indefinitely (Dwyer, Shurr, & Oh, 1987).  Macneil (1980) 
developed a list of 10 norms, or expectations of behavior, that are common to all 
contracts to some degree and that would increase contractual benefits for both parties if 
present.  These norms, which are at least partly shared by all members in a transaction, 
largely govern individual exchange relationships between firms (Heide & John, 1992).  
The 10 norms are as follows: 
1. role integrity 
2. reciprocity 
3. implementation of planning 
4. effectuation of consent 
5. flexibility 
6. contractual solidarity 
7. restitution, reliance, and expectation interests 
8. creation and restraint of power 
9. propriety of means 
10. harmonization with the social matrix 
In an extension on relational contract theory, Morgan and Hunt (1994) developed 
the commitment-trust theory for relational marketing. In their model, commitment and 
trust are central because they encourage marketers to work toward preserving 
investments in relationships through cooperation, favor beneficial long-term partnerships 
over short-term, volatile pacts, and consider higher-risk endeavors without fear of 
partners acting in opportunistic manners (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  Commitment is a long-
term desire to maintain a relationship that is considered to be important or valuable, and 
trust is a reflection of willingness to depend on a business partner.  In Morgan and Hunt’s 
model, communication is a precursor to trust, which ultimately results in successful 
relational exchanges between parties by providing a mechanism for partners to resolve 
disputes, align their expectations and perceptions, and jointly develop strategies 
(Wittmann, Hunt, & Arnett, 2009). 
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Two of the procurement theories that explain firm governance are relational 
exchange and transaction cost economics (TCE).  TCE theory suggests that activities will 
be outsourced when transaction costs are lower than the cost of performing the work in-
house (Williamson, 1975).  The transaction costs of contracting in the market include the 
costs of writing and negotiating contracts and the costs of monitoring suppliers—actions 
needed to thwart supplier opportunism.  Relational exchange offers a more efficient 
alternative to governing suppliers.  By establishing trust and commitment, suppliers need 
not be monitored as closely and the contract need be written as thoroughly.  After all, 
even the most thorough contracts cannot possibly cover all contingencies.  Numerous 
positive effects of relational exchange include increased cooperation (Morgan & Hunt, 
2004), reduced opportunism (Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2000; Joshi & Stump, 1999), increased 
performance (Skarmeas, Katsikeas, & Schlegelmilch, 2002), and increased satisfaction 
and service quality (Paulin, Perrien, & Ferguson, 1997).  Therefore, given the centrality 
of relational exchange or buyer–supplier dynamics, any study of B2B exchange should 
include the effects of relational norms. 
When contracting for services, proper communication between a services 
purchaser, contractor, and end user is critically important to handle variations or 
unforeseen events in service delivery (Bryntse, 1996).  Cohen and Eimicke (2008) 
included several forms of government–contractor communication problems among their 
list of top issues within public procurement.  First, they argued that poor communication 
between the government and the contractor’s management team often produces an 
unacceptable level of performance and causes conflicts between the parties, particularly 
when communication issues result in poorly defined tasks or when projects fail.  
Similarly, they reasoned that communication issues between the government and the 
contractor’s employees at the staff level may result in employee confusion regarding 
direction on tasks or assignments.  In these situations, the authors argued that the 
contractor’s staff-level employees are often forced to establish direction and solve 
problems internally, which may result in methods or levels of performance that do not 
match the government’s expectations.  In parallel with this line of reasoning, inadequate 
communication between the government and the contractor’s managerial or staff-level 
employees may result in undesirable contractor performance on those actions required to 
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ensure compliance with the government’s procurement policies.  Kong and Mayo (1993) 
reiterated the importance of this function-level communication.  They emphasized the 
need for supply chain members to integrate (e.g., through high involvement and 
frequency of contact) the respective functional areas of each firm in order to minimize 
gaps and maximize service levels to the end consumer.  Likewise, they also warn that 
where buyer–supplier interfaces are constrained (e.g., because of cross-functional, cross-
organizational, dialogue is controlled or stymied), gaps in service delivery will occur.  
This is logical—particularly when requirements documents inadequately define 
expectations and needs.  Where specifications are vague, communication can fill the 
void.  As such,  
Hypothesis 6: The greater the communication between the government and the 
contractor, the greater the service quality. 
Hypothesis 7: The greater the communication between the government and the 
contractor, the greater the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
G. AGENCY THEORY 
In agency theory, the agency relationship is defined as an agreement in which at 
least one person, the principal, delegates duties and some decision-making authority to 
another, the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) described the 
agency problem as the likelihood that the agent will not act in the interest of the principal 
if both parties seek to maximize their utility.  Eisenhardt (1989) asserted that two 
fundamental problems may occur in principal–agent relationships. The first problem will 
ensue when the principal and agent have conflicting goals and it is either difficult or 
expensive for the principal to monitor the agent.  The second problem occurs when the 
principal and agent have different attitudes toward accepting risk.  The principal can limit 
actions by the agent that are misaligned with the principal’s interests by expending 
additional resources on monitoring the agent, by offering incentives, or by paying for the 
agent’s bonding.  Therefore, the cost of the agency relationship, or the agency cost, is the 
sum of these three actions by the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
28 
Within public procurement, a misalignment of interests between the government 
(principal) and a contractor (agent) is typically identified through the use of surveillance 
methods, often termed quality assurance.  Lam (2008) asserted that surveillance is 
necessary to ensure service quality in public procurements and argued for its 
effectiveness.  Other authors tend to agree; Axelsson and Wynstra (2002) wrote that 
service quality is as dependent on the post-award management of performance as it is on 
the pre-award specification of service requirements and source selection.  Despite this, 
the GAO found that contracting activities within the DoD have typically placed a far 
greater emphasis on the act of awarding service contracts than on ensuring that trained 
and knowledgeable quality assurance personnel are assigned prior to contract award 
(GAO, 2005b).  The GAO also reported that these actions, and others that lead to 
inadequate post-award surveillance, reduce the government’s ability to assure that service 
suppliers are providing timely and quality services and mitigating performance problems.  
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 8: The greater the amount of government surveillance of contractor 
performance, the greater the service quality. 
The federal government and the DoD prescribe the implementation of 
performance-based services acquisition (PBSA) procedures in order to address agency 
problems that which occur in the acquisition of services.  Most notably, PBSA promotes 
the procurement of commercial services and promotes contractor innovations through the 
use of outcome-based requirement definitions, as opposed to requirement definitions that 
specify the inputs and tasks necessary for performance (USD[AT&L], 2000).  The OFPP 
enumerated four requirements that, at a minimum, must be included in a service contract 
for the proper implementation of PBSA procedures: an outcome-based requirement 
definition, performance standards that are tied to requirements, a government-developed 
plan for monitoring contractor performance against performance standards, and, when 
appropriate, positive and negative performance incentives (Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy [OFPP], 1997).  Although the DoD has had some issues fully implementing PBSA 
procedures (see, for example, Ausink, Baldwin, Hunter, & Shirley, 2002; GAO, 2002b), 
the use of PBSA in public procurement has been linked to improved acquisition 
outcomes, most notably reduced cost and improved performance (OFPP, 1998).  As such, 
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Hypothesis 9: The greater the extent to which performance-based services 
acquisition procedures are used, the greater the service quality. 
H. RESOURCE-BASED VIEW 
The resource-based view of the firm states that a firm’s competitive advantage in 
the marketplace is based on its ability to acquire and maintain valuable resources 
important to production (Connor, 1991).  Resources are a firm’s physical capital, human 
capital, and organizational capital that improve efficiency or effectiveness (Barney, 
1991).  However, not all of a firm’s capital should be considered resources because some 
capital could, in fact, reduce efficiency or effectiveness. 
For a firm to build a sustained competitive advantage, defined as a competitive 
advantage that lasts a long period of time (Jacobsen, 1988), firms must possess resources 
that are rare, valuable, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable by other resources that 
are valuable but neither rare nor imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1991).  Barney (1991) 
asserted that no firm can gain a competitive advantage in an industry in which firms 
possess exactly the same resources (homogeneity) and the resources are perfectly mobile.  
However, for a firm that possesses a competitive advantage to achieve returns that are 
above normal, it must either produce a product that is distinctive in the eyes of buyers or 
sell a product that is comparable to that of other firms but at a lower cost (Connor, 1991; 
Porter, 1985). 
In terms of the acquisition of services in the U.S. Air Force, alliance resources 
between the purchasing activity and the requiring activity include acquisition personnel 
and the time allotted for those personnel to perform all of the functions necessary for the 
acquisition of the service.  First, the sufficiency of the procurement lead-time, or time 
available to perform those contractual functions required prior to award, varies between 
procurements and is dictated by the period between the purchaser learning of the 
requirement and the contract being awarded.  The length of this period may determine 
how well the requirement is defined, the amount or depth of market research that is 
performed, the appropriateness of the acquisition strategy, and the ability of the 
contracting activity to comply with applicable directives such as advertising 
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requirements, competing requirements, applying appropriate socio-economic strategies 
(e.g., set-asides), documenting determinations and findings, and conducting solicitation 
and contract reviews.  As such, it is posited that, 
Hypothesis 10: The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater 
the service quality. 
Hypothesis 11: The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater 
the compliance with regulations and statutes. 
Hypothesis 12: The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater 
the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
As a resource in the purchaser–supplier alliance, the assignment of an adequate 
number of personnel to perform contract award and administration functions is crucial to 
the acquisition’s overall success.  Recent reports by the DoD Inspector General 
highlighted issues resulting from insufficient manpower and increased turnover due to 
acquisition workforce reductions (DoD-IG, 2000a, 2000b, 2003).  Several key areas in 
which problems were noted include increased program costs, reduced scrutiny and 
timeliness in reviewing acquisition actions, lost opportunities to develop cost–saving 
initiatives, insufficient staff to manage requirements, and increased backlogs in closing 
out completed contracts (DoD-IG, 2000a).  In particular, the excessive turnover of 
acquisition personnel threatens the long-term success of acquisitions as government 
administration functions that are required by contract terms, regulations, or statutes may 
not be properly accomplished (SIGIR, 2008).   
Dalton, Krackhardt, and Porter (1981) offer multiple classifications for employee 
turnover, noting that some forms of turnover may not be harmful to organizations.  For 
example, organizations may benefit when lower-performing or disruptive employees 
depart (Mathis & Jackson, 2003).  Other forms of turnover, such as the departure of high-
performing personnel at critical times, are clearly detrimental to an organization’s ability 
to achieve desired objectives.  As such, some authors argue that an optimal level of 
employee turnover exists for firms (see, for example, Abelson & Baysinger, 1984).  
Other authors broadly contend that turnover is associated with decreased organizational 
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effectiveness (Glebbeek & Bax, 2004).  Despite these differing views, research has 
generally supported the deleterious effects of high levels of employee turnover on 
organizational performance (see, for example, Glebbeek & Bax, 2004; Huselid, 1995), 
regardless of turnover cause or classification.  Schlesinger and Heskett (1991) asserted 
that high employee turnover in service organizations results in long-term decreases in 
sales and profitability as well as lower levels of service quality.  Harrison (2008) noted 
that high levels of employee turnover in the aerospace and defense industry has created a 
knowledge gap; vital information has left companies along with their employees.  As 
such, increased employee turnover is generally associated with decreased efficiency and a 
diminished ability to meet organizational objectives, especially when the level of 
turnover is high or excessive.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 13: The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the 
lesser the service quality. 
Hypothesis 14: The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the 
lesser the compliance with regulations and statutes. 
I. COMPETENCE-BASED VIEW 
Often considered an extension to the resource-based view, the competence-based 
view claims that competitive advantage is a function of a firm’s core competencies.  
Sanchez, Heene, and Thomas (1996) defined competence as the ability to sustain the 
coordinated deployment of assets in ways that help a firm achieve its goals.  Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) applied a three-part litmus test to identify core competences in a firm.  
First, a core competency should offer potential access to a range of markets such as 
Intel’s core competency of manufacturing semiconductors.  Semiconductors have a broad 
range of uses in multiple markets from consumer electronics—such as computers, 
televisions, radios and phones to the high-tech worlds of aerospace and medicine.  
Second, a core competency should provide a benefit to the consumer; such a benefit may 
be perceived or actual.  Intel’s corporate experience and status as a frontrunner in the 




customers.  Finally, the competency should be difficult for competitors to imitate, such as 
Intel’s implementation of simultaneous multithreading into the central processing units of 
personal computers. 
Econom (2006) argued that federal agencies must consider contract management 
as a core competency because the functions performed by third-party contractors are 
often essential in successfully achieving organizational goals, and she concludes that the 
success of acquisition organizations is largely dependent on hiring personnel who possess 
the right mix of skills, abilities, experience, and training. Other studies have also found 
that this right mix is critical to achieving contract performance outcomes (United States 
Merit Systems Protection Board, 2005).  Within services acquisition, personnel 
education, training, and experience are enablers for the purchasing organization to 
effectively deploy assets, monetary and otherwise, to achieve acquisition objectives.  
Those individuals with the greatest breadth of education, training, and experience may be 
capable of effectively purchasing and administering a wider range of service contracts to 
meet customer requirements.  Although the development of knowledge may be a result of 
broad-based practical and educational exposure, experience is often a function of time 
spent performing tasks.  Purchaser education typically occurs outside of the work 
environment and may be reflected by the granting of degrees or by professional 
certifications.  The level of training of the federal acquisition workforce is measured 
using the Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP), which offers three 
levels of certification in several areas of acquisition based on the completion of training 
courses and modules, on-the-job experience (time), and the applicant’s level of education.  
In practice, federal acquisition personnel who demonstrate a capability for increased 
responsibility through competencies of education, training, and work experience may be 
assigned to award or administer acquisitions that are more complex in definition or 
structure, requiring compliance with increased numbers of regulations and statutes. As 
such, 
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Hypothesis 15: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of 
contract administrator experience and the sufficiency of the requirement 
definition. 
Hypothesis 16: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of 
contract administrator experience and regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Hypothesis 17: The greater the contract administrator’s APDP certification level, 
the greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Hypothesis 18: The greater the contract administrator’s APDP certification level, 
the greater the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Hypothesis 19: The greater the contract administrator’s education level, the 
greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Hypothesis 20: The greater the contract administrator’s education level, the 
greater the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
J. INTERNAL CUSTOMER COMMITMENT 
The many roles of the client, or internal customer, are critical to the success of a 
supply chain throughout the life cycle.  Briscoe et al. (2004) found that the internal 
customer’s desire to develop supply chain relationships was the single most important 
factor to achieving supply chain integration.  The authors also found that, during the 
requirements definition stage of procurement, client organizations influenced how the 
project team was shaped and the selection of the procurement method.  Similarly, the 
many roles of internal customers in U.S. Air Force services acquisition are critical to the 
overall acquisition success.   
First, the internal customer often provides the necessary funding to acquire the 
service.  This level of funding may permit the use of certain performance-based 
incentives if appropriate for the contractual action.  Second, the internal customer plays 
an integral role in the generation of requirements documents such as the Statement of 
Work or the Performance Work Statement as well as in the creation of other documents 
that may be necessary for the proper execution or surveillance of the acquisition.  Third, 
the internal customer must devote manpower to the services acquisition for (1) the 
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evaluation of offers throughout the source selection process, (2) the performance of 
quality-assurance functions that are necessary to the surveillance of contractor 
performance, and (3) the management of the requirement, including contract-change 
requests, development of past performance information, and the determination of 
performance-based incentive awards.  This level of manpower is often based on 
manpower standards that allocate full-time positions based on the number of contracts 
that a unit manages, among other factors (Reed, 2010; U.S. Air Force, 2001).  In such a 
situation, the assignment of available personnel to contracts within a unit’s portfolio 
would be an indication of the level of commitment to each acquisition. Without an 
acceptable level of commitment from the internal customer to properly conduct the 
acquisition, adequate standards for the level of service quality may not be established and 
the contract may not be effectively managed after award to ensure that contractual, 
regulatory, and statutory requirements are met.  As such, 
Hypothesis 21: The greater the internal customer’s commitment to the service 
acquisition, the greater the compliance with regulations and statutes. 
Hypothesis 22: The greater the internal customer’s commitment to the service 
acquisition, the greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
K. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, a total of 22 relationships were hypothesized based on a review of 
relevant literature and theory; a summary of hypotheses can be found in Table 1.  Chapter 
III presents the research and statistical methods used to explore these relationships, along 
with measurement scales and a path diagram of the conceptualized modeling of the 
determinants of services sourcing performance. 
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Table 1.  Research Hypotheses 
Notation Hypothesis 
 H1 The greater the compliance with regulations and statutes, the greater the service quality. 
 H2 There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency of the requirement definition 
and service quality. 
 H3 There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency of the requirement definition 
and regulatory and statutory compliance. 
 H4 The greater the extent to which the contractor defines requirements, the greater the service 
quality. 
 H5 The greater the extent to which the contractor defines requirements, the greater the sufficiency of 
the requirement definition. 
 H6 The greater the communication between the government and the contractor, the greater the 
service quality. 
 H7 The greater the communication between the government and the contractor, the greater the 
regulatory and statutory compliance. 
 H8 The greater the amount of government surveillance of contractor performance, the greater the 
service quality. 
 H9 The greater the extent to which performance-based services acquisition procedures are used, the 
greater the service quality. 
 H10 The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater the service quality. 
 H11 The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater the compliance with 
regulations and statutes. 
 H12 The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater the sufficiency of the 
requirement definition. 
 H13 The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the lesser the service quality. 
 H14 The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the lesser the compliance with 
regulations and statutes. 
 H15 There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of contract administrator 
experience and the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
 H16 There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of contract administrator 
experience and regulatory and statutory compliance. 
 H17 The greater the contract administrator’s APDP certification level, the greater the sufficiency of 
the requirement definition. 
 H18 The greater the contractor administrator’s APDP certification level, the greater the regulatory 
and statutory compliance. 
 H19 The greater the contract administrator’s education level, the greater the sufficiency of the 
requirement definition. 
 H20 The greater the contract administrator’s education level, the greater the regulatory and statutory 
compliance. 
 H21 The greater the internal customer’s commitment to the service acquisition, the greater the 
compliance with regulations and statutes. 
 H22 The greater the internal customer’s commitment to the service acquisition, the greater the 
sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
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This chapter will first discuss the design of the research study, including the 
statistical methodology and data collection methodology selected.  A conceptual model is 
then presented in which all variables and hypothesized relationships are visually depicted 
in a path diagram.  Finally, the population sampled in the study is discussed, followed by 
a presentation of the measurement scales for constructs and manifest variables. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study seeks to precisely identify and measure the determinants of services 
sourcing performance through the testing of models and hypotheses.  As a result, the 
research lends itself to a quantitative approach because hypothesized relationships have 
been identified and because the scales for measurement of these hypothesized 
relationships already exist, can be adapted from previous research, or can be created.  
Quantitative analysis is an explanation of phenomena, in numerical terms, through 
statistical and mathematical testing of numerical data.  This study will primarily use 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) for statistical analysis—a method chosen due to its 
numerous advantages over other common statistical techniques.   
SEM is a multivariate statistical method used to conduct confirmatory factor 
analysis and to test causal hypothesized relationships between manifest and unobserved 
(latent) variables.  Latent variables are those variables that are not directly observable but 
that are inferred from a set of other observed variables and, when utilizing a survey for 
data collection, are often measured using a scale.  In SEM, latent or observed variables 
that are unexplained in a model are considered to be exogenous, having one or more 
causal paths that lead from them to other variables.  Conversely, variables that are 
explained in the model are considered to be endogenous and have one or more causal 
paths leading to them from other endogenous or exogenous variables. 
 
38 
At the most fundamental level, SEM provides researchers a tool to measure 
multivariate relationships containing a mixture of latent constructs and observed variables 
(MacCallum, 1995).  One primary advantage lies in the ability of SEM to simultaneously 
evaluate all relationships in a research model (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  
Additionally, unlike other multivariate techniques, SEM provides an assessment of 
construct measurement error; alternative statistical tools such as regression analysis 
typically assume that there is no error in measured variables, which may subject a 
researcher to the interpretation of faulty results (Byrne, 2010).  Furthermore, SEM allows 
for the analysis of mediating variables and can perform a simultaneous analysis of 
multiple dependent variables, which may be critical to accurately estimating complex 
models (Hoyle, 1995).  Finally, SEM can be used to assess the overall level of model fit 
for adequacy and for comparison against alternative, competing models (Hoyle & Panter, 
1995). 
After selection of the statistical method, the second step in the research design 
was the development of a conceptual model that visually depicted the hypothesized 
relationships that were studied.  Thus, the path diagram of the conceptual model (Figure 
6) contains 22 relationships that represent the 22 hypotheses, 3 endogenous latent 
variables, 4 exogenous latent variables, and 6 exogenous observed variables.  In this path 
diagram, latent constructs are depicted using ellipses and observed variables are depicted 
using rectangles.  Hypothesized relationships between variables are depicted using 
arrows; the directionality of causal paths begins from a variable at the arrow’s tail and 
ends at a variable about the arrow’s point.  These arrows are annotated with a plus or 










































































Figure 6.  Conceptual Model 
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C. SAMPLE 
The population for this study consisted of U.S. Air Force civilian and military 
contracting personnel who administer service contracts within the United States.  Several 
constraints existed for surveying this population.  First, because resources and timing 
prohibited data collection from every individual in the population, data were drawn from 
a sample consisting of the broadest range of contract administration personnel within the 
U.S. Air Force using a web-based survey.  Second, a list of contact information for 
potential respondents did not exist and could not reasonably be created.  Due to the costs 
required to mail a sufficient quantity of surveys to contracting units and the resources 
required to manually input responses into a dataset, surveys were deployed by forwarding 
to commanders and supervisors at contracting units an e-mail that contained a link to an 
online survey.  Finally, the population was limited to contracting personnel who 
administer service contracts within the United States because cultural and business 
norms, as well as standards for the application of contracting procedures, may differ in 
other countries.   
Efforts were made to ensure that the sample provided an accurate representation 
of the population; however, the possibility exists that unknown factors may have 
predisposed the selection towards a biased sample (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).  Tests for 
bias due to non-response are presented in Chapter IV. 
D. SURVEY DESIGN AND CONSTRUCT MEASUREMENT 
A total of 44 measures were used to capture the seven latent constructs, which 
underlie these measures.  While some scales had to be created, existing, proven scales 
were used when possible.  All latent constructs were measured using seven-point Likert-
type scales. 
Hartline and Ferrell (1996) suggested that unresolved issues with the 
measurement of service quality have caused the proper selection of construct measures to 
become problematic.  The five-dimension SERVQUAL scale developed by Parasuraman 
et al. (1988) has been criticized for its use of gap scores, its mixture of positively and 
negatively worded questions, and its inability to permit researchers to generalize the 
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service quality dimensions to multiple contexts. This scale consists of 44 questions, 
measuring ex ante service expectations and ex post perceptions of actual service quality.  
Conversely, Cronin and Taylor (1992) contended that a performance-only measure of 
service quality, such as SERVPERF, is more effective and includes dimensions that can 
be generalized over a broader range of services.  However, neither scale has been widely 
adopted as a single measure of service quality.  As an alternative, Hartline and Ferrell 
(1996) argued for the appropriateness of modification to the SERVQUAL scale so that 
each separate set of 22 questions for the measurement of expectations and perceptions is 
combined into one question each (for a total of 22) through modification of the Likert 
scale.  Hartline and Ferrell (1996) contend that service customers will respond to 
questions regarding quality using expectancy-disconfirmation without the need for such a 
separation.  A similar approach was taken in this study. 
The five dimensions of SERVQUAL proposed by Parasuraman et al. (1988) were 
tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy.  The dimensions reliability 
and assurance are specifically applicable and of interest to the study of B2B services such 
as those acquired through service contracts by the U.S. Air Force.  However, the 
dimensions tangibles, responsiveness, and empathy do not fit within a B2B context.  
Tangibles refers to physical evidence of the service—specifically the appearance of the 
supplier’s facility; the appearance of personnel, tools or equipment used in the service; 
the physical representations of the service; and the perceptions of other customers in the 
supplier’s facility.  In a B2B context, and specifically on a military installation, it is 
unlikely that customers would be exposed to the tangibles of service delivery for many 
contracts.  Similarly, the dimensions responsiveness and empathy assume that the 
purchaser has face-to-face contact with the service provider during service delivery, 
which is less typical with the purchasing of business-to-business services.  The scales for 
reliability and assurance were therefore retained for inclusion in the study while scales 
for tangibles, empathy, and responsiveness were discarded.   
A new dimension, responsiveness to requirements, was added to better suit the 
assessment of service quality in customer-defined B2B acquisitions.  Kong and Mayo 
(1993) attempted to address the additional gaps required to adapt the Gaps Model 
developed by Parasuraman et al. (1985) to the context of B2B services but fell short; the 
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five dimensions of SERVQUAL still do not fit within their framework for B2B services.  
As such, a new scale containing an additional dimension is needed to accurately and 
validly measure service quality in customer-defined B2B service acquisitions. The items 
in this new dimension, responsiveness to requirements, address the additional gaps in the 
proposed gaps model (Figure 4) by measuring how well perceived service levels reflect 
expected service levels, as defined in customer-generated requirements documents.  To 
assess the content validity of the proposed dimension, items were reviewed by three 
academicians in business- and supply-chain-related fields and were later pretested 
qualitatively by practitioners at three different buying locations.  Acquisition personnel at 
each of these locations administered portfolios of customer-defined B2B service 
acquisitions ranging in type from low-complexity grounds maintenance services to highly 
technical engineering support and research and development services.  The final 
dimension consists of five items that, like the remainder of the SERVQUAL dimensions, 
were measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale, with anchors of much worse than I 
expected and much better than I excepted.  This final scale for the measurement of 












Table 2.  Construct Measurement of Service Quality 
Scale item Survey question 
 SQa* When the contractor’s management promises to do something by a certain time, 
it does so. 
 SQb* When you have problems, the contractor’s management is sympathetic and 
reassuring. 
 SQc* The contractor’s dependability. 
 SQd* The contractor provides its services at the time it promises to do so. 
 SQe* The contractor’s keeping of its records accurately. 
 SQf** How much you can trust employees of the contractor. 
 SQg** How much you feel safe in your interactions with the contractor’s employees. 
 SQh** How polite the contractor’s employees are. 
 SQi** The adequacy of the support the contractor’s employees receive from their 
company to do their jobs well. 
 SQj*** The contractor met the requirements of the contract. 
 SQk*** The contractor satisfied our need. 
 SQl*** The contractor performed the work we needed it to do. 
 SQm*** The timeliness of the contractor’s work. 
 SQn*** The quality of the contractor’s work. 
*Reliability, **Assurance, ***Responsiveness to Requirements. 
 
No appropriate, previously validated scales were available for the measurement of 
regulatory and statutory compliance.  Because an observable measure for compliance that 
cited specific regulations and statutes could not be generalized across all service 
contracts, a semantic differential scale (Table 3) was generated that broadly assessed the 
respondent’s perception of compliance with regulations and statutes.  The scale consists 
of five questions that were measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale with anchors of 




Table 3.  Construct Measurement of Regulatory and Statutory Compliance 
Scale item Survey question 
 RSCa This contract is compliant with all applicable policy letters, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation and its Supplements, and procurement law. 
 RSCb There is nothing wrong with this contract. 
 RSCc This contract does not violate applicable requirements of policy letters, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), FAR Supplements, or procurement law. 
 RSCd If this contract were to be inspected by an independent organization it would be 
deemed compliant. 
 RSCe* There are aspects of this contract that, if changed, would make it more 
compliant with policy, laws, or regulations.  
*Reverse-coded item. 
 
Similarly, no appropriate, previously validated scales were available for the 
measurement of the sufficiency of the requirement definition.  Because contract 
requirements and, by extension, the definitions of those requirements vary broadly 
between acquisitions, the developed scale assessed the administrator’s overall perception 
of the sufficiency of the definition.  The scale (Table 4) consists of five questions 
measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale with anchors of strongly disagree and 
strongly agree. 
 
Table 4.  Construct Measurement of Requirement Definition Sufficiency 
Scale item Survey question 
 RD1a The requirement was very well defined in the contract. 
 RD1b The contract (including the statement of work, performance work statement, 
specification, drawings, etc.) defined the requirement very well. 
 RD1c There were no flaws or omissions in the definition of the requirement (including 
the statement of work, performance work statement, specification, drawings, 
etc.) 
 RD1d The requirement, as defined in the contract, expressed to the contractor exactly 
what we needed. 
 RD1e There were no ambiguities in the definition of the requirement (including the 
statement of work, performance work statement, specification, drawings, etc.) 
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The scale for the measurement of communication (Table 5) was adapted from 
Morgan and Hunt (1994).  In the original three-item reflective scale, all measures began 
with ―In our relationship, my alliance partner and I… .‖ The text was modified to read as 
follows: ―In our relationship, the government and contractor… .‖  Additionally, two 
items were added to the scale to assess how effectively the administrator is able to 
communicate the government’s needs and how carefully the contractor listens to the 
government’s requests.  The final scale consists of five questions measured on a seven-
point Likert-type scale with anchors of strongly disagree and strongly agree. 
 
Table 5.  Construct Measurement of Communication 
Scale item Survey question 
 REa In our relationship, the government and contractor effectively communicate 
expectations for each other’s performance 
 REb In our relationship, the government and contractor keep each other informed of 
new developments. 
 REc In our relationship, the government and contractor provide each other with 
information that helps both parties. 
 REd I am able to communicate my needs effectively to this contractor. 
 REe This contractor listens carefully to my requests. 
 
No appropriate, previously validated scale was available for the measurement of 
the amount of contract surveillance.  A scale was developed (Table 6) based on 
surveillance practices established in the FAR, in which surveillance occurs in four 
primary areas: service quality, timeliness of performance, fulfillment of requirements 
included in the requirements document, and fulfillment of other contract terms and 
conditions (such as adherence to the labor rates established by the Department of Labor).  
The scale asked respondents to use a seven-point Likert-type scale to rate the amount of 
surveillance in each area.  Scale anchors were no monitoring of supplier and extensive 
monitoring of supplier. 
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Table 6.  Construct Measurement of Amount of Surveillance 
Scale item Survey question 
 AT1a Service Quality 
 AT1b Timeliness of Performance 
 AT1c Fulfillment of Requirements in the Statement of Work / Performance Work 
Statement 
 AT1d Compliance with Contract Terms & Conditions 
 
The scale for the measurement of internal customer commitment (Table 7) was 
adapted from Garbarino and Johnson (1999), who developed a four-item scale for the 
measurement of customer commitment.  All four items could be generalized to fit a 
business-to-business context with some modification and were measured on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale with anchors of no extent and great extent. 
 
Table 7.  Construct Measurement of Internal Customer Commitment 
Scale item Survey question 
 ICCa To what extent is your primary internal customer proud to be a member of this 
service acquisition team? 
 ICCb To what extent does your primary internal customer feel a sense of purpose 
when the team achieves specific acquisition objectives? 
 ICCc To what extent does your primary internal customer care about the long-term 
success of this acquisition? 
 ICCd To what extent is your primary internal customer dedicated to ensuring the 
acquisition meets requirements? 
 
No appropriate, previously validated scales were available for the measurement of 
procurement lead-time sufficiency.  A five-item scale was developed (Table 8) to 
measure the administrator’s perception of the adequacy of the procurement lead-time.  
The scale consists of five questions measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale with 
anchors of strongly disagree and strongly agree. 
 
47 
Table 8.  Construct Measurement of Procurement Lead Time Sufficiency 
Scale item Survey question 
 RBV1a* I did not have enough time to award a quality contract. 
 RBV1b* The milestones for awarding this contract were too aggressive. 
 RBV1c* My leadership or my customer wanted this contract awarded too fast. 
 RBV1d I was not rushed to award this contract. 
 RBV1e I had sufficient time to get this contract awarded.  
*Reverse-coded item. 
 
Questions were constructed to measure single indicators and to collect 
demographic data.  First, seven-point Likert-type scales were employed to measure the 
extent that PBSA procedures were used and the extent that the contractor defined 
requirements (Table 9).  Anchors for both scales were none and substantial. 
 
Table 9.  Measurement of Extents PBSA and Contractor Defined Requirements 
 Variable Survey question 
 AT2 The extent to which this contract is performance based. 
 RD2 To what extent, if any, did the contractor help define the requirements prior to 
contract award? (The contractor's help defining requirements includes questions 
before and after the issuance of the solicitation, participation in industry days, 
responses to requests for information, responses to draft RFQ/RFP, and any 
other dialogue with the contacting officer or specialist.) 
 
The number of personnel required to administer a service contract may vary 
substantially based on scope, value, or other factors.  Therefore, personnel turnover was 
measured by dividing the number of times personnel had turned over by the number of 
personnel assigned to the contract.  This allowed turnover to be measured as a percentage 
and required two questions for measurement.  The survey questions for the measurement 




Table 10.  Measurement of Turnover 
 Variable Survey question 
 RBV2a How many acquisition personnel (contracting officers + contract specialists + 
contracting officer representatives + quality assurance evaluators/personnel + 
inspectors + program/project manager or other active representative of the user) 
are currently assigned to this contract?  Include only those individuals who 
actively, routinely help manage the contract. 
 RBV2b Over the life of this contract, how many different times have personnel turned 
over?  Consider all Contract Administrators, Contract Specialists, Contracting 
Officers, Contracting Officer's Representatives, and Quality Assurance 
Personnel who actively, routinely helped manage the contract. 
 
The contract administrator’s levels of APDP certification and education were 
measured using ordinal scales, and the administrator’s number of years of contracting 
experience was measured by text input into a field.  For APDP certification level, 
possible responses were no contracting APDP certification, APDP Level I, APDP Level 
II, and APDP Level III.  For level of education, possible responses were high school 
diploma/GED, associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, and 
doctoral/professional degree. 
 
Table 11.  Measurement of Experience, APDP Level, and Education Level 
 Variable Survey question 
 CBV1 How many years of experience do you have in contracting? 
 CBV2 At the time you started working on this service contract, what was the highest 
level of Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP) certification 
that you held in the area of Contracting? 
 CBV3 What is the highest level of education that you have attained? 
 
Finally, questions were included in the survey to measure sample demographics. 
Respondent-related demographics included the respondent’s age, gender, agency of 
employment, workload, and whether the respondent held professional certifications 
outside of those offered by the APDP.  Demographic questions to assess the makeup of 
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sample service contracts included the service type and commerciality; the contract type, 
instrument, age, and value; the type and amount of incentives; the type andamount of 
quality-assurance inspections and the experience of inspectors; the number of formal 
communications to the contractor; and a direct measure of procurement lead-time.  These 
survey questions can be found in Appendix A. 
All survey questions were pre-tested through interviews with current U.S. Air 
Force contract administrators at three separate installations and through reviews by 
graduate-level students and professors who specialize in the field of DoD acquisition.  
Inputs received from these individuals on scale items were used to refine the measures.  
Interviewees and reviewers were also presented with a copy of the conceptual model to 
verify content validity.  Responses from these individuals supported the proposed 
research hypotheses and did not reveal a need to re-specify the conceptual model by 
adding new relationships or by removing existing ones. 
Once constructed, the order of the survey questions was structured to reduce bias 
among scale items by mixing questions with like scales; the complete survey can be 
found in Appendix A.  As required for the deployment of surveys for data collection from 
U.S. Air Force personnel, the survey was reviewed and approved by the Air Force Survey 
Office.  An additional review was conducted through the Department of the Navy’s 
Institutional Review Board to ensure the protection of human subjects. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter first presented the research methodology and statistical method used 
in this study.  A conceptual model was then presented, followed by a discussion of the 
population and sampling methods and the survey design.  The next chapter reports the 
results of the data collection and statistical analysis. 
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This chapter presents the results of the survey deployment and of the model and 
hypothesis testing.  The results of the data collection efforts are discussed first, along 
with a presentation of sample demographics. Next, data are examined to verify that the 
assumptions of SEM analysis are met.  These examinations include tests for normality, 
outliers, scale and construct reliability, convergent validity, and discriminate validity.  
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is then performed in PASW Statistics Version 18.0 to 
purify scales while confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling 
(SEM) are accomplished in Mplus Version 6.0.  Two competing structural models are 
presented:  a hypothesized structural model containing all hypothesized relationships and 
a trimmed structural model in which nonsignificant, originally hypothesized causal paths 
have been removed.  Finally, an alternative model is analyzed in SEM and further 
analysis is performed using other statistical methods. 
In the presentation of the results in this chapter, the level of support for a path was 
determined by the significance level of the estimated path coefficient; supported path 
estimates have significance levels less than 0.05, moderately supported path estimates 
have significance levels between 0.05 and 0.10, and non-supported path estimates have 
significance levels greater than 0.10.  Path estimates and their respective effect sizes are 
standardized.  As opposed to unstandardized estimates, which retain the scaling 
information of those variables involved, the scaling of standardized estimates is not 
linked to the scale of the variables; they estimate the change in standard deviation of the 
dependent variable based on a change of one standard deviation to the independent 
variable when all other independent variables are held at zero (Hoyle, 1995).  When 
interpreting standardized estimates, a relationship with a parameter estimate greater than 
0.50 is considered to have a large effect; a relationship with a parameter estimate between 
0.20 and 0.50 is considered to have a moderate effect; and a relationship exhibiting a 
parameter estimate less than 0.20 is considered to have a small effect (Hair et al., 2010).  
Because this study used psychometric scales to measure unobserved variables, it is not 
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appropriate to interpret the estimate as a marginal change; rather, it is more appropriate to 
generalize the interpretation of estimates into effect sizes and to employ a comparative 
approach. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Data were collected electronically using a web-based survey deployment. Because 
it is difficult to identify personnel who have the necessary service contracting experience 
required for response to the survey, an invitation (Appendix B) was forwarded via e-mail 
to eligible individuals through supervisors of U.S. Air Force contracting units.  A 
memorandum of support for the study from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Contracting and from the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Services 
was attached to the message (Appendix C).  Of the 60 units invited to participate in the 
study, 42 units agreed to participate and collectively distributed the survey to 743 
personnel.  The only criterion given to supervisors for selecting personnel was that 
respondents must either currently administer service contracts or must have done so in 
the recent past.  Of the 743 potential participants, 252 individuals responded, yielding a 
34% response rate, which is consistent with rates reported for web-based surveys 
(Dillman, 2000).  Within these responses, 12 were later discarded due to missing, faulty, 
or inconsistent responses.  Summary statistics from the remaining 240 usable responses 
can be found in Table 12. 
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Table 12.  Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variables (n=240) Measure Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Variables (n=240) Measure Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Service quality SQa 5.38 1.34 2.00 7.00 Communication REa 5.73 1.18 3.00 7.00
SQb 5.55 1.29 1.00 7.00 REb 5.65 1.29 1.00 7.00
SQc 5.77 1.17 2.00 7.00 REc 5.70 1.24 1.00 7.00
SQd 5.70 1.18 3.00 7.00 REd 5.88 1.17 1.00 7.00
SQe 5.47 1.33 1.00 7.00 REe 5.80 1.08 1.00 7.00
RSCa 6.19 1.16 1.00 7.00 RBV1a 4.81 1.86 1.00 7.00
RSCb 4.78 1.74 1.00 7.00 RBV1b 4.59 1.80 1.00 7.00
RSCc 6.23 1.18 1.00 7.00 RBV1c 4.45 1.93 1.00 7.00
RSCd 6.01 1.10 1.00 7.00 RBV1d 4.13 1.84 1.00 7.00
RSCe 4.80 1.75 1.00 7.00 RBV1e 4.45 1.69 1.00 7.00





Buyer experience CBV1 11.66 
1.98
RD1d 5.53 1.27 1.00 7.00
9.88 0.00 41.00 
1.00



































































































RD1a 5.31 1.49 1.00 7.00
Extent PBSA AT2 5.60 1.63
1.00 7.00
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C. SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS 
From the 240 usable responses, the average respondent was 41.7 years old and 
had 11.7 years of federal contracting experience.  The gender of respondents was nearly 
even, with males accounting for 51.9% of respondents and females accounting for 48.1% 
of respondents.  Respondents had a diverse range of educational experience, with the 
highest level of education for 11.9% of respondents being a high school diploma or 
general equivalency diploma, the highest level of education for 12.3% of respondents 
being an associate’s degree, the highest level of education for 43.2% of respondents 
being a bachelor’s degree, and the highest level of education for 31.7% of respondents 
being a master’s degree.  Only two respondents, or 0.8%, held a doctoral or professional 
degree.  When the respondents were asked about their Acquisition Professional 
Development Program (APDP) certification level in the area of contracting, 19.3% 
reported that they held no APDP contracting certification, 18.5% reported that they held a 
Level I APDP contracting certification, 36.6% reported that they held a Level II APDP 
contracting certification, and 25.5% reported that they held a Level III APDP contracting 
certification.  Additionally, 37 respondents, or 15.4%, reported that they held a 
professional certification other than an APDP certification, such as those granted by the 
National Contracting Management Association or the Institute for Supply Management.  
Demographics for the education and certification levels of the respondents can be found 
in Table 13. 
 







High school diploma or GED 11.90% No APDP certification 19.30%
Associate's degree 12.30% APDP Level I 18.50%
Bachelor's degree 43.20% APDP Level II 36.60%
Master's degree 31.70% APDP Level III 25.50%
Doctoral or professional degree 00.80% Other professional certification 15.40%
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Respondents were asked to keep one specific service contract in mind while 
completing the survey.  A diverse range of service types were reported (Table 14).  
84.4% of respondents reported their contract type as being fixed-price and 9.1% of 
respondents reported their contract type as being hybrid, a combination of multiple 
contract types.  Of the remainder, 1.7% respondents reported labor-hour contracts, 1.2% 
reported cost-reimbursement contracts, 0.8% reported time and materials contracts, and 
2.9% reported other.  Additionally, 78.2% of respondents reported that the service being 
acquired met the definition of a commercial service, as defined in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation. 





Professional, administrative and management support 17.70 
Utilities and housekeeping 17.28 
Medical 10.29 
Education and training 4.53 
Architect-engineering 3.29 
Quality control, testing, and inspection 0.82 




1. Missing Data 
Nine of the original 252 responses were discarded due to missing data.  Three of 
the remaining responses did not include a properly reported age in the demographic field; 
these responses were not used when reporting age-related demographic information but 
were imputed for tests of non-response bias through mean substitution.  An additional 
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five responses included a plus symbol as a qualifier in a total of six data fields and two 
responses included the preposition over in a total of two data fields.  In each of these 
cases, responses were assumed to be one plus the numerical response. 
2. Outliers 
Prior to performing tests for the detection of outliers, data were first assessed for 
faulty or inconsistent responses.  The inclusion of four reverse-coded survey items 
(Churchill, 1979) allowed for the identification of firewalled responses (identical 
responses for all survey questions), where a firewalled response would likely also result 
in the identification of a case as a multivariate outlier.  A total of three survey responses 
were identified as faulty due to an examination of the reverse-coded items and an 
assessment of the overall survey response, including any comments left by the respondent 
in the comment field.  Each of these responses was discarded. 
Next, the presence of univariate and multivariate outliers was assessed using 
PASW Statistics Version 18.0.  To detect univariate outliers, responses for each variable 
were saved as standardized values and evaluated against a benchmark in which potential 
outliers had z-scores outside of ±3.00.   Each potential case was reviewed individually; 
none appeared to be invalid or warranted removal from the data set.   
An assessment for the presence of multivariate outliers was performed by 
computing Mahalanobis Distance using a multiple regression in PASW Statistic Version 
18.0 in which the dependent variable was arbitrarily selected and all other variables were 
included as independent variables (Table 14); associated probabilities were calculated 
using the chi-square distribution.  Byrne (2010) asserted that a case containing 
multivariate outliers is identifiable when the Mahalanobis D
2
 stands distinctly apart from 
other D
2
 values.  A review of D
2
 values in Table 15, which contains the highest 60 
values, reveals a distribution in values from 61 to 142, with 12 cases exceeding a D
2
 
value of 100.  All cases with a probability less than or equal to 0.001 were individually 










146 142.18 < 0.001 182 78.86 0.003 118 69.24 0.024
96 133.28 < 0.001 15 78.53 0.004 6 68.00 0.030
82 124.06 < 0.001 117 78.31 0.004 73 67.08 0.036
9 120.29 < 0.001 4 77.98 0.004 112 66.28 0.041
125 111.63 < 0.001 84 77.00 0.005 76 66.27 0.041
54 109.94 < 0.001 56 76.77 0.005 91 66.21 0.042
143 109.40 < 0.001 3 75.92 0.006 128 65.94 0.044
217 107.04 < 0.001 113 75.45 0.007 225 65.26 0.049
115 104.58 < 0.001 150 75.35 0.007 162 64.75 0.054
199 102.15 < 0.001 62 74.69 0.008 20 64.52 0.056
122 100.65 < 0.001 58 73.07 0.011 98 64.50 0.056
104 100.25 < 0.001 22 72.69 0.012 52 64.49 0.056
169 97.96 < 0.001 216 72.19 0.014 179 64.27 0.058
34 94.61 < 0.001 207 71.17 0.017 23 63.73 0.064
31 88.78 < 0.001 39 70.95 0.017 200 63.00 0.072
46 88.53 < 0.001 221 70.71 0.018 141 62.28 0.081
126 87.89 < 0.001 194 70.59 0.019 108 62.09 0.083
173 85.35 0.001 53 69.92 0.021 119 61.96 0.085
190 82.93 0.001 65 69.61 0.022 237 61.34 0.094
185 82.89 0.001 154 69.38 0.023 61 61.27 0.095
Table 15.  Outlier Assessment
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3. Normality 
An assumption of normality is extremely important to the analysis of structural 
equation models (Arbuckle, 2007).  The maximum likelihood method of estimation, the 
most commonly used method of estimation in SEM and the method that was used in this 
study, is considered to be robust against modest levels of non-normality (Chou & Bentler, 
1995).  Alternative methods of estimation, such as asymptotically distribution-free or 
generalized least squares, may be used when data depart substantially from normality, but 
these methods typically require samples of substantial size (Muthén & Kaplan, 1992). 
While normally distributed data take the form of a symmetrical bell curve, non-
normally distributed data may exhibit a curve that is skewed in either direction or that is 
abnormally peaked, termed kurtosis.  A distribution with too few cases in the tails of the 
curve (positive kurtosis) will exhibit a higher-than-normal peak.  Alternatively, a 
distribution with too many cases in the tails of the curve (negative kurtosis) will exhibit a 
flatter-than-normal peak (DeCarlo, 1997). 
Table 16 displays an assessment of normality that was produced using descriptive 
statistics in PASW Statistics Version 18.0.  Using the benchmark of ± 2.0 for significant 
skewness (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995), a review of the values in the table does not 
reveal that distributions for any of the variables depart substantially from normality as a 
result of skew. 
The assessment of normality also displays test statistics for kurtosis.  In the 
analysis of kurtosis, normal distributions display a standardized kurtosis value (β2) of 
3.0, and rescaled distributions display a β2 value of zero.   West, Finch, and Curran 
(1995) suggested that rescaled β2 values greater than or equal to 7 are indicative, to some 
extent, of non-normality.  Since none of the β2 values in the assessment exceed this 
threshold, it can be assumed that univariate kurtosis does not exist and that the 
assumption of normality is not violated. 
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Table 16.  Normality Assessment 
 
Variable Variable
SQa 2.00 7.00 –0.53 –3.35 –0.64 –2.01 REa 3.00 7.00 –0.74 –4.69 –0.33 –1.05
SQb 1.00 7.00 –0.81 –5.12 0.37 1.16 REb 1.00 7.00 –1.00 –6.31 0.71 2.25
SQc 2.00 7.00 –0.78 –4.95 –0.18 –0.55 REc 1.00 7.00 –0.92 –5.81 0.72 2.29
SQd 3.00 7.00 –0.64 –4.05 –0.59 –1.88 REd 1.00 7.00 –1.66 –10.51 3.77 11.91
SQe 1.00 7.00 –0.70 –4.40 –0.07 –0.23 REe 1.00 7.00 –0.96 –6.06 1.23 3.89
RSCa 1.00 7.00 –1.82 –11.48 3.75 11.85 RBV1a 1.00 7.00 –0.48 –3.01 –0.89 –2.81
RSCb 1.00 7.00 –0.62 –3.91 –0.54 –1.72 RBV1b 1.00 7.00 –0.32 –1.99 –0.84 –2.67
RSCc 1.00 7.00 –1.95 –12.36 4.36 13.79 RBV1c 1.00 7.00 –0.34 –2.16 –0.96 –3.04
RSCd 1.00 7.00 –1.41 –8.89 2.41 7.63 RBV1d 1.00 7.00 –0.03 –0.16 –0.94 –2.98
RSCe 1.00 7.00 –0.38 –2.43 –0.93 –2.94 RBV1e 1.00 7.00 –0.28 –1.80 –0.54 –1.72
RD1a 1.00 7.00 –0.91 –5.76 0.34 1.06 AT2 1.00 7.00 –1.28 –8.10 1.08 3.42































































































































RD1c 1.00 7.00 –0.42 –2.68
0.00 15.61RBV2 4.94






RD2 1.00 7.00 0.85 5.36 CBV3
RD1e 1.00 7.00 –0.67 –4.24 –0.21 –0.67
–0.34 –1.07
0.00 3.00 –0.33 –3.48






4. Non-Response Bias 
Non-response bias was estimated using extrapolation methods (Armstrong & 
Overton, 1977).  The extrapolation method is a commonly used method to estimate bias 
when responses are received in successive waves after follow-up communications to non-
respondents (Filion, 1976).  Responses in this study were grouped into waves according 
to the order of arrival, with non-respondents belonging to an unobserved wave that most 
closely resembles the final wave of respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977).  Since 
non-responders were least likely to resemble early responders and were most likely to 
resemble late responders, differences between early and late responders were explored to 
detect bias using tests of equality of means.  When using extrapolation methods, if these 
tests do not produce sufficient statistical evidence to reject the null hypotheses that the 
means are equal then it is not unreasonable to assert that the unobserved group of non-
respondents has similar characteristics to those of the survey respondents and that non-
respondents are missing at random. 
As such, responses were categorized into three groups.  Group 1 represented the 
first third of respondents to complete the survey; Group 2 represented the second third of 
respondents; and Group 3 represented the final third of respondents (i.e., the latest 
responders).  A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was then conducted 
against age, years of contracting experience, and three latent variables in order to explore 
differences.  The three latent variables—requirement definition sufficiency, regulatory 
and statutory compliance, and service quality—were computed using summations of 
scale items.  Additionally, two categorical variables, gender and education level, were 
examined for differences in means between the waves using Pearson’s chi-square test.  
Individual hypotheses are located in Table 17 and descriptive statistics for the variables 






Table 17.  Non-Response Bias Hypotheses 
Variable Hypothesis Significance 
Age H0: μAge1 = μAge2 = μAge3 α = 0.05 
Gender H0: μGender1 = μGender2 = μGender3 α = 0.05 
Buyer experience H0: μExperience1 = μExperience2 = μExperience3 α = 0.05 
Education level H0: μEducation1 = μEducation2 = μEducation3 α = 0.05 
Service quality H0: μQuality1 = μQuality2 = μQuality3 α = 0.05 
Requirement definition H0: μDefinition1 = μDefinition2 = μDefinition3 α = 0.05 
Regulatory and 
statutory compliance 
H0: μCompliance1 = μCompliance2 = μCompliance3 α = 0.05 
 
Homogeneity of variances is a critical underlying assumption to the analysis of 
variance (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).  If variances between groups are not equal, or 
homoscedastic, then correlation coefficients may reflect error.  The following was 




X3.  Levene’s test was applied to 
each variable and test statistics were calculated.  Reviewing the results in Table 18, no 
statistic was significant at α = 0.05 and none of the null hypotheses can be rejected.  
There is little evidence that the variances are not equal, and homogeneity of variances can 
be assumed for all seven variables. 
A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted in PASW Statistics Version 
18.0 to test the first five of the seven hypotheses; gender and education level were later 
tested.  F-tests for Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest 
Root were performed; no F-test statistics were significant.  Additional results of the 
univariate F-tests are presented in Table 19.  An examination of the significance of the F-
test statistics reveals that none are significant at a level of 0.05.  Therefore, there is 
insufficient statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis that group means are equal in 
any of the five variables, and it can be assumed that no bias exists between survey 
responders and survey non-responders in these cases (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). 
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df1 df2 Sig. 
Age  0.727 2 237 0.485 
Gender  0.298 2 237 0.742 
Buyer experience  0.067 2 237 0.936 
Education level  1.386 2 237 0.252 
Sufficient requirement definition  0.230 2 237 0.795 
Regulatory and statutory compliance  0.651 2 237 0.523 
Service quality  0.117 2 237 0.890 
 








Age Between groups  259.65  2  129.83 0.88 0.41 
Within groups  34804.67  237  146.86   
Total  35064.32  239    
       
Buyer 
experience 
Between groups  183.66  2  91.83 0.93 0.40 
Within groups  23425.38  237  98.84   
Total  23609.04  239    




Between groups  14.70  2  7.35 0.19 0.83 
Within groups  9261.76  237  39.08   
Total  9276.46  239    




Between groups  24.93  2  12.46 0.47 0.63 
Within groups  6264.93  237  26.43   
Total  6289.85  239    
       
Service quality Between groups  331.86  2  165.93 0.78 0.46 
Within groups  50378.64  237  212.57   




The final two variables, gender and education level, were tested for non-response 
bias using Pearson’s chi-square test.  Crosstabs and test results for these two variables are 
located in Table 20 and Table 21.  As seen in the tables, neither test was significant at an 
alpha level of 0.05; the null hypotheses stating that group means are equal cannot be 
rejected for either of the two variables. 
 
Table 20.  Chi-Square Test of Gender for Non-Response Bias 
Female Male Total
1 41 39 80
2 35 45 80






















PhD / Pro 
Degree
Total
1 07 11 25 0 080
2 13 08 28 1 080
3 09 09 24 1 080

























In summary, seven variables were tested for potential effects due to the presence 
of non-response bias using multiple methods.  The results of testing did not provide 
statistical evidence to reject the null hypotheses stating that the means of variables are 
equal between the first third, middle third, and final third of respondents.  As such, it can 
be assumed that non-respondents are missing from the sample at random and that further 
statistical analysis will not yield biased estimates due to non-response. 
5. Sample Size 
The analysis of structural equations is often considered a large-sample technique 
(Ullman, 2006).  Althouh the maximum likelihood method of estimation can provide 
stable and valid results under ideal conditions with sample sizes as low as 50, parameter 
estimates and the chi-square test of fit are known to be sensitive to the size of the sample 
(Hair et al., 2010).  As a result, researchers have developed several rules of thumb 
regarding adequate sample sizes, in which many have advocated for a minimum sample 
size of 200 and others have recommended minimum sample sizes as low as 100 (Smith & 
Langfield-Smith, 2004).  Hair et al. (2010) considered model complexity when 
recommending a minimum sample size, and they posited that a minimum of 150 samples 
is generally adequate for models with seven or fewer constructs, modest communalities, 
and no underdefined constructs; such is the case with this study.  Because 240 responses 
are available for analysis, the sample size for this study exceeded the minimum 
recommended by most authors and was appropriately large when model complexity and 
the method of estimation are considered. 
E. EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
As a preliminary step to establishing construct validity, scales were purified using 
exploratory factor analysis in PASW Statistics Version 18.0.  Principle components 
factor analysis was first performed on a group consisting of all exogenous structures and 
then separately performed on a group consisting of all endogenous structures.  Items were 
discarded if they presented low component-factor scores, significant cross-loadings on 
other factors, or were detrimental to construct reliability.  Combined, 42 items were 
reduced to 27 across seven constructs. 
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As expected, items for the four exogenous constructs extracted into four factors 
using Varimax rotation when minimum eigenvalues for factors were set at value of one 
(Table 22).  Initial eigenvalues showed that the first factor explained 37% of the variance, 
the second factor 20% of the variance, the third factor 12% of the variance, and the final 
factor 10% of the variance.  In total, the four factors explained 79% of the variance; a 
scree plot of eigenvalues by factor is located in Appendix E.  All but one item displayed 
cross-loadings below the 0.300 limit recommended by Hair et al. (2010).  This item, a 
measurement item from the communication scale, presented a cross loading of 0.324 on 
the factor consisting of scale items for internal customer commitment; however, the item 
had a strong primary loading of 0.776 on its own factor and was therefore retained.  All 
construct items loaded cleanly on their respective factors with factor loadings above the 
0.400 benchmark.  Descriptive statistics for the resultant factors are located in Table 23. 
 
Table 22.  Exogenous Construct Component Matrix 
 Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 
AT1a 0.922 0.121 0.000 0.046 
AT1c 0.934 0.145 0.030 0.100 
AT1d 0.946 0.049 0.034 0.111 
ICCa 0.134 0.891 0.121 0.191 
ICCb 0.093 0.898 0.158 0.216 
ICCd 0.109 0.814 0.218 0.153 
RBV1c  –0.015 0.111 0.766 0.122 
RBV1d 0.003 0.186 0.850 0.145 
RBV1e 0.075 0.141 0.871 0.093 
REa 0.112 0.290 0.205 0.749 
REb 0.032 0.324 0.090 0.776 










Table 23.  Descriptive Statistics for Exogenous Constructs 
Summated construct Items Min. Max. M  (SD) Skewness Kurtosis
Amount of surveillance 
(AT1)
3 3 21 16.08 (4.25) –0.90 0.49
Internal customer 
Commitment (ICC)
3 5 21 16.32 (3.81) –0.69 –0.05
Procurement lead-time 
sufficiency (RBV1)
3 3 21 13.03 (4.63) –0.21 –0.35
Communication (RE) 3 8 21 17.27 (2.99) –0.70 –0.09
 
Items for the three endogenous constructs extracted cleanly into three factors 
(Table 25).  As before, Varimax rotation was selected and a minimum value of one was 
established for factor eigenvalues.  Initial eigenvalues showed that the first factor 
explained 51% of the variance, the second factor 16% of the variance, and the third factor 
10% of the variance.  In total, these three factors explained 76% of the variance; a scree 
plot of eigenvalues by factor is located in Appendix F.  As anticipated, scale items for all 
three service quality dimensions presented strong loadings on the same factor, indicating 
that these dimensions share a primary factor and evidencing construct validity.  No scale 
items from any constructs displayed cross-loadings above the 0.300 recommended 
threshold and all construct items presented factor loadings greater than 0.400 on their 
respective factors.  Descriptive statistics for the resultant factors are located in Table 24. 
 
Table 24.  Descriptive Statistics for Endogenous Constructs 
Summated construct Items Min. Max. M  (SD) Skewness Kurtosis
Service quality (SQ) 8 21 56 45.21 (8.68) –0.65 –0.43
Regulatory and statutory 
compliance (RSC)
3 4 21 17.22 (3.30) –1.01 1.13
Requirement definition 
sufficiency (RD1) 




Table 25.  Endogenous Construct Component Matrix 
 Factor 
 Item 1 2 3 
SQa 0.804 0.265 0.055 
SQc 0.921 0.140 0.079 
SQd 0.904 0.142 0.098 
SQf 0.763 0.113 0.081 
SQi 0.826 0.174 0.093 
SQj 0.901 0.148 0.105 
SQk 0.898 0.184 0.071 
SQm 0.894 0.183 0.078 
RSCa 0.203 0.209 0.853 
RSCc 0.155 0.115 0.878 
RSCe  –0.038 0.093 0.658 
RD1a 0.231 0.866 0.138 
RD1b 0.220 0.880 0.153 
RD1e 0.180 0.811 0.176 
 
Finally, scale reliability was assessed using PASW Statistics Version 18.0.  
Cronbach’s alpha is the most widely used measure of scale reliability and consistency 
(Hair et al., 2010), in which reliability coefficients range from 0.00 to 1.00 and scales 
with coefficients greater than 0.70 are generally considered to be reliable (Nunnally, 
1978).  As seen in Table 26, reliability coefficients for the seven constructs ranged from 
0.70 to 0.96, with all scales exceeding the recommended minimum. 
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Table 26.  Endogenous and Exogenous Construct Reliability 
Latent structure Title Cronbach’s alpha 
ƞ1 Service quality 0.959 
ƞ2 Regulatory and statutory compliance 0.702 
ƞ3 Sufficient requirement definition 0.870 
ξ1 Communication 0.757 
ξ2 Amount of surveillance 0.939 
ξ3 Sufficient procurement lead-time 0.806 
ξ4 Internal customer commitment 0.901 
 
F. CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a method of testing how well manifest 
variables represent their respective constructs.  CFA differs from EFA in that CFA is a 
confirmatory test of a priori measurement theory, and EFA identifies factors solely on 
statistical results (Hair et al., 2010).  In this respect, a primary objective of CFA is to 
assess construct validity and fit of measurement models prior to performing further 
analysis through the use of structural equation modeling or other statistical techniques. 
Measurement models are CFA models that test measurement assumptions of 
latent variables, such as construct validity (Bagozzi, 1983), with no constraints on 
correlations between constructs.  Mulaik and James (1995) asserted that researchers 
should not proceed to test a structural model if a measurement model exhibits poor fit.  
Generally, the fit of a model is the extent that the implied covariance matrix is equivalent 
to the observed population covariance matrix from which the sample is drawn (Hoyle, 
1995).  While the most common assessment of this equivalence is through the use of the 
chi-square test statistic, this test is known to penalize large samples and complex models 
and; as a result, researchers have developed and adopted alternative measures of fit (Hu 
& Bentler, 1995).  These measures of fit are often categorized into three groups:  absolute 
fit indices (of which chi-square is a member), incremental fit indices, and parsimony fit 
indices.  Because no generally accepted guideline exists as to which fit indices 
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researchers should report, multiple indices are often used with one or more fit index 
coming from each category.  The fit indices reported in this study fit conform to this 
prescription but are limited to those indices that are produced by the SEM software 
Mplus Version 6.0: chi-square (χ2); relative chi-square (χ2/df); the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI); the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI); which is also known as the Non-normed Fit Index 
(NNFI); the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA); and the Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR).  
Hair et al. (2010) offered four rules of thumb for assessing construct validity.  
First, the authors recommended that standardized loading estimates should, ideally, be 
higher than 0.70 but generally higher than 0.50.  Second, for convergent validity, average 
variance extracted (AVE) for latent constructs should be at least 0.50, meaning that at 
least 50% of variance is explained among the items of a construct.  Third, for 
discriminant validity, AVE for any given construct should be higher than the square of 
the correlation between the construct and any other construct.  Finally, for internal 
consistency, construct reliability coefficients should be 0.70 or higher.  Because construct 
reliabilities were previously found to be adequate, with all Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
exceeding the guideline of 0.70, the three remaining elements, or rules of thumb, for 
assessing construct validity will be examined throughout this section. 
For uniformity with EFA methods, CFA was performed separately on exogenous 
and endogenous constructs.  However, CFA was first performed on a combined 
measurement model containing all exogenous and endogenous constructs (Appendix G) 
to assess nomological validity.  Pearson correlation coefficients as well as directionality 
of correlations between constructs (endogenous or exogenous) and endogenous 
constructs were examined.  Of these correlations, all were in the expected direction and 
were significant with a p value of less than 0.01, indicating acceptable evidence of 
nomological validity (Hair et al., 2010). 
2. Exogenous Measurement Model 
Exogenous structures were first examined for model fit and construct validity 
using confirmatory factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) in Mplus 
Version 6.0.  In the path diagram of the measurement model (Figure 7), latent variable 
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variances are held at one, and regression weights between latent variables and their 
respective factors are free parameters.  All latent variables were permitted to covary 
freely.  Factor loadings that link factors to their respective latent constructs are labeled 
with the Greek letter lambda (λ), and exogenous constructs are represented by the Greek 
letter ksi (ξ). Measurement error of factors associated with exogenous constructs are 
labeled with the Greek letter delta (δ), and covariance estimates are represented by the 
Greek letter phi (φ).   The model contains 12 observed variables, 78 sample moments, 




















































Figure 7.  Path Diagram of the Exogenous Measurement Model 
Fit of the measurement model (Table 27) was initially examined using the chi-
square test statistic; the chi-square (χ2) value of 52.72 was not significant with a p value 
of 0.30, suggesting good fit.  The relative chi-square value (χ2 divided by degrees of 
freedom) of 1.10 also indicates good fit when assessed against the threshold of 3.0 
recommended by Kline (1998).  A global assessment of model fit was also accomplished 
using the other fit indices produced by Mplus Version 6.0.  The CFI value of 1.00 and 
TLI value of 1.00 are both higher than the 0.95 minimums that were proposed by Hair et 
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al. (2010), indicating good fit.  Similarly, the RMSEA value of 0.02 and SRMR value of 
0.03 indicate good fit and are substantially less than the thresholds proposed by Hair et al. 
(2010), who recommend a maximum value of 0.08 for each.  Overall, this assessment of 
fit indicates that the exogenous measurement model appears to fit well to the sample data. 
Table 27.  Exogenous Measurement Model Diagnostics 
 χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Measurement model  1.10  1.00  1.00  0.02  0.03 
Fitness criterion  < 3.00  > 0.95  > 0.95  < 0.08  < 0.08 
 
An examination of factor loadings from the results of the confirmatory factor 
analysis (Table 28) revealed all standardized loadings to be above 0.50, the minimum 
loading recommended by Hair et al. (2010).  Nearly all factor loadings from the 
exogenous measurement model also meet the authors’ more rigorous guideline of 0.70, 
which they consider to be ideal. Furthermore, all constructs exceed the minimum 50% 
AVE also recommended by Hair et al. (2010), where AVE for each construct was 
calculated by summating the squared factor loadings for construct items and dividing the 





Finally, the results of the estimation were examined for the presence of Heywood 
Cases, or instances of negative measurement error variance. A review of error variance, 

























REa 0.814 < 0.001 
0.76 52% REb 0.771 < 0.001 




AT1a 0.875 < 0.001 
0.94 84% AT1c 0.938 < 0.001 




RBV1c 0.612 < 0.001 
0.81 61% RBV1d 0.862 < 0.001 




ICCa 0.909 < 0.001 
0.90 76% ICCb 0.950 < 0.001 
ICCd 0.752 < 0.001 
 
The final test for discriminant validity was conducted using a comparison of AVE 
against squared construct correlation coefficients.  This is a rigorous test for discriminant 
validity (Hair et al., 2010), in which two constructs can be considered distinct from one 
another if the average variance extracted values for both constructs are higher than their 
squared correlation coefficient.  An examination of the values in Table 29—in which 
correlations are above the diagonal, AVE values are on the diagonal and in bold, and 
squared correlations are below the diagonal—revealed that the exogenous constructs are 
indeed distinct; discriminant validity can therefore be assumed. 
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Table 29.  Squared Exogenous Construct Correlation Matrix and AVE 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1)  Communication  0.52 0.25 0.41 0.58 
(2)  Amount of surveillance 0.06 0.84 0.10 0.20 
(3)  Sufficiency of 
procurement lead-time 
0.17 0.01 0.61 0.40 
(4)  Internal customer 
commitment 
0.34 0.04 0.16 0.76 
 
3. Endogenous Measurement Model 
A second assessment of model fit and construct validity was conducted for the 
endogenous structures using CFA with MLE in Mplus Version 6.0.  As before in the 
exogenous measurement model, the variances of latent constructs were held at one, while 
regression weights between latent variables and their respective factors were free 
parameters, and all three latent variables were permitted to covary freely.  In the path 
diagram of the endogenous measurement model (Figure 8), endogenous constructs are 
represented by the Greek letter eta (η), and measurement error of factors associated with 
endogenous constructs are labeled with the Greek letter epsilon (ε).  The endogenous 
measurement model contains 14 observed variables, 105 sample moments, and 31 free 






















































Figure 8.  Path Diagram of the Endogenous Measurement Model 
As before, fit of the measurement model (Table 30) was first examined using the 
chi-square test.  The chi-square test statistic of 127.63 is significant with a p value of less 
than 0.001, indicating that fit may be less than adequate.  Since the chi-square test is 
known to penalize complex models and large samples, a global assessment of model fit 
was performed using multiple fit indices.  The relative chi-square value of 1.72 is less 
than the threshold of 3.0 recommended by Kline (1998), suggesting adequate fit.  
Additionally, CFI and NNFI are greater than the 0.95 minimums that were proposed by 
Hair et al. (2010), indicating good fit.  Similarly, the RMSEA value of 0.06 and the 
SRMR value of 0.03 indicate good fit and are less than the thresholds of 0.08 proposed 
by Hair et al. (2010) for each. 
Table 30.  Endogenous Measurement Model Diagnostics 
 χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Measurement model  1.72  0.98  0.98  0.06  0.03 
Fitness criterion  < 3.00  > 0.95  > 0.95  < 0.08  < 0.08 
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An examination of factor loadings from confirmatory factor analysis (Table 31) 
revealed all loadings to be above 0.50, the minimum loading recommended by Hair et al. 
(2010), with the exception of one item from regulatory and statutory compliance 
construct, which presented a loading of 0.392.  However, further analysis reveals that the 
loading is statistically significant, all constructs exceed the minimum construct reliability 
alpha of 0.70, and all constructs, including regulatory and statutory compliance, exceed 
the minimum 50% AVE also recommended by Hair et al. (2010).  Furthermore, no 
instances of negative error variance are present (Appendix I). 












SQa 0.812 < 0.001 
0.96 76% 
SQc 0.933 < 0.001 
SQd 0.912 < 0.001 
SQf 0.726 < 0.001 
SQi 0.810 < 0.001 
SQj 0.909 < 0.001 
SQk 0.919 < 0.001 




RSCa 0.951 < 0.001 
0.70 58% 
RSCc 0.825 < 0.001 
RSCe 0.391 < 0.001 
Sufficiency of the 
requirement 
definition (RD1) 
RD1a 0.871 < 0.001 
0.87 71% RD1b 0.917 < 0.001 
RD1e 0.724 < 0.001 
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As before, the test for discriminant validity of endogenous constructs was 
performed using a comparison of AVE against squared construct correlation coefficients.  
An examination of values in Table 32—in which correlations are above the diagonal, 
AVE values are on the diagonal and in bold, and squared correlations are below the 
diagonal—reveals that the exogenous constructs are indeed distinct, and discriminant 
validity can also be assumed for the endogenous structures. 
Table 32.  Squared Endogenous Construct Correlation Matrix and AVE 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
(1)  Service quality 0.76 0.34 0.46 
(2)  Regulatory and statutory 
compliance 
0.12 0.58 0.43 
(3)  Sufficiency of requirement 
definition 
0.21 0.18 0.71 
 
G. HYPOTHESIZED STRUCTURAL MODEL 
Finally, the structural model (Figure 9)—containing all variables, factors, and 
paths for the testing of hypotheses—was analyzed using MLE in Mplus Version 6.0.  In 
the path diagram, parameter estimates from exogenous variables to endogenous variables 
are represented by the Greek letter gamma (γ), and parameter estimates between 
endogenous variables are represented by the Greek letter beta (β).  As is typical when 
modeling with structural equations, exogenous constructs were permitted to covary 
freely.  The structural model contains 32 observed variables, 528 sample moments, and 
125 free parameters and is therefore overidentified with 403 degrees of freedom.  The 




1 3 1 5 2 8 3 6 13 1 14 9 15 1 2 2 3 1X X X                      
2 4 1 10 3 19 4 11 15 13 16 15 17 17 18 3 3 2X X X X                     
















































































































































































Figure 9.  Path Diagram of the Hypothesized Structural Model 
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Fit of the structural model (Table 33) was assessed using the same criteria as 
those applied to the measurement models.  The chi-square value of 532.26 is significant 
with a p value of less than 0.001, suggesting that fit may be less than adequate.  However, 
the relative chi-square value of 1.32 is less than the 3.0 threshold recommended by Kline 
(1998), suggesting good fit.  Since the chi-square test is not a representative measure for 
higher-order models (Fornell, 1983), other measures were again used.  The values for CFI 
and TLI are both higher than the 0.95 minimums that were proposed by Hair et al. 
(2010), suggesting good fit.  Similarly, the RMSEA and SRMR values of 0.04 and 0.05 
are less than the thresholds proposed by Hair et al. (2010), who recommended maximum 
values of 0.08 for each.  Overall, the structural model appears to exhibit good fit to the 
sample data. 
Table 33.  Structural Model Diagnostics 
 χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Structural model  1.32  0.97  0.97  0.04  0.05 
Fitness criterion  < 3.00  > 0.95  > 0.95  < 0.08  < 0.08 
Table 34 displays the standardized loading estimates of construct items in the 
structural model.  All items loaded above the 0.50 minimum recommended by Hair et al. 
(2010), with the exception of one item in the regulatory and statutory compliance 
construct.  As previously discussed, the decision to retain this item was made based on a 
review of construct reliability and AVE, which exceeded the recommended minimums. 
Standardized path estimates for the 22 hypothesized relationships are displayed in 
Table 35.  In reviewing the table, several of the paths did not result in statistically 
significant estimates because of high p values and low critical ratios. Path γ1, the 
hypothesized causal relationship from extent contractor defined requirements to service 
quality, has a high p value, indicating that the parameter estimate did not differ 
significantly from zero.  Similarly, the hypothesized causal relationships between the two 
agency theory variables and service quality, represented by paths γ5 and γ6, were not 
found to be statistically significant.  Additional paths between sufficient procurement 
lead-time (γ9) and internal customer commitment to regulatory and statutory compliance 
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(γ19) were also not found to be statistically significant, as were any of the paths stemming 
from the manifest competence-based view variables.  A complete assessment of paths, 
including those effects occurring directly as a result of one causal path and those effects 
occurring indirectly through one or more mediating variables, can be found in Table 36.  
This table also displays the coefficient of determination (R
2
) for each endogenous latent 
variable. For an endogenous (dependent or explained) variable, R
2
 is a measure of the 
portion of variance about the mean that is explained by the exogenous (independent or 
explanatory) variables (Hair et al., 2010).  R
2
 for the endogenous variable service quality 
was relatively high at 0.655, indicating a high degree of explanatory power.  R
2
 was 
greater than 0.30 for the other two endogenous variables, regulatory and statutory 
compliance and requirement definition sufficiency, indicating a moderate degree of 
explanatory power. 
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To   From  To   From Path 
SQa ← SQ  Y1 ← ƞ1 λ1 0.809 0.023  34.756 < 0.001 
SQc ← SQ  Y2 ← ƞ1 λ2 0.929 0.010  90.246 < 0.001 
SQd ← SQ  Y3 ← ƞ1 λ3 0.911 0.012  74.245 < 0.001 
SQf ← SQ  Y4 ← ƞ1 λ4 0.724 0.032  22.933 < 0.001 
SQi ← SQ  Y5 ← ƞ1 λ5 0.808 0.023  34.526 < 0.001 
SQj ← SQ  Y6 ← ƞ1 λ6 0.906 0.013  71.239 < 0.001 
SQk ← SQ  Y7 ← ƞ1 λ7 0.915 0.012  77.684 < 0.001 
SQm ← SQ  Y8 ← ƞ1 λ8 0.906 0.013  70.654 < 0.001 
            
RSCa ← RSC  Y9 ← ƞ2 λ9 0.966 0.030  31.801 < 0.001 
RSCc ← RSC  Y1
0 
← ƞ2 λ10 0.808 0.033  24.168 < 0.001 
RSCe ← RSC  Y1
1 
← ƞ2 λ11 0.381 0.059  6.491 < 0.001 
            
REa ← RE  X1 ← ξ1 λ12 0.797 0.031  25.975 < 0.001 
REb ← RE  X2 ← ξ1 λ13 0.803 0.030  26.436 < 0.001 
REd ← RE  X3 ← ξ1 λ14 0.542 0.051  10.689 < 0.001 
            
AT1a ← AT1  X4 ← ξ2 λ15 0.873 0.018  48.857 < 0.001 
AT1c ← AT1  X5 ← ξ2 λ16 0.939 0.013  74.629 < 0.001 
AT1d ← AT1  X6 ← ξ2 λ17 0.933 0.013  72.045 < 0.001 
            
RD1a ← RD1  Y1
2 
← ƞ3 λ18 0.871 0.023  38.322 < 0.001 
RD1b ← RD1  Y1
3 
← ƞ3 λ19 0.916 0.020  45.241 < 0.001 
RD1e ← RD1  Y1
4 
← ƞ3 λ20 0.727 0.059  21.094 < 0.001 
            
RBV1c ← RBV1  X7 ← ξ3 λ21 0.622 0.046  13.601 < 0.001 
RBV1d ← RBV1  X8 ← ξ3 λ22 0.843 0.031  27.643 < 0.001 
RBV1e ← RBV1  X9 ← ξ3 λ23 0.849 0.030  28.030 < 0.001 
            
ICCa ← ICC  X1
0 
← ξ4 λ24 0.914 0.016  57.963 < 0.001 
ICCb ← ICC  X1
1 
← ξ4 λ25 0.942 0.014  66.622 < 0.001 
ICCd ← ICC  X1
2 














To   From  To   From Path 
SQ ← RSC  ƞ1 ← ƞ2 β1  –0.252 0.074  –3.406  0.001 
SQ ← RD1  ƞ1 ← ƞ3 β2  0.181 0.066  2.716  0.007 
RSC ← RD1  ƞ2 ← ƞ3 β3  0.149 0.077  1.937  0.053 
SQ ← RD2  ƞ1 ← X14 γ1  0.027 0.051  0.527  0.598 
RD1 ← RD2  ƞ3 ← X14 γ2  –0.110 0.058  –1.884  0.060 
SQ ← RE  ƞ1 ← ξ1 γ3  0.930 0.079  11.773  < 0.001 
RSC ← RE  ƞ2 ← ξ1 γ4  0.578 0.083  6.963  < 0.001 
SQ ← AT1  ƞ1 ← ξ2 γ5  0.048 0.055  0.887  0.375 
SQ ← AT2  ƞ1 ← X13 γ6  –0.044 0.053  –0.827  0.408 
RD1 ← RBV1  ƞ3 ← ξ3 γ7  0.317 0.071  4.454  < 0.001 
SQ ← RBV1  ƞ1 ← ξ3 γ8  –0.204 0.068  –2.993  0.003 
RSC ← RBV1  ƞ2 ← ξ3 γ9  –0.027 0.079  –0.341  0.733 
SQ ← RBV2  ƞ1 ← X15 γ10  0.077 0.052  1.498  0.134 
RSC ← RBV2  ƞ2 ← X15 γ11  –0.094 0.059  –1.599  0.110 
RD1 ← CBV1  ƞ3 ← X16 γ12  0.011 0.075  0.149  0.882 
RSC ← CBV1  ƞ2 ← X16 γ13  0.038 0.071  0.537  0.591 
RD1 ← CBV2  ƞ3 ← X17 γ14  0.044 0.074  0.589  0.566 
RSC ← CBV2  ƞ2 ← X17 γ15  –0.067 0.073  –0.925  0.355 
RD1 ← CBV3  ƞ3 ← X18 γ16  0.032 0.060  0.531  0.596 
RSC ← CBV3  ƞ2 ← X18 γ17  0.051 0.057  0.901  0.367 
RD1 ← ICC  ƞ3 ← ξ4 γ18  0.377 0.065  5.780  < 0.001 
RSC ← ICC  ƞ2 ← ξ4 γ19  –0.039 0.079  –0.494  0.621 
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   Sig.
–0.252 0.001 –0.252 0.001
0.181 0.007 –0.038 0.022 0.143 0.029
0.930 < 0.001 –0.145 0.007 0.784 < 0.001
0.048 0.375 0.048 0.375
–0.044 0.408 –0.044 0.408
0.027 0.598 –0.016 0.153 0.011 0.826
–0.204 0.003 0.052 0.093 –0.152 0.017
0.077 0.134 0.024 0.147 0.101 0.043
0.578 < 0.001 0.578 < 0.001
0.149 0.053 0.149 0.053
–0.027 0.733 0.047 0.077 0.020 0.789
–0.094 0.110 –0.094 0.110
0.038 0.591 0.002 0.882 0.040 0.579
–0.067 0.355 0.007 0.573 –0.061 0.408
0.051 0.367 0.005 0.608 0.056 0.329
–0.039 0.621 0.056 0.067 0.017 0.828
–0.110 0.060 –0.110 0.060
0.317 < 0.001 0.317 < 0.001
0.011 0.882 0.011 0.882
0.044 0.556 0.044 0.556
0.032 0.596 0.032 0.596








Extent contractor defined requirements
Buyer APDP certification level
Buyer education level
Internal customer commitment







Buyer APDP certification level
Turnover
Procurement lead–time sufficiency
Regulatory and statutory compliance  (R
2 
= 0.388)







 Direct effect Indirect effects   Total effectDependent variable Determinant Sig. Sig.
Table 36.  Standardized Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects 
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)
(1) Service quality –1.00
(2) Regulatory and statutory compliance –0.32** –1.00
(3) Communication –0.78** –0.62** –1.00
(4) Surveillance –0.23** –0.21** –0.25** –1.00
(5) PBSA –0.13* –0.17** –0.23** –0.25** –1.00
(6) Contractor-defined requirements –0.07 –0.02 –0.06 –0.06 –0.16* –1.00
(7) Requirement definition –0.45** –0.41** –0.59** –0.14* –0.17* –0.08 –1.00
(8) Procurement lead-time –0.19** –0.26** –0.41** –0.10 –0.15* –0.01 –0.44** –1.00
(9) Turnover –0.05 –0.13 –0.05 –0.05 –0.06 –0.07 –0.02 –0.01 –1.00
(10) Buyer experience –0.10 –0.02 –0.01 –0.00 –0.02 –0.08 –0.02 –0.19** –0.01 –1.00
(11) APDP level –0.05 –0.04 –0.04 –0.07 –0.03 –0.03 –0.04 –0.21** –0.12 –0.60** –1.00
(12) Education level –0.05 –0.02 –0.01 –0.06 –0.01 –0.04 –0.02 –0.11 –0.04 –0.05 –0.14* –1.00
(13) Internal customer commitment –0.42** –0.36** –0.58** –0.26** –0.20** –0.09 –0.48** –0.40** –0.05 –0.00 –0.10 –0.02 –1.00
Variables
 Note. *p <0.05, **p <0.01.
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H. TRIMMED STRUCTURAL MODEL 
In the interest of achieving a more parsimonious model, paths with nonsignificant 
relationships were considered for potential trimming.  This occurred in an iterative 
process in which paths presenting critical ratios of less than one were considered as 
candidates for removal. Similarly, variables and constructs were trimmed if they 
presented no statistically significant paths and, therefore, had little relevance to the 
model.  Figure 10 presents a path diagram of this trimmed model; it contains 25 observed 
variables, 325 sample moments, and 69 free parameters and is therefore overidentified 






























































































































Figure 10.  Path Diagram of the Trimmed Model 
1 3 1 5 2 8 3 6 13 1 14 9 15 1 2 2 3 1X X X                      
2 4 1 10 3 19 4 11 15 13 16 15 17 17 18 3 3 2X X X X                     
3 7 3 18 4 2 14 12 16 14 17 16 18 3X X X X               
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Fit of this respecified model (Table 38) was assessed using the same criteria as 
those applied to the previous measurement models and the hypothesized structural model. 
The chi-square value of 360.61 is significant with a p value of less than 0.001.  While this 
suggests that fit may be less than adequate, the relative chi-square value is 1.41 and less 
than the 3.00 recommended threshold, indicating good fit to the sample data.  As before, 
a global assessment of fit was also performed using CFI, TLI, RMSEA, and SRMR since 
the chi-square test is not representative of higher order models and tends to penalize for 
complexity and larger samples.  The values for CFI and TLI are both higher than the 0.95 
minimums that were proposed by Hair et al. (2010), suggesting good fit.  Similarly, the 
RMSEA and SRMR values of 0.04 and 0.06 are less than the thresholds proposed by Hair 
et al. (2010), who recommended maximum values of 0.08 each.  Overall, the trimmed 
structural model appears to fit well to the sample data. 
 
Table 38.  Trimmed Structural Model Diagnostics 
 χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Structural model  1.41  0.98  0.98  0.04  0.06 
Fitness criterion  < 3.00  > 0.95  > 0.95  < 0.08  < 0.08 
 
A review of the standardized path and loading estimates in Table 39 revealed all 
loadings to be significant with p values less than 0.001.  Additionally, path estimates for 
all hypothesized relationships are either significant with a p value of less than 0.05, 
marginally significant with a p value greater than 0.05 but less than 0.10, or meet the 
inclusion criteria of having a critical ratio greater than 1.0.  Standardized direct, indirect, 
and total effects are again displayed (Table 40), where a total effect is the summation of 
the direct effect and any indirect effects.  The coefficient of determination (R
2
) for the 
endogenous variable service quality was relatively high, at 0.651, indicating a high 
degree of explanatory power.  R
2
 was greater than 0.30 for the other two endogenous 
variables, regulatory and statutory compliance and requirement definition sufficiency, 
indicating a moderate degree of explanatory power. 
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Table 39.  Trimmed Structural Model Loading and Path Estimates 







To   From  To   From Path 
SQa ← SQ  Y1 ← ƞ1 λ1  0.809 0.023  34.783  < 0.001 
SQc ← SQ  Y2 ← ƞ1 λ2  0.929 0.010  90.137  < 0.001 
SQd ← SQ  Y3 ← ƞ1 λ3  0.911 0.012  74.099  < 0.001 
SQf ← SQ  Y4 ← ƞ1 λ4  0.723 0.032  22.923  < 0.001 
SQi ← SQ  Y5 ← ƞ1 λ5  0.808 0.023  34.476  < 0.001 
SQj ← SQ  Y6 ← ƞ1 λ6  0.906 0.013  70.980  < 0.001 
SQk ← SQ  Y7 ← ƞ1 λ7  0.915 0.012  77.652  < 0.001 
SQm ← SQ  Y8 ← ƞ1 λ8  0.906 0.013  70.703  < 0.001 
RSCa ← RSC  Y9 ← ƞ2 λ9  0.963 0.030  32.295  < 0.001 
RSCc ← RSC  Y10 ← ƞ2 λ10  0.811 0.033  24.634  < 0.001 
RSCe ← RSC  Y11 ← ƞ2 λ11  0.383 0.058  6.539  < 0.001 
REa ← RE  X1 ← ξ1 λ12  0.797 0.031  25.962  < 0.001 
REb ← RE  X2 ← ξ1 λ13  0.807 0.030  26.860  < 0.001 
REd ← RE  X3 ← ξ1 λ14  0.537 0.051  10.527  < 0.001 
RD1a ← RD1  Y12 ← ƞ3 λ18  0.870 0.023  38.276  < 0.001 
RD1b ← RD1  Y13 ← ƞ3 λ19  0.916 0.020  45.370  < 0.001 
RD1e ← RD1  Y14 ← ƞ3 λ20  0.727 0.034  21.101  < 0.001 
RBV1c ← RBV1  X7 ← ξ3 λ21  0.620 0.046  13.454  < 0.001 
RBV1d ← RBV1  X8 ← ξ3 λ22  0.846 0.031  27.358  < 0.001 
RBV1e ← RBV1  X9 ← ξ3 λ23  0.848 0.031  27.523  < 0.001 
ICCa ← ICC  X10 ← ξ4 λ24  0.911 0.016  56.898  < 0.001 
ICCb ← ICC  X11 ← ξ4 λ25  0.945 0.014  67.168  < 0.001 
ICCd ← ICC  X12 ← ξ4 λ26  0.754 0.030  24.814  < 0.001 
SQ ← RSC  ƞ1 ← ƞ2 β1  –0.240 0.072  –3.318  0.001 
SQ ← RD1  ƞ1 ← ƞ3 β2  0.172 0.066  2.605  0.009 
RSC ← RD1  ƞ2 ← ƞ3 β3  0.140 0.072  1.953  0.051 
RD1 ← RD2  ƞ3 ← X14 γ2  –0.112 0.058  –1.934  0.053 
SQ ← RE  ƞ1 ← ξ1 γ3  0.930 0.072  12.919  < 0.001 
RSC ← RE  ƞ2 ← ξ1 γ4  0.539 0.067  8.062  < 0.001 
RD1 ← RBV1  ƞ3 ← ξ3 γ7  0.299 0.068  4.378  < 0.001 
SQ ← RBV1  ƞ1 ← ξ3 γ8  –0.199 0.066  –3.007  0.003 
SQ ← RBV2  ƞ1 ← X15 γ10  0.078 0.051  1.511  0.131 
RSC ← RBV2  ƞ2 ← X15 γ11  –0.101 0.058  –1.743  0.081 
RD1 ← ICC  ƞ3 ← ξ4 γ18  0.380 0.064  5.921  < 0.001 
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Table 40.  Standardized Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects for Trimmed Model 
    Sig.
–0.240 0.001 –0.240 0.001
0.172 0.009 –0.034 0.071 0.138 0.033
0.930 < 0.001 –0.130 0.006 0.800 < 0.001
–0.199 0.003 0.041 0.062 –0.158 0.012
0.078 0.131 0.024 0.123 0.102 0.041
0.539 < 0.001 0.539 < 0.001
0.140 0.051 0.140 0.051
–0.101 0.081 –0.101 0.081
–0.101 0.081 –0.101 0.081
0.299 < 0.001 0.299 < 0.001




Requirement definition sufficiency  (R
2 
= 0.330)












Regulatory and statutory compliance
Requirement definition sufficiency
Dependent variable Determinant Direct effect Sig. Indirect effects Sig. Total effect
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I. COMPARISON OF COMPETING MODELS 
Although the trimmed structural model is more parsimonious than the 
hypothesized structural model and exhibits a similar goodness of fit, further empirical 
analysis is required to properly compare models and to determine the most preferred 
model.  Competing models are typically categorized as either nested models or non-
nested models.  Models are considered to be to be nested when all of one model’s free 
parameters are a subset of another model’s free parameters (Hoyle & Panter, 1995).  In 
such situations, Hoyle and Panter (1995) argued for comparison using absolute fit 
indexes which are based on chi-square differences.  Alternatively, non-nested models 
have different numbers of total parameters, meaning that the number of free parameters, 
or those parameters being estimated, plus the number of constrained parameters differs 
between the models.  In the comparison of non-nested models, the most appropriate 
statistics are the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC).  Both AIC and BIC provide an adjustment for the number of free 
parameters being estimated, while BIC penalizes more than AIC for model complexity 
(Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1995).  In both cases, the preferred model is the one with 
the lowest information criterion value.   
The models presented in this study are considered to be non-nested because 
several latent and manifest exogenous variables have been removed from the 
hypothesized model.  As such, it is appropriate to identify the best model through a 
comparison of AIC and BIC, which were obtained from the SEM output produced by 
Mplus Version 6.0.  As seen in Table 41, the trimmed model presents lower values for 
both criteria and can therefore be considered the most preferred model of the two. 
Table 41.  Information Criteria for Competing Models 
Structural Model χ
2 P-value df AIC BIC
Hypothesized 532.26 < 0.001 403 22702.24 23154.73
Trimmed 360.61 < 0.001 256 16781.71 17091.48
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J. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Additional analysis of the relationships between variables can often provide 
further insight when previous analysis can be extended or when results can be more fully 
explored.  This section will present results from further analytic research and will employ 
a variety of statistical methods, such as SEM, linear and non-linear regression analysis, 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).  
Additional tests involving personnel turnover, buyer experience, APDP level, and 
education level, as well as tests of the factors affecting the assignment of personnel to 
services acquisitions, are performed. 
1. Turnover of Acquisition Personnel 
Neither the hypothesized relationship between the turnover of acquisition 
personnel and service quality nor the hypothesized relationship between the turnover of 
acquisition personnel and compliance with regulations and statutes were found to be 
highly significant in the trimmed model; p values for both path coefficients were slightly 
greater than 0.05. To further analyze these relationships, three modifications were applied 
to the turnover variable, RBV2, which represented percent turnover as a ratio of the 
number of times acquisition personnel had turned over to the number of acquisition 
personnel assigned.  First, an additional variable was created as a high-low binary 
variable, PTbin, where a cut in the data occurred about the median (1.00).  Since the 
values of RBV2 were calculated as ratios, responses were coded in PTbin with a value of 
one if the number of times that acquisition personnel turned over was greater than the 
median of 1.00 (n = 130).  All other responses were coded with a value of zero (n = 110).  
As such, 
Proposition 1: The level of service quality and the amount of compliance with 
regulations and statues differ between acquisitions where turnover ratios are high 
and acquisitions where turnover ratios are low. 
Next, the ratio of personnel turnover was modified to represent the annualized 
percent turnover (APT) by accounting for the duration of the contract.  As discussed in 
Chapter III, respondents were asked for the amount of time that had passed since contract 
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award.  While the previous SEM analysis assumed that effects due to personnel turnover 
were unrelated to time, this new variable considers that the relationships between 
turnover and contract outcomes were dependent on the duration in which the turnover 
occurred.  Therefore, 
Proposition 2: The higher the annualized percent turnover, the lesser the service 
quality and compliance with regulations and statutes. 
Similar to the previous binary transformation, APT was also modified as a high-
low binary variable where a cut in the data occurred about APT’s median (0.42). Within 
this new binary variable, APTbin, the cases in which APT was less than 42% were coded 
with a value of zero (n = 122), and the cases in which APT was greater than or equal to 
42% were coded with a value of one (n = 118).  As such, 
Proposition 3: The level of service quality and the amount of compliance with 
regulations and statues differ between acquisitions where annualized turnover 
ratios are high and acquisitions where annualized turnover ratios are low. 
Table 42 contains descriptive statistics for all measures of turnover that are used 
in this analysis. Additionally, values for service quality and compliance are treated in 
ANOVAs and regression analysis as summations of the scale items used in CFA and 
SEM for each.  Descriptive statistics for these summated scales are also included in the 
table. 
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Table 42.  Descriptive Statistics for Analysis of Personnel Turnover 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Median St. Dev.
Percent turnover        
(RBV2 )
240 0.00 7.00 1.22 1.00 1.17
Binary percent turnover 
(PTbin)
240 0.00 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.50
Annualized percent turnover 
(APT )
240 0.00 12.00 0.68 0.42 1.09
Binary annualized percent 
turnover (APTbin )
240 0.00 1.00 0.49 1.00 0.50
Summated scale of service 
quality (SQ )
240 21.00 56.00 45.21 48.00 8.68
Summated scale of 
compliance (RSC )
240 4.00 21.00 17.22 18.00 3.30
 
Proposition 1 was tested first using a MANOVA in PASW Statistics 18.0 to 
compare the means of service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance between 
the two groups, low percent turnover and high percent turnover.  Test statistics for Pillai’s 
Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest Root were statistically 
significant with p values of less than 0.05.  These results indicate that there is a 
significant effect of the high/low percent turnover variable on service quality and 
regulatory and statutory compliance when the two dependent variables are considered as 
a group.  These group differences were further explored using univariate F-tests.  As seen 
in Table 43, there is a significant difference in the means between the two groups of 
regulatory and statutory compliance but no statistically significant difference in the 
means between the two groups of service quality.  As such, additional testing using a 
linear regression analysis of regulator and statutory compliance on PTbin was appropriate 
to estimate the coefficient size and direction (Table 44).  The resulting estimate was 
statistically significant with a standardized estimate of –0.175, indicating that compliance 
is less on those services acquisitions in which acquisition personnel turnover is greater 




Table 43.  Univariate F-tests Between Groups by High-Low Turnover Ratios 
Sum of 
squares    df
Mean 
square F Sig.
Between groups 79.23 001 79.23 7.48 0.01
Within groups 2522.07 238 10.60
Total 2601.30 239
Between groups 27.36 001 27.36 0.36 0.55






Table 44.  Regression of Compliance on High Percent Turnover 
Standardized 
coefficients
Variable B S.E. β t Sig.
 (Constant) 17.845 0.310 57.496 < 0.001
 PTbin –1.153 0.422 –0.175 –2.734 0.007






SEM analysis was performed in Mplus Version 6.0 to test Proposition 2, where 
RBV2 was removed from the trimmed structural model and replaced with APT in an 
alternative model.  As before, the model remains overidentified with 256 degrees of 
freedom.  The results of this analysis can be found in Figure 11, which contains the path 
diagram and parameter coefficients, and in Table 45, which contains fit diagnostics and 
all parameter estimates.  Although the model’s chi-square value of 352.81 was significant 
with a p value of less than 0.001, a global assessment of fit measures once again indicated 
good fit.  However, neither the path estimate from APT to service quality nor the path 
estimate from APT to regulatory and statutory compliance were statistically significant, 



























































































Figure 11.  Path Diagram of the Alternative Model 
 
94 




















Finally, Proposition 3 was tested using a MANOVA in PASW Statistics 18.0 to 
compare the means of service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance between 
the two groups, low annualized percent turnover and high annualized percent turnover.  
Test statistics for Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest 
Root were statistically significant with p values of less than 0.05.  These results indicate            
To From To From Path
SQ ← RSC ƞ1 ← ƞ2 β1
SQ ← RD1 ƞ1 ← ƞ3 β2
RSC ← RD1 ƞ2 ← ƞ3 β3
RD1 ← RD2 ƞ3 ← X14 γ2
SQ ← RE ƞ1 ← ξ1 γ3
RSC ← RE ƞ2 ← ξ1 γ4
RD1 ← RBV1 ƞ3 ← ξ3 γ7
SQ ← RBV1 ƞ1 ← ξ3 γ8
SQ ← APT ƞ1 ← X15 γ10
RSC ← APT ƞ2 ← X15 γ11
RD1 ← ICC ƞ3 ← ξ4 γ18
SQa ← SQ Y1 ← ƞ1 λ1
SQc ← SQ Y2 ← ƞ1 λ2
SQd ← SQ Y3 ← ƞ1 λ3
SQf ← SQ Y4 ← ƞ1 λ4
SQi ← SQ Y5 ← ƞ1 λ5
SQj ← SQ Y6 ← ƞ1 λ6
SQk ← SQ Y7 ← ƞ1 λ7
SQm ← SQ Y8 ← ƞ1 λ8
RSCa ← RSC Y9 ← ƞ2 λ9
RSCc ← RSC Y10 ← ƞ2 λ10
RSCe ← RSC Y11 ← ƞ2 λ11
REa ← RE X1 ← ξ1 λ12
REb ← RE X2 ← ξ1 λ13
REd ← RE X3 ← ξ1 λ14
RD1a ← RD1 Y12 ← ƞ3 λ18
RD1b ← RD1 Y13 ← ƞ3 λ19
RD1e ← RD1 Y14 ← ƞ3 λ20
RBV1c ← RBV1 X7 ← ξ3 λ21
RBV1d ← RBV1 X8 ← ξ3 λ22
RBV1e ← RBV1 X9 ← ξ3 λ23
ICCa ← ICC X10 ← ξ4 λ24
ICCb ← ICC X11 ← ξ4 λ25
































































































































































Finally, Proposition 3 was tested using a MANOVA in PASW Statistics 18.0 to 
compare the means of service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance between 
the two groups, low annualized percent turnover and high annualized percent turnover. 
Test statistics for Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest 
Root were statistically significant with p values of less than 0.05. These results indicate 
that there is a significant effect of the high-low annualized percent turnover variable on 
service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance when the two dependent 
variables are considered as a group.  The group differences were explored further using 
univariate F-tests.  As seen in Table 46, there is a statistically significant difference in the 
means between the two groups of regulatory and statutory compliance but no statistically 
significant difference in the means between the two groups of service quality.  As such, 
additional testing using a linear regression analysis of regulatory and statutory 
compliance on PTbin was appropriate to estimate the coefficient size and direction (Table 
47).  The resulting estimate was statistically significant with a standardized estimate of –
0.190, indicating that compliance was lesser on those services acquisitions in which 
acquisition personnel turnover was greater than or equal to 42% annually. 
 
Table 46.  Univariate F-tests Between Groups by High/Low APT 
Sum of 
squares    df
Mean 
square F Sig.
Between groups 92.92 001 93.92 8.92 < 0.01
Within groups 2507.37 238 10.54
Total 2601.30 239
Between groups 17.15 001 17.15 0.23 0.63








Table 47.  Regression of Compliance on High/Low APT 
Standardized 
coefficients
Variable B S.E. β t Sig.
 (Constant) 17.836 0.294 60.696 < 0.001
 APTbin –1.251 0.419 –0.190 –2.986 0.003







3. APDP Certification Level 
In the hypothesized structural model, the exogenous variable representing the 
contract administrator’s APDP certification level was trimmed because it did not produce 
significant path estimates to the variables representing requirement definition sufficiency 
or regulatory and statutory compliance.  As such, further analysis using a MANOVA was 
warranted to test for differences in the means between groups.  As mentioned in the 
literature review, contracting personnel can be awarded three different levels of APDP 
certification; however, not all personnel possess such certification.  Therefore, four 
APDP categories are available:  APDP Level I (n = 44), APDP Level II (n = 88), APDP 
Level III (n = 61), and no APDP Certification (n = 47).  A MANOVA was first 
performed in PASW Statistics 18.0 to test for multivariate differences in group means.  
Test statistics for Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest 
Root were statistically significant with p values of less than 0.05.  These results indicate 
that there is a significant effect of buyer APDP level on requirement definition 
sufficiency and on regulatory and statutory compliance, when the two dependent 
variables are considered as a group.  Possible group differences were explored further 
using univariate F-tests on the two dependent variables between the four APDP groups.  
The analysis resulted in a significant F-test statistic on requirement definition sufficiency 
and a marginally significant F-test statistic on regulatory and statutory compliance, as 
seen in Table 48.  
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Table 48.  Univariate F-tests of Outcomes Between Groups of APDP Level 
Sum of 
squares    df
Mean 
square F Sig.
Between groups 71.02 003 23.67 2.21 0.09
Within groups 2530.28 236 10.72
Total 2601.30 239
Between groups 223.99 003 74.66 4.79 < 0.01







Because the results of the F-tests justified further investigation, and because the 
inclusion of more than two groups permitted post-hoc analysis, Scheffe’s test was also 
performed.  Post-hoc tests can isolate the groups that differ.  Whereas there are many 
post-hoc tests available, the Scheffe test is appropriate when pairwise contrasts are not 
possible (i.e., group sizes differ) and there are more than three means.  Kirk (1995) states 
that this test ―controls the Type I error rate at less than alpha for the infinite number of 
contrasts that can be performed‖ (p. 154), but sacrifices some statistical power to detect 
differences.  In the test results (Table 49), Column I represents an APDP group of the 
dependent variable of which the mean is compared to other APDP groups in Column J.  
Only one statistically significance difference was found between means of APDP groups; 
the mean reported level of requirement definition sufficiency by APDP Level II contract 
administrators (16.63 on a summated scale using three seven-point items) was more than 
that reported by APDP Level III contract administrators (14.20), and the difference of 
2.43 was statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01. 
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1 1.15 0.69 0.43 –0.79 3.08
2 –0.25 0.59 0.98 –1.92 1.41
3 0.67 0.64 0.77 –1.11 2.46
0 –1.15 0.69 0.43 –3.08 0.79
2 –1.40 0.60 0.15 –3.10 0.30
3 –0.47 0.65 0.91 –2.30 1.35
0 0.25 0.59 0.98 –1.41 1.92
1 1.40 0.60 0.15 –0.30 3.10
3 0.93 0.55 0.41 –0.61 2.46
0 –0.67 0.64 0.77 –2.46 1.11
1 0.47 0.65 0.91 –1.35 2.30
2 –0.93 0.55 0.41 –2.46 0.61
1 –0.26 0.83 0.99 –2.59 2.08
2 –1.54 0.71 0.20 –3.55 0.47
3 0.89 0.77 0.72 –1.27 3.05
0 0.26 0.83 0.99 –2.08 2.59
2 –1.28 0.73 0.38 –3.34 0.77
3 1.14 0.78 0.54 –1.05 3.34
0 1.54 0.71 0.20 –0.47 3.55
1 1.28 0.73 0.38 –0.77 3.34
3 2.43 0.66 < 0.01 0.58 4.28
0 –0.89 0.77 0.72 –3.05 1.27
1 –1.14 0.78 0.54 –3.34 1.05

















4. Buyer Education Level 
A similar approach to analysis was taken to explore differences in means by 
groups of varying buyer education level (CBV3), which did not produce significant path 
estimates in SEM and was trimmed from the hypothesized model.  A MANOVA was 
performed on requirement definition sufficiency and regulatory and statutory compliance 
by groups of four education levels: high school or general equivalency diploma (n = 29), 
associate’s degree (n = 104), bachelor’s degree (n = 28), and master’s degree or higher (n 
= 79).  None of the test statistics for Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, or 
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Roy’s Largest Root were statistically significant, indicating that group means did not 
differ.  Additional results from univariate F-tests (Table 50) confirmed this finding; no 
statistically significant differences in means between groups were found for either 
dependent variable. 
Table 50.  Univariate F-tests Between Groups of Education Level 
Sum of 
squares    df
Mean 
square F Sig.
Between groups 2.37 003 0.79 0.07 0.98
Within groups 2598.93 236 11.01
Total 2601.30 239
Between groups 3.43 003 1.14 0.07 0.98







5. Buyer Experience 
Further analysis was also performed to explore potential relationships between 
buyer experience and service quality, regulatory and statutory compliance, and 
requirement definition sufficiency.  First, a MANOVA was performed on the latter three 
variables when grouped using a binary high-low measure of experience, where the cut in 
data occurred about the median of experience reported (8.5 years).  In the high-low 
variable for buyer experience, the cases in which respondents had less than 8.5 years of 
experience were coded with a value of one (n = 120), and all other cases were coded with 
a value of zero (n = 120).  None of the test statistics for Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, 
Hotelling’s Trace, or Roy’s Largest Root were statistically significant, indicating that 
multivariate group means did not differ.  However, although univariate F-tests were also 
not significant for any of the dependent variables (Table 51), the test result for service 
quality indicated that additional analysis may be warranted based on the value of the F 




Table 51.  Univariate F-tests Between High and Low Groups of Experience 
Sum of 
squares    df
Mean 
square F Sig.
Between groups 1.20 001 1.20 0.11 0.74
Within groups 2600.09 238 10.93
Total 2601.30 239
Between groups 0.94 001 0.94 0.06 0.81
Within groups 3902.86 238 16.40
Total 3903.80 239
Between groups 97.54 001 97.54 1.30 0.26







As such, buyer experience responses were partitioned into three groups:  low, 
medium, and high.  Low-experience buyers were considered to be those respondents with 
five or less years of contract administration experience (n = 91).  Medium-experience 
buyers were considered to be those respondents with between 5 and 15 years of 
experience (n = 76).  Finally, high-experience buyers were those respondents with more 
than 15 years of experience (n = 73).  Two binary variables were created, one for 
medium-experience and another for high-experience.  Service quality, compliance, and 
requirement definition sufficiency were regressed individually on the two variables; 
regression results are located in Table 52.  Only the regression of service quality 
exhibited any level of statistical significance; both binary variables were moderately 
significant with coefficient p values less than 0.10.  However, the sizes of the estimates 
were nearly identical between the two variables, indicating that an additional high-low 
analysis might be appropriate with the medium and high responses combined.  For ease 
of interpretation, this additional regression of service quality was only performed on a 
binary variable representing low experience, since medium and high experience would be 
effectively consolidated in the constant of the regression equation.  This regression 
analysis (Table 53) resulted in the estimation of a statistically significant non-positive 
path coefficient for the binary variable representing low buyer experience.  Therefore, it 
is concluded that low buyer experience (five years or less) is associated with lower levels 
of service quality. 
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Table 52.  Regressions on Buyer Experience 
Standardized 
coefficients
Variable B S.E. β t Sig. (p )
Regression of service quality (R
2
 = 0.02)
 (Constant) 43.780 0.906 48.303 < 0.001
 Experience_Mod. 2.299 1.344 0.123 1.711 0.088
 Experience_High 2.316 1.359 0.123 1.705 0.090
Regression of compliance with regulations and statutes (R
2
 < 0.01)
 (Constant) 17.000 0.347 49.048 < 0.001
 Experience_Mod. 0.500 0.514 0.071 0.973 0.331
 Experience_High 0.205 0.520 0.029 0.396 0.693
Regression of requirement definition sufficiency (R
2
 < 0.01)
 (Constant) 15.516 0.425 36.481 < 0.001
 Experience_Mod. 0.036 0.630 0.004 0.057 0.954




Table 53.  Regression of Service Quality on Low Buyer Experience 
Standardized 
Coefficients
Variable B S.E. β t Sig. (p )
 (Constant) 46.087 0.707 65.202 < 0.001
 Experience_Low –2.307 1.148 –0.129 –2.010 0.046






6. Assignment of Contract Administration Personnel 
Finally, the assignment of contract administration personnel to service 
acquisitions was explored to discern any links between the characteristics of 
procurements and buyer qualifications.  Reed (2010) discussed some of the leading 
variables used by the U.S. Air Force in the assignment of contract administration 
manpower to contracting units, which included the complexity of acquisitions and the 
allowable time for the completion of contract actions, among other variables.  Because 
manpower is later assigned internally by unit management, it is warranted to also 
examine whether the manpower allocation variables—which are used broadly by the U.S. 
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Air Force—are replicated in unit management’s decisions to internally assign personnel 
to acquisitions.  Although data on respondent pay grade were not collected, respondents 
can be readily grouped by years of experience and by levels of APDP certification and 
education.  Using the variables provided by Reed (2010) as a general basis for the 
assignment of manpower, potential determinants for the assignment of administration 
personnel to acquisitions are the contract type, commerciality of the service, the 
sufficiency of lead-time available for the procurement, and the level of the internal 
customer’s commitment to the acquisition, in which the level of the internal customer’s 
commitment may be a proxy for the manager’s perception of the importance of the 
acquisition.  In the analysis, linear regression was used to examine assignment by 
experience—since buyer experience was represented as a continuous variable—and 
ordinal logistic regression was used in the regressions of APDP certification and buyer 
education, since the two variables are ordered categorical.  For the regression of 
education level (Table 56), buyers were ordered into the following four categories:  high 
school or GED diploma, associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, or master’s degree or 
higher.  Statistically significant coefficients were found for the linear regression on buyer 
experience (Table 54) and the ordinal logistic regression on APDP Level (Table 55).  It 
cannot be inferred, based on the data, that managers consider buyer education level when 
assigning buyers to service acquisitions.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that the level 
of commitment by the internal customer is a factor in the assignment of buyers to 
acquisitions.  However, lower levels of buyer experience and lower buyer APDP levels 
were associated with commercial acquisitions, fixed-price acquisitions, and acquisitions 








Table 54.  Linear Regression of Buyer Experience on Assignment Factors 
Standardized 
coefficients
Variable B S.E. β t Sig. (p )
 (Constant) 20.853 3.259 6.399 < 0.001
 RBV1 –0.394 0.143 –0.185 –2.750 0.006
 ICC 0.130 0.173 0.050 0.749 0.455
 Fixed_Price –3.757 1.774 –0.139 –2.118 0.035
 Commercial –3.844 1.582 –0.161 –2.430 0.016






Table 55.  Ordinal Logistic Regression of APDP Level on Assignment Factors 





[APDP = 0] –4.519 0.704 41.176 1.000 < 0.001 –5.900 –3.139
[APDP = 1] –3.532 0.686 26.500 1.000 < 0.001 –4.876 –2.187
[APDP = 2] –1.737 0.654 7.049 1.000 0.008 –3.019 –0.455
RBV1 –0.050 0.028 3.192 1.000 0.074 –0.106 0.005
ICC –0.037 0.034 1.185 1.000 0.276 –0.103 0.029
Fixed_Price –0.616 0.355 3.010 1.000 0.083 –1.312 0.080
Commercial –1.482 0.327 20.535 1.000 < 0.001 –2.123 –0.841






















[EDUC = 0] –2.669 0.667 15.999 1.000 < 0.001 –3.978 –1.361
[EDUC = 1] –1.842 0.653 7.944 1.000 0.005 –3.122 –0.561
[EDUC = 2] 0.076 0.642 0.014 1.000 0.905 –1.181 1.334
RBV1 –0.041 0.028 2.072 1.000 0.150 –0.096 0.015
ICC 0.029 0.034 0.738 1.000 0.390 –0.037 0.096
Fixed_Price –0.404 0.352 1.318 1.000 0.251 –1.093 0.286
Commercial –0.327 0.312 1.098 1.000 0.295 –0.939 0.285








7. Service Quality Scale 
The scale that was proposed for measuring B2B service quality exhibited 
excellent consistency, with a reliability coefficient of 0.96 after purification in EFA.  The 
resultant factor contained 8 of the original 14 scale items, including 3 from the proposed 
dimension responsiveness to requirements.  Loadings from the latent variable service 
quality to each of these 3 items in CFA were high.  Changes in the variance of the latent 
variable explained 83% of the variation in the first item, SQj; 85% of the variation of the 
second item, SQk; and 83% of the variation in the third item, SQm, as measured by the 
coefficient of determination, R
2
.  Table 57 presents measurement statistics for all items in 
the new dimension. 
 









SQj The contractor met 
the requirements of 
the contract.
5.78 1.23 0.901 0.909 0.826 0.174
SQk The contractor 
satisfied our need.
5.76 1.18 0.898 0.919 0.845 0.155
SQl The contractor 
performed the work 
we needed it to do.
5.79 1.23
SQm The timeliness of the 
contractor's work.
5.71 1.25 0.894 0.908 0.824 0.175





Not used for measurement








In summary, this chapter reported the results from tests of the sample data using 
multiple methods.  First, the 240 usable survey responses were analyzed to verify that 
SEM assumptions were met prior to testing.  EFA was then performed to purify scales, in 
which a total of 26 measurement items were retained for 7 constructs, with all constructs 
being measured by no less than 3 items and exhibiting sufficient reliability coefficients.  
Construct validity was then assessed using CFA.  Constructs met the four rules of thumb 
for construct validity that were proposed by Hair et al. (2010), and an assessment of fit 
indices revealed that measurement models exhibited good fit to the sample data.  Finally, 
the hypothesized structural model was estimated using SEM, which fit well to the sample 
data but resulted in several nonsignificant path estimates.  These paths were later trimmed 
from the structural model, along with manifest and latent variables where appropriate, 
resulting in a second structural model.  This model also fit well to the sample data and 
was found to be the preferred model of the two, when competed using two popular 
information criterions.  Additional testing was also performed, when appropriate, to 
further explore relationships.  For ease of interpretation, a summary table containing the 
significance level of each hypothesis from the trimmed model can be found in Table 58. 
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Hypotheses
H1 The greater the compliance with regulations and statutes, the greater the service quality. No
c
H2 There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency of the requirement
definition and service quality.
H3 There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency of the requirement
definition and regulatory and statutory compliance.
H4 The greater the extent to which the contractor defines requirements, the greater the service
quality.
No
H5 The greater the extent to which the contractor defines requirements, the greater the
sufficiency of the requirement definition.
No
c
H6 The greater the communication between the government and the contractor, the greater the
service quality.
H7 The greater the communication between the government and the contractor, the greater the
regulatory and statutory compliance.
H8 The greater the amount of government surveillance of contractor performance, the greater the
service quality.
No
H9 The greater the extent to which performance-based services acquisition procedures are used,
the greater the service quality.
No
H10 The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater the service quality. No
c
H11 The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater the compliance with
regulations and statutes.
No
H12 The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater the sufficiency of the
requirement definition.
H13 The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the lesser the service quality. No
d
H14 The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the lesser the compliance with
regulations and statutes.
H15 There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of contract administrator
experience and the sufficiency of the requirement definition.
No
H16 There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of contract administrator
experience and regulatory and statutory compliance.
No
H17 The greater the contract administrator's APDP certification level, the greater the sufficiency
of the requirement definition.
No
H18 The greater the contractor administrator's APDP certification level, the greater the regulatory
and statutory compliance.
No
H19 The greater the contract administrator's education level, the greater the sufficiency of the
requirement definition.
No
H20 The greater the contract administrator's education level, the greater the regulatory and
statutory compliance.
No
H21 The greater the internal customer's commitment to the service acquisition, the greater the
compliance with regulations and statutes.
No
H22 The greater the internal customer's commitment to the service acquisition, the greater the







Significant but inverse estimate, 
d
Nonsignificant but retained in trimmed model.Notes.  p  < 0.05, 
b
p  < 0.10, 
c
Signif cant but inverse estimate,
d
















Table 58.  Summary of Support for Hypotheses in Trimmed Structural Model 
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V. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research was to bridge a literature gap and to offer service 
contract practitioners within the U.S. Air Force a comprehensive model to better improve 
the acquisition of services while increasing compliance with federal, DoD, and service 
acquisition regulations.  The study addressed the following three research questions: 
Research Question 1: What are the determinants of services sourcing 
performance? 
Research Question 2:  Which determinant(s) have the greatest impact on the key 
contract outcomes of service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance? 
Research Question 3:  How can service quality be validly measured in a business-
to-business context? 
A new gaps model was proposed that extended previous work by Parasuraman et 
al. (1985) and Kong and Mayo (1993) into the context of business-to-business (B2B) 
services in which service requirements are defined by the customer.  This framework was 
also utilized to create a service quality measurement scale for B2B services in which two 
of the five SERVQUAL dimensions proposed by Parasuraman et al. (1988) were retained 
and a new dimension, responsiveness to requirements, was added.  The scale exhibited an 
exceptionally high reliability coefficient, and further testing in exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) provided support for scale validity. 
A structural model of the determinants of services sourcing performance was also 
tested and found to exhibit good fit to the sample data, which were collected from 240 
U.S. Air Force contract administrators and analyzed using structural equation modeling 
(SEM).  The model was later trimmed to achieve a greater degree of parsimony and to 
allow for a more precise and reliable replication in future research.  This trimmed model 
was empirically found to be the preferred model of the two through an examination of the 
trimmed model’s goodness-of-fit to the sample data and a competition of both structural 
models using information criterion measures. 
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Finally, hypothesized causal paths within the two structural models were 
estimated using SEM to test 22 hypothesized relationships.  Further analysis was also 
performed, when appropriate, through other statistical techniques such as analyses of 
variance and linear and non-linear regression.  Many of the findings from these 
hypothesis tests have significant implications to the U.S. Air Force’s and DoD’s 
management of service acquisitions.  Among them is a finding that the adequacy of 
government–contractor communication has the greatest impact on the level of service 
performance and also has an impact on the extent to which the contract is compliant with 
regulations and statutes.  Further findings provide support for the importance of 
sufficiently defining service requirements and for establishing proper levels of 
commitment to acquisitions by internal customers.  An analysis of acquisition personnel 
turnover resulted in two practical findings in which statistically significant differences in 
the levels of contract compliance (with regulation and statutes) were discovered between 
groups of contracts with high acquisition personnel turnover and groups of contracts with 
low acquisition personnel turnover.  Finally, a negative association was found between 
the service outcomes of compliance with regulations and statutes and service quality—a 
finding that not only presents managerial implications but that may warrant further 
research to determine cause. 
B. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This section presents a discussion of the research results as well as of the 
theoretical and managerial implications of the research.  The results from the SEM 
analysis of the trimmed model are discussed when path estimates and their respective 
effect sizes and significance levels are referenced, as the trimmed model was found to be 
the most preferred model in the study.  This model exhibited good fit to the sample data 
and provided support for seven of the hypotheses.  Empirically, the SEM analysis 
resulted in statistically significant estimates for eight of the causal paths (Hypotheses 1, 
2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, and 22), moderately significant estimates for two of the causal paths 
(Hypotheses 5 and 14), and estimates with no statistical support for 12 of the causal paths 
(Hypotheses 4, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 15 through 21).   
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The order of the discussion in this section will coincide with the order of the 
sections within the literature review and with the numerical order of the 22 hypotheses.  
The proposed gaps model and the effectiveness of the proposed scale for the 
measurement of service quality in customer-defined B2B service acquisitions will be 
discussed first and will be followed by discussions of the results from hypothesis testing.   
1. Gaps Model and Service Quality Scale 
The primary theoretical implication of this study is the extension of service 
quality theory into B2B contexts.  The previous work of Kong and Mayo (1993) 
attempted to do this but fell short because their framework was limited to interfirm 
account services and was not directly applicable to B2B purchasing; a flaw in the model 
did not allow for generalization to service acquisitions in which service specifications are 
defined by the customer and not the service supplier. 
Furthermore, a scale for the measurement of B2B service quality was developed 
based on adaptations of Pasaruraman et al.’s (1988) SERVQUAL scale, in which two of 
the authors’ five service quality dimensions were retained and a new dimension, 
responsiveness to requirements, was added.  The scale performed well in EFA; all service 
quality measurement items loaded on one factor, once purified from 14 to 8 items, and 
exhibited an exceptionally high scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.96).  
Three of the eight measurement items retained after EFA were from the newly proposed 
dimension and each presented factor loadings greater than 0.89 on the primary factor, 
indicating that responsiveness to requirements successfully integrated with the two 
SERVQUAL dimensions that were retained.  This new scale offers value to researchers.  
First, it can be used to guide future research in the context of B2B service acquisitions.  
There is an apparent need for further improvements in the management of services 
acquisitions; the necessary first step is to apply valid measures when quality is examined.  
Second, existing service quality scales were not directly applicable to B2B services since 
they emphasized the delivery of off-the-shelf services by suppliers and assumed face-to-
face contact between customers and suppliers.  Previous findings based on these scales 
may need to be revisited since the measures that were used may not have been 
appropriate or valid in B2B contexts. 
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2. Regulatory and Statutory Compliance 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the compliance with regulations and statutes, the 
greater the service quality. 
The modeled path for Hypothesis 1 was found to be statistically significant with a 
moderate effect size.  However, the data did not support the a priori positive path 
coefficient. Instead, the model estimated a statistically significant, non-positive 
coefficient that reflected the following relationship: the lesser the compliance with 
regulations and statutes, the greater the service quality.  As such, service quality and 
compliance with regulations and statutes are somewhat mutually exclusive.  Several 
potential explanations of this result are offered. 
First, it is plausible that some of the regulations and statutes applicable to the U.S. 
Air Force’s acquisitions of services are successful at achieving public policy objectives 
but are detrimental to achieving the expected levels of service quality.  For example, 
competition requirements may force suppliers in highly competitive industries to lower 
the quantity or quality of service inputs to remain competitive in proposals, resulting in 
lower service levels.  Or, contract administrators who do not comply with competition 
requirements and, instead, issue non-competitive awards may be predisposed to enter into 
sole-source negotiations with a preferred supplier.  Alternatively, if competition does 
allow for the selection of higher-performing suppliers, the act of compliance with pre-
solicitation policies, regulations, and statutes (e.g., synopsis requirements, approvals, and 
solicitation reviews) may limit the time available for competition.  Coopers and Lybrand 
and The Analytical Sciences Corporation (1994) found that compliance with regulations 
and statutes drives an 18% cost premium to the DoD.  It is plausible that the true cost of 
compliance to the DoD also includes a premium on performance. 
A second possibility exists that the actions necessary to achieve compliance with 
the numerous regulations and statutes directly reduce the contract administrator’s ability 
to adequately monitor and assess performance and to address deficiencies with the 
supplier.  Compliance with labor law acts, such as the McNamara-O’Hara Service 
Contract Act or the Davis-Bacon Act, which require administrators to perform on-site 
interviews with contractor employees and to review payrolls, may unduly limit the 
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administrator’s available time to manage performance.  As such, in some instances, the 
government’s level of contract administration manpower may also be low enough that 
personnel are forced to tradeoff their available time between complying with statues and 
regulations and ensuring that the expected level of service performance is achieved.  DoD 
leadership also seems to favor the possibility that certain policies unduly overburden the 
contracting workforce.  For example, the USD(AT&L) recently issued guidance to 
reduce non-productive procurement processes through the elimination of non-valued 
added regulations and statutes, among other steps (USD[AT&L], 2010b).  The 
USD(AT&L) found that the DoD’s compliance with internal and congressional 
procurement reporting requirements not only cost the department an estimated 350 
million dollars annually but also took the acquisition workforce away from executing 
defense programs. 
Finally, regulations and statutes or actions by the contractor to comply with 
regulations and statutes may directly detract from the contractor’s ability to perform.  As 
before, the actions necessary for the contractor to comply with labor laws may detract 
from the time available to maintain service levels.  These laws may also prove to be a 
disincentive to the hiring of additional labor if the applicable prevailing wage rates are 
higher than the wages typically paid by the firm.  Alternatively, the focus on compliance 
may regress the government–contractor relationship to that of a compliance orientation 
instead of a relationship built on the relational exchange norms. 
3. Requirement Definition 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency 
of the requirement definition and service quality. 
Hypothesis 2 was supported in the model, with a statistically significant parameter 
estimate approaching a moderate effect size.  This finding supports non-empirical claims 
of other authors who have argued that sufficiently defining performance requirements is 
critical to obtaining desired levels of service.  It also provides empirical support for the 
proposed gaps model, in which end-user needs are translated into quality specifications 
and the difference between service expectation and perceptions is dependent on the 
sufficiency of the requirements documents.  Furthermore, this result bolsters the need to 
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address the requirements creep caused by poorly defined service specifications, as 
recently discussed in a USD(AT&L) guidance memorandum (USD[AT&L], 2010b).   
Hypothesis 3: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency 
of the requirement definition and regulatory and statutory compliance. 
The trimmed model offered moderate support for Hypothesis 3 and the associated 
argument that a well-defined requirement definition should also adequately define those 
actions required of the contractor to ensure compliance with regulations and statutes.  A 
wide variety of service types, contract types, and award amounts were represented by 
survey respondents in this study.  Since compliance-related actions required by the 
contractor are also likely to vary based on these factors, the level of significance and the 
small effect size obtained from the SEM analysis are not surprising.  For example, 
requirements documents for a firm-fixed-price acquisition of custodial services would 
likely contain far fewer compliance-related requirements for the supplier than a cost-plus-
award-fee contract for research and development.  As such, the proper estimation of this 
path may require the inclusion of moderating effects (i.e., interactions) due to contract 
complexity or other effects.  Nonetheless, it can be concluded that sufficiently defining 
the service requirement is a critically important task because it affects both service 
quality and the amount of compliance with regulations and statutes.  As such, managers 
must make certain that performance requirements and compliance-related requirements 
are well defined in requirements documents to achieve desired acquisition outcomes. 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the extent to which the contractor defines 
requirements, the greater the service quality. 
The SEM analysis did not provide support for Hypothesis 4. At first glance, this 
result seems to indicate that early integration of suppliers into the planning and 
solicitation phases of acquisitions has no direct, significant effect on service quality, 
which is counter to the findings of other authors who have argued for the effectiveness of 
early supplier integration (see, for example, Briscoe et al., 2004).  However, the lack of 
support for this hypothesis does not mean that early integration has no effect on service 
levels since the scale used in this study to measure service quality is based on gaps 
between expectations and actual observations of service levels and since the model path 
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also included a mediating variable.  Because the hypothesized relationship is a direct 
effect on service quality (excluding the indirect effect in which requirement definition 
sufficiency is a mediating variable), the causal path only represents direct effects on 
changes to expectations and/or observations of service levels; effects due to changes in 
the sufficiency of the requirement definition are accounted for elsewhere in the model.  
Therefore, supposing that the expected service level prior to award is defined as E, the 
supplier involvement in the definition of requirements results in a change in expectations, 
or ∆E, and the government expectation of the service level after pre-award interaction 
with the contractor is E’, where E’ = E + ∆E.  If the observed level of service (O), is 
commensurate with the buyer’s expected level of service, as communicated in the 
requirements documents, then O = E, O’ = E’, and ∆O must equal ∆E.  In reality, it 
would be unreasonable to expect that the observed service level always equals the 
expected service level (O = E); however, it is reasonable to expect that a prudent supplier 
would adequately perform the portion of the service that represents the change in 
expectations due to the supplier’s recommendations.  As such, it can still be expected that 
the change in the observed service level equals the change in the expected service level 
(∆O is still equal to ∆E), and the estimate of the causal path from extent contractor 
defined requirements to service quality would not be expected to differ significantly from 
zero.  Therefore, this nonsignificant finding should not be interpreted to mean that the 
early integration of suppliers has no effect on service levels, but rather that any increases 
or decreases in observed service levels due to early integration were likely offset by 
similar increases or decreases in expectations; when government–contractor 
communications prior to contract award changed the government’s expected service 
level, the contractor adequately performed to the change if the change in expected service 
level was not formalized in the requirements documents. 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the extent to which the contractor defines 
requirements, the greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Under ideal conditions, the contractor’s overall level of service performance 
would be the same as the level of performance specified in the requirements documents, 
and these documents would accurately reflect government expectations, such that the 
expected service level would equal the observed service level.  However, in reality and in 
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the sample used in this study, it is atypical for requirements documents to fully and 
accurately communicate the government’s expectations for performance of the service.  
As such, it seems reasonable that supplier interactions in defining requirements would 
also change how sufficiently the requirement definition describes the government’s 
service requirements.  The model estimated a small and non-positive relationship 
between the extent to which the contractor defined requirements and the sufficiency of 
the requirement definition, implying that greater involvement by the contractor in 
defining service requirements leads to a less sufficient definition of those requirements—
perhaps due to a greater gap between the contractor’s version of the work and the 
government’s true need. 
The results of Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 suggest that early integration of 
suppliers into procurement planning may be productive, or at least not detrimental, in 
aligning government expectations with contractor capabilities and industry standards.  
However, the government’s acquisition objectives may be at risk when potential suppliers 
directly influence how these objectives are communicated in the solicitation and contract.  
Additionally, it is important to note that the survey used a single-item scale to measure 
the extent to which the contractor defined requirements.  Because this extent cannot be 
readily observed, a multi-item scale may have been more appropriate for reliable 
measurement and would have allowed the model to account for any measurement error in 
the variables. 
4. Relational Exchange 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the communication between the government and the 
contractor, the greater the service quality. 
Hypothesis 7: The greater the communication between the government and the 
contractor, the greater the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 were both found to be supported by the sample data and 
presented the largest effect sizes on the key sourcing outcomes of service quality and 
regulatory and statutory compliance.  It is interesting that an aspect of relational exchange 
—communication—has a greater effect on key service outcomes than do any 
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transactional processes (e.g., requirements definition), resources (e.g., time), or 
characteristics of the involved personnel (e.g., experience).  This finding is in stark 
contrast to the way acquisition personnel are trained, educated, and developed.  Nowhere 
in their development are these valuable soft skills taught.  Perhaps more time should be 
devoted to the development and sustainment of relational norms such as solidarity, 
mutuality, flexibility, reciprocity, trust, commitment, and harmonization of conflict. 
5. Agency Theory 
Hypothesis 8: The greater the amount of government surveillance of contractor 
performance, the greater the service quality. 
Hypothesis 8, the relationship between the amount of government surveillance 
and service quality, was not supported in the model.  It is possible that many of the 
service contractors are capable of policing their own performance or that government–
contractor communication and trust were sufficient enough to eliminate the type of 
asymmetric information that might be obtained through surveillance of performance.  
Gundlach and Cannon (2009) also arrived at a similar conclusion that surveillance does 
not impact quality; they determined that information exchange was the most effective 
verification strategy in medium- and high-trust relationships and that corroboration with 
external sources may be the most effective strategy in low-trust relationships.  Such a 
finding as this may indicate that the continuous calls for the DoD to improve its oversight 
of contractors, such as those calls by the GAO, may be unwarranted, at least within the 
U.S.  Rather than investing contract management resources into increased supplier 
monitoring, contract administrators may be better served by increasing communications.  
As such, relational exchange seems to better account for supplier performance than do the 
precepts of transaction cost economics or agency theory.   
Hypothesis 9: The greater the extent to which performance-based services 
acquisition procedures are used, the greater the service quality. 
Hypothesis 9 was also found to be nonsignificant, indicating that no significant, 
direct relationship exists between the extent that PBSA procedures are used and service 
quality.  This is especially surprising considering that the benefits from using outcome-
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oriented requirements definitions had been well-supported by literature.  However, the 
survey used a single-item scale to measure the extent that PBSA procedures were 
integrated into the acquisition.  Because this extent cannot be readily observed, a multi-
item scale may have been more appropriate for reliable measurement and to account for 
measurement error.  Similarly, the subjective assessments by respondents as to the extent 
that PBSA procedures were used may have varied greatly with respect to interpretations 
of what constitutes a PBSA contract.  More than 78% of respondents reported that the 
extent that PBSA procedures were used was five or greater on a seven-point scale, with a 
mean reported value of 5.6.  As such, a subjective measure may not have been effective 
if, in reality, the majority of service acquisitions were not highly performance based. 
6. Resource-Based View of the Firm 
Hypothesis 10: The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater 
the service quality. 
Hypothesis 11: The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater 
the compliance with regulations and statutes. 
Hypothesis 12: The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater 
the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Of Hypotheses 10, 11, and 12, only Hypothesis 12 was supported in the model as 
hypothesized; the analysis produced a moderately-sized effect for this hypothesized path.  
The model estimated a small and negative path coefficient for Hypothesis 10 that was 
statistically significant, supporting an alternative argument that service quality decreases 
as the sufficiency of procurement lead-time increases.  No support was provided in the 
model for Hypothesis 11. 
Prior to considering the potential causes of the negative relationship that was 
estimated between procurement lead-time sufficiency and service quality, it is most 
appropriate to focus away from factors that are explained elsewhere in the model.  For 
example, in the context of DoD service acquisitions, one might normally expect that 
quality would increase when lead-time increases since the buyer(s) would have more time 
to perform critical pre-award tasks (such as performing market research, ensuring the 
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adequacy of the  SOW/PWS, completing contract reviews, issuing a synopsis and 
solicitation, and evaluating offers).  However, most of these factors were already 
accounted for elsewhere in the model.  For instance, requirement definition sufficiency 
was found to be positively related with the procurement lead-time sufficiency in 
Hypothesis 12.  In fact, a positive, indirect effect from procurement lead-time sufficiency 
to service quality exists through requirement definition sufficiency as a mediating 
variable. 
However, the path estimate from procurement lead-time sufficiency to regulatory 
and statutory compliance was not significant, indicating that buyers may be resilient 
against insufficient procurement lead-times when it comes to compliance with regulations 
and statutes.  As such, the negative path estimate from Hypothesis 10 is a result of factors 
that are external to regulatory and statutory compliance, requirement definition 
sufficiency, and impacts on service quality that are due to these regulations and statutes 
or to the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
One such external factor was examined in this study using regression analysis, 
and it was found that the greater the sufficiency of the procurement lead-time, the lesser 
the experience and APDP level of the buyer assigned to the acquisition.  To further 
explore the impacts on such an assignment of buyers, it is helpful to first step back and 
view how pre-award contract actions that occur during the period designated as 
procurement lead-time can affect performance outcomes. 
The measurement of service quality is based on differences between the 
expectations and perceptions of service levels over the life of the contract—after the 
contract has been awarded and performance has begun.  By definition, the sufficiency of 
procurement lead-time has immediate and direct impacts on actions that occur during pre-
award stages of the acquisition.  After contract award, it is possible to correct some, but 
not all, pre-award mistakes that affect service delivery through the use of contract 
modifications.  As an example, if the service requested was sufficiently defined by the 
requirements documents but did not meet actual demand, as was the case with the 
Department of Homeland Security’s acquisition of cruise ship berthing during Hurricane 
Katrina (see, for example, Snider & Rendon, 2008), then sourcing outcomes could be 
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negatively affected but could also be corrected through contract modification.  Other 
performance issues that are caused prior to award, such as when supplier evaluations 
result in an award to a low-performing supplier (i.e., adverse selection), may not be as 
easily corrected.  In this scenario, evaluation criteria in the solicitation may have been 
sufficient enough to meet regulatory requirements but not sufficient enough to select the 
best supplier, potentially due to the assignment of an inexperienced buyer.  Additional 
pre-award errors that might contribute to decreased service quality throughout the life of 
an acquisition are the selection of the wrong contract type or instrument, the 
misapplication of contract incentives, and the misuse of certain procedures, such as 
commercial-item acquisition procedures or simplified acquisition procedures.  The 
misuse of these procedures could prove detrimental to ensuring the government’s interest 
post-award because of limitations on the use of contract clauses, limitations on requiring 
cost or pricing data, or limitations on the government’s ability to oversee contractor 
performance.  If errors such as these are made by inexperienced buyers, long-term 
acquisition outcomes would likely be affected.  This also seems to be supported by 
regression results in this study in which acquisitions that were administered by personnel 
with five or less years of experienced were found to have lower levels of service quality 
than acquisitions administered by more experienced personnel.  
Overall, the SEM results show that procurement lead-time improves the 
sufficiency of the requirement definition, which, in turn, improves service quality and 
compliance with regulations and statutes.  However, it seems that requirements with 
sufficient lead-time (i.e., little pressure to award a contract) are not viewed to be as 
important to the internal customer or to contracting personnel; thus, perhaps less attention 
is afforded to the requirement and the buyer’s source selection process is also less 
rigorous, directly decreasing service quality. 
Hypothesis 13: The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the 
lesser the service quality. 
Hypothesis 14: The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the 
lesser the compliance with regulations and statutes. 
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Neither Hypothesis 13 nor Hypothesis 14 was fully supported in the SEM model.  
However, two highly significant regression results provided support for Hypothesis 14. 
In the first supporting regression, turnover was calculated as a ratio (percent) and 
modified to a binary variable about the median of 1.00 (100%).  A small, but highly 
significant, coefficient was estimated, indicating that compliance with regulations and 
statutes was significantly less on services acquisitions in which, over the life of the 
contract, more personnel had turned over than were assigned.  Such a result has strong 
implications for managers of contracting organizations in which it appears likely that the 
continuity of tasks necessary for compliance breaks down as turnover approaches 100%.  
Furthermore, survey responses indicated that personnel turnover is not adequately 
managed and, in many cases, is highly excessive (possibly due to deployments, 
reassignments, cannibalization of skilled personnel by other agencies that have recently 
increased hiring, retirements due to an aged workforce, and normal attrition).  In the 
sample data, the mean respondent was assigned to a contract in which turnover was in 
excess of 120%.  Nearly 25% of respondents were assigned contracts in which turnover 
was at least 200% and 7.5% of respondents were assigned to contracts in which turnover 
was at least 300%.  Alternatively, only 27.5% of respondents were assigned to contracts 
in which turnover was less than 50%, and less than 16% of respondents were assigned to 
contracts with less than 25% turnover.  Figure 12 presents a histogram of percent 


















Percent turnover of acquisition personnel
 
Figure 12.  Histogram of Percent Turnover of Acquisition Personnel 
This result was further developed when the length of time after the contract was 
awarded was also considered and percent turnover was recalculated as an annualized 
percentage.  Once again, the measure was modified into a binary variable with a cut 
about the median, where median annualized turnover was 42%.  Similar to the previous 
regression result, this relationship from turnover to compliance with regulations and 
statutes was found to be highly significant, approaching a moderate effect size.  The 
results indicate that service acquisitions with more than 42% annual turnover are 
significantly less compliant with regulations and statutes than those service acquisitions 
with less than 42% annual turnover.  As before, the rates of turnover are alarming.  The 
mean respondent sampled was assigned to a contract in which personnel had turned over 
in excess of 65% annually.  Nearly 19% of respondents were assigned to contracts in 
which acquisition personnel turned over at least once annually, and less than 16% were 
assigned to contracts in which personnel turned over less than 10% annually.  Figure 13 
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Figure 13.  Histogram of Annualized Percent Turnover of Acquisition Personnel 
The results of testing Hypothesis 14 and the demographics of the data collected 
paint a dismal picture of the state of personnel turnover in the acquisition workforce.  To 
properly achieve acquisition objectives, specifically that of compliance with acquisition 
regulations and statutes, managers must drastically reduce the current levels of turnover.  
First, managers should avoid assigning temporary employees or those employees due to 
rotate, deploy, separate, or retire to manage service contracts and instead should assign 
those personnel who are expected to be retained throughout the life of the contract.  
Furthermore, agencies should consider establishing goals and procedures to reduce 
personnel turnover and should direct that units report turnover metrics periodically.  
These metrics should be used to track agency-level trends and to identify and stabilize 
those units that exhibit levels of personnel turnover greater than 100% over the life of 
service contracts, or 42% annually. 
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7. Competence-Based View of the Firm 
Hypothesis 15: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of 
contract administrator experience and the sufficiency of the requirement 
definition. 
Hypothesis 16: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of 
contract administrator experience and regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Hypothesis 17: The greater the contract administrator’s APDP certification level, 
the greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Hypothesis 18: The greater the contract administrator’s APDP certification level, 
the greater the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Hypothesis 19: The greater the contract administrator’s education level, the 
greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Hypothesis 20: The greater the contract administrator’s education level, the 
greater the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
None of these six hypotheses stemming from theory on the competence-based 
view of the firm were found to be statistically significant in the SEM model.  However, 
several plausible explanations may exist for why this is the case.   
First, it may be that the government contract administrator’s interaction in the 
development of requirements documents is not significant enough to greatly impact the 
sufficiency of requirements documents or the customer’s ability to communicate service 
expectations.  In practice, contract administrators are likely to perform reviews of 
requirements documents to ensure adequacy (FAR, 2005b), but administrators are 
unlikely to have an in-depth understanding of how services should be performed or the 
level of performance that internal customers require.  This may be especially true when 
acquisitions are for highly technical services such as medical services, research and 
development, or information technology services. 
Second, it is important to note that less experienced personnel, who will have a 
lower APDP certification level and are less likely to have attained higher levels of 
education, may be assigned to administer simpler service contracts that are less burdened 
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with regulations, such as those acquired using simplified acquisition procedures.  
Achieving full compliance on such an acquisition may be more feasible for an 
inexperienced buyer than doing so on a large, complex service acquisition that may 
employ cost-type line-items or undefinitized contractual actions.  This theory may be 
substantiated, to some degree, by the finding that a statistically significant difference in 
means of requirement definition sufficiency existed between APDP Level II and APDP 
Level III personnel, in which the average Level II respondent reported a higher level of 
requirement definition sufficiency.  This finding indicates that more qualified personnel 
may typically be assigned to more complex acquisitions in which contract outcomes and 
performance measures, such as those that would be communicated in requirements 
documents, are harder to define.  Applying this relationship—that personnel who possess 
the least experience and knowledge in the area of contract compliance are assigned to the 
simplest service contracts and those personnel with the greatest experience and 
knowledge are assigned to the most complex service contracts—all personnel may be 
challenged equally.   
Third, it should be considered that multiple contract administration personnel are 
often assigned to services acquisitions, even on common acquisitions such as base 
support services.  For situations in which multiple administrators are assigned, the 
measurement of experience is only an indicator of the respondent’s experience and not an 
adequate representation of experience for all contract administration personnel assigned a 
the service acquisition. 
Finally, it is quite possible that the contract administrator who responded to the 
survey is not the same individual who awarded the contract, as evidenced by the high 
levels of turnover that were previously discussed.  As such, the effects from buyer 
experience, training, and education at all stages in the procurement may not be properly 
accounted for in the sample data. 
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8. Internal Customer Commitment 
Hypothesis 21: The greater the internal customer’s commitment to the service 
acquisition, the greater the compliance with regulations and statutes. 
No support was provided for a direct effect from internal customer commitment to 
regulatory and statutory compliance, although a significant indirect effect was found 
through the mediating variable requirement definition sufficiency.  The absence of a 
direct effect is not surprising when consideration is given to the types of regulations and 
statutes that are applicable to the acquisition of services; many are central to contracting 
as a function and require compliance by the contracting office, or at least require 
significant interaction by contracting personnel.  As such, the contract administrator may 
often become the overseer of regulatory and statutory requirements while the internal 
customer focuses on contractor surveillance and issues that may arise during service 
delivery, at least in relatively small service contracts for operational support. 
Hypothesis 22: The greater the internal customer’s commitment to the service 
acquisition, the greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
The model did support Hypothesis 22, estimating a moderately sized effect that 
greater commitment to the service acquisition by the internal customer results in a greater 
sufficiency of the requirement definition.  A review of the results from the trimmed 
structural model reveals that the level of internal customer commitment is, in fact, the 
largest determinant of the sufficiency of the requirement definition.  Because the 
requirement definition impacts both service quality and regulatory and statutory 
compliance, the adequacy of commitment from the internal customer also has second-
order effects on service outcomes.  Thus, managers should assess commitment and assign 
only committed employees to manage service contracts. 
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research Question 1: What are the determinants of services sourcing 
performance? 
In the final structural model, service quality was directly dependent on five 
variables: compliance with statutes and regulations, communication between the 
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government and contractor, sufficiency of the requirement definition, sufficiency of 
procurement lead-time, and the amount of turnover of acquisition personnel.  The other 
sourcing performance outcome, compliance with regulations and statutes, was directly 
dependent on three variables: communication between the government and contractor, 
sufficiency of the requirement definition, and the amount of turnover of acquisition 
personnel.  Additional analysis also uncovered a significant relationship between the 
contract manager’s experience (years) and the quality of the service. 
Research Question 2: Which determinant(s) have the greatest impact on the key 
contract outcomes of service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance? 
The extent of communication between the government and the contractor appears 
to have the greatest impact on both outcomes, exhibiting highly significant path estimates 
with large effect sizes to these outcome variables.  The amount of compliance with 
regulations and statutes exhibited a significant but negative and moderately sized effect 
on service quality.  Effect sizes for all other path estimates leading to the contract 
outcomes were small and varied in the level of significance; notable second-order effects 
came from the sufficiency of procurement lead-time and the level of commitment to the 
acquisition by the internal customer. 
Research Question 3: How can service quality be validly measured in a business-
to-business context? 
A 14-item scale was proposed in Chapter III for the measurement of service 
quality in business-to-business applications that was found to exhibit excellent reliability, 
as measured by Cronbach’s coefficient alpha.  This scale was based on a five-dimension 
SERVQUAL scale that was developed by Parasuraman et al. (1988), in which two of the 
original dimensions were retained and a new dimension, responsiveness to requirements, 
was added.  This new dimension is comprised of five items and addresses a literary gap 
in the measurement of service quality in contractual and business relationships in which 
service requirements and performance standards are established by the purchasing 
organization and not the service supplier. 
126 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation 1:  Limit the turnover of acquisition personnel to no more than 
100% over the life of contracts and 42% annually. 
Increased levels of turnover were found to be detrimental to the contracting 
officer’s ability to ensure compliance with acquisition regulations and statutes.  In 
particular, the results from regression analysis indicate that acquisitions are substantially 
less compliant with regulations and statutes once turnover reaches critical thresholds of 
100% over the life of the contract, or 42% annually.  At or above these levels, it seems 
that continuity is lost in the contract administration process and personnel are forced to 
focus resources away from compliance and toward other elements of administration in 
order to ensure an adequate level of performance.  Although a certain level of personnel 
turnover may be unavoidable due to deployments, retirements, and regular rotations, 
managers should avoid assigning temporary personnel to manage service acquisitions 
and, instead, should assign those personnel who the manager best anticipates retaining 
throughout the life of the contract.  
Furthermore, agencies should develop metrics to track the rates of acquisition 
personnel turnover according to contract type.  Table 59 presents an example of several 
appropriate metrics that have been completed using the data acquired in this study.  
Turnover metrics should not only be used by agencies to identify turnover-related risks in 
classes of services but also should be reported to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) so that DoD-wide trends and areas for improvement can be identified.  
Additionally, data gathered by agencies and the OSD should be used to concentrate 
contract reviews and inspections on classes of services acquisitions that are at the highest 
risk of being non-compliant with acquisition regulations and statutes due to excessive 
levels of personnel turnover. 
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Maintenance/repair 120.19% 57.14% $4,946,596.58 1.81E-05
Professional, administrative 
and management support
103.54% 66.56% $5,211,690.23 8.68E-06
Utilities and housekeeping 118.42% 62.06% $3,036,980.78 1.02E-05
Medical 98.87% 99.08% $2,628,672.47 1.77E-05
Education and training 195.89% 87.23% $3,597,922.50 4.88E-06
Architect-engineering 101.56% 65.31% $2,351,853.94 9.48E-06
Quality control, testing, and 
inspection
75.00% 45.94% $719,448.75 4.94E-06
Research and development 45.83% 12.83% $1,354,166.67 1.31E-06
Other 136.29% 72.35% $7,203,481.92 6.59E-06
 
Recommendation 2:  Establish buyer–supplier relationship management skills as 
a core competency of the acquisition workforce through the incorporation of 
skills training into acquisition curriculums at all levels. 
The extent of communication between the government and contractor was found 
to have the greatest impact on contract outcomes.  As Gundlach and Cannon (2009) 
assert, it is reasonable that information exchanges and the development of relational 
norms, particularly of trust between the contractual parties, enhance performance and 
may be a more appropriate method of verification than surveillance and formal 
evaluation, at least in the case of some procurements in which low levels of trust are not 
present.  DoD acquisition training programs do not currently focus on the development of 
buyer–supplier relationship management skills.  For example, nowhere does the Defense 
Acquisition University, or on-the-job training, teach the strategic segmentation of spend 
(see, for example, Kraljic, 1983).  This is a prerequisite for not only sourcing strategy but 
also for supplier management because it determines the appropriate relationship—
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transaction or collaborative.  In reality, many strategic suppliers are treated as 
transactional, and far too many resources are utilized on other spend that is truly 
transactional (e.g., the procurement of furniture).  Acquisition training programs should 
capitalize on opportunities to increase buyer–supplier relationship management skills 
such as communication; acquisition personnel need to know how to effectively 
communicate expectations for performance, keep all parties informed of new 
developments, provide information that helps both parties achieve acquisition objectives, 
effectively communicate the government’s needs, and listen carefully to communications 
from the contractor and other acquisition team members. 
Recommendation 3: Ensure that assigned internal customers are fully committed 
to services acquisitions prior to engaging in procurement processes. 
The results of SEM analysis in this study indicated that a high level of 
commitment from the internal customer is necessary to sufficiently define acquisition 
requirements and ultimately procure high-quality services.  The internal customers of 
service acquisitions need to devote the manpower necessary to adequately communicate 
requirements to prospective contractors; to develop evaluation criteria and participate in 
source selections; to assess and manage contractor performance through surveillance, 
information exchanges, or other verification methods; to manage changes to service 
requirements; and to communicate with suppliers during performance.  Furthermore, 
internal customers must commit to assigning their best talent to managing services 
contracts, as Ellram et al. (2007) asserted.  Specifically, managers should identify and 
assign those personnel who exhibit traits similar to those measured in the internal 
customer commitment scale: pride in membership of the service acquisition team, a sense 
of purpose when acquisition objectives are achieved, care for the long-term success of the 
acquisition, and dedication to ensuring the acquisition meets requirements.  Although 
these traits are subjective in nature, feedback from supervisors and all members of the 
acquisition team may allow for the identification of the most suitable personnel as well as 
the identification of those personnel who may be less qualified, or less appropriate, for an 
assignment to managing a service acquisition. 
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Furthermore, the manpower standards of internal customers may need to be 
reviewed to determine whether units are being adequately staffed to handle service 
contracts.  For example, many of the U.S. Air Force’s common installation-level service 
contract requirements are generated by civil engineering (CE) units and are managed, in 
part, by the CE operations flight.  The Air Force Manpower Standard (AFMS) 44EO is 
used to determine the appropriate level of manning for this flight, in conjunction with Air 
Force Instruction 63-124 (U.S. Air Force, 2005), but does not specify how units should 
assign personnel for the management of service acquisitions or the appropriate level of 
manning for acquisition-related tasks such as performing quality assurance functions 
(U.S. Air Force, 2000).  Organizations such as CE that lack a methodology for 
determining manning levels for service contract management may consider adopting 
some of the standards used by the U.S. Air Force contracting community, which 
considers acquisition type and value, among other factors, when determining adequate 
unit manning (U.S. Air Force, 2001). 
Recommendation 4: Pursue initiatives to better educate customers on methods to 
effectively develop requirements documents; develop high-quality requirements 
documents templates for commonly acquired services. 
The government’s ability to write sufficiently-defined requirements is paramount 
to achieving service levels that meet customer expectations.  However, few enterprise-
level training programs exist that instruct customers how to best define their 
organization’s requirements.  Similarly, no APDP certification standard is established for 
such personnel, who may have few or no resources to rely on when tasked with the 
planning of service procurements.  Instituting certification programs for internal 
customers will not only increase the sufficiency of requirement definitions but also may 
increase personnel efficiency, increase procurement lead-times, and decrease post-award 
modifications to customer requirements.  Similarly, agencies should mandate monthly 
contracting stand-down days for contract managers, contracting officers, internal 
customers, and program managers.  In these sessions, expert trainers should provide live 
continuous learning over the Internet via a centralized training platform and should 
provide personnel with updates on best practices, acquisition tools, and policy changes. 
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Furthermore, offering high-quality templates of requirements documents for the 
most commonly acquired services may increase the quality of those services, promote 
greater compliance with regulations and statutes such as the acquisition of commercial 
services and the use of PBSA procedures, facilitate strategic sourcing, increase lead-
times, and increase the availability of internal customer manpower to prepare for source 
selection and post-award functions.  As such, agencies should consider establishing an 
electronic repository of work statements for commonly acquired commercial services, 
such as custodial services and refuse services.  Such a system would allow for the sharing 
of high-quality work statements and would permit agencies to track and report the 
number of different requirements documents that are in use for each commercial service.  
Agencies should also establish goals for the standardization of work statements for 
certain acquisitions and use should metrics from the repository to track status by 
organization. 
Finally, agencies should consider requiring that units provide monthly reports of 
the number of contract changes and contractor claims that result from poor specifications 
and insufficiently defined requirements.  These metrics should be included in the criteria 
for unit awards and be a mandatory input to annual performance reports of unit directors 
and commanders of contracting units as well as to those of internal customers.  
Furthermore, these metrics should be used to identify trends in the sufficiency of 
requirements documents for commonly procured services and to evaluate improvements 
gained by the standardization of work statements.  
Recommendation 5: Revise or remove non-value added regulations and statutes; 
investigate which regulations and statutes are detrimental to acquisition 
outcomes. 
A non-positive relationship was found between the extent of compliance with 
regulations and statutes and service quality.  This result suggests that the effects of 
regulations and statutes should be analyzed to assess whether any are directly detrimental 
to service quality or whether the individual act of compliance with a regulation or statute 
or the collective act of compliance with all overburdens contract administrators to the 
point that resources are insufficiently allocated to the management of contractor 
131 
 
performance.  Additional analysis should also be performed at the unit level to ensure 
that compliance is equal among all contracts and that contracts with high-performing 
suppliers are not overlooked or filed away. 
Recommendation 6: Implement a performance-evaluation system for service 
contracts using the service quality scale. 
Agencies should integrate the service quality scale into a supplier performance-
evaluation system to assess and rate the performance of service suppliers throughout the 
life of acquisitions.  Simpson, Siguaw, and White (2002) argued for the importance of 
regular feedback between buyers and suppliers.  With regular and continuous feedback, 
suppliers can concentrate resources on improving those dimensions of service delivery 
that are most important to the buyer.  However, the DoD’s current method of rating 
contractor performance, the contractor performance assessment reporting system 
(CPARS), with few exceptions, only assesses performance annually and is more 
appropriate for use as past performance information (i.e., used to inform source selection 
decisions) than as a means of continuous supplier improvement (Straight, 1999).  
Periodic ratings using a service quality scale could address this deficiency and could also 
be used to rank-order suppliers based on performance, to segment services spend by high- 
and low-performing suppliers, and to assess the performance of individual buying 
activities.  As such, rather than focusing on compliance as recommended by the GAO 
(e.g., more oversight), agencies could focus directly on improving the performance of 
service suppliers and the ultimate quality of those services acquired.  Finally, through the 
implementation of a supplier performance-evaluation system based on a service quality 
scale and of the electronic submittal and aggregation of ratings, agencies could regularly 
assess the quality of acquired services at an enterprise level using a services quality 
barometer or quality index (see, for example, Fornell, 1992).  Such an assessment would 
allow for the identification of macro-level performance trends by service type or by top 
suppliers, or even allow for the evaluation of overall trends resulting from policy changes 
or external factors. 
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E. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study was limited in several areas.  First, research was performed using a 
representative sample from a population.  Because this sample came solely from the U.S. 
Air Force, the study findings may not generalize to the DoD, other federal agencies, or 
the private sector.  Additionally, a convenience sample rather than a random sample was 
used.  Convenience samples may introduce bias in respondents.  Second, service contract 
administrators were asked to respond directly to questions that were indicators of the key 
contract outcomes, service quality and regulatory and statutory compliance.  In some 
circumstances, the contract administrator may not have had a complete and accurate 
understanding of the contractor’s performance because this individual may not have been 
an end user of the service and may not have typically performed quality assurance 
functions.  When answering questions regarding contract compliance, contract 
administrators also may not have responded in a manner that reflected the true level of 
contract compliance if they were not genuinely aware of all of the regulations and statutes 
applicable to the acquisition.  For example, an administrator who was unaware that 
competition requirements applied to an acquisition would not have considered the 
acquisition’s level of compliance with competition requirements when responding to the 
survey.  Additionally, some degree of socially desirable response bias may be present for 
cases in which respondents were reluctant to tell the truth regarding sensitive or 
vulnerable areas (e.g., contract compliance).  Finally, the data in this study represent the 
self-reported perceptions of contracting professionals.  As with all self-reported data, 
there is a potential for common method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). 
F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study primarily focused on the contract outcomes of service quality and 
compliance with regulations and statutes.  However, the desired outcomes of public 
policy, such as those implemented in the FAR, typically differ from those of corporate 
policies in that goals of public policies are numerous and occasionally conflict.  For 
example, corporate policies for purchasing within a private organization may only focus 
on achieving an optimal mix of price (or total ownership costs) and quality. The 
outcomes of public procurement policy, especially policy at the federal level, also include 
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maximizing competition, furthering socioeconomic goals, and ensuring transparency and 
fairness in the procurement process.  The determinants of each of these outcomes and 
their interactions could be further explored. 
Furthermore, this study only examined the determinants of services sourcing 
performance within the U.S. Air Force.  This population could be extended in future 
research through the application of the model to other federal populations, such as 
another DoD Service, the DoD at-large, or other federal agencies.  If properly executed, 
the results of these studies could be compared in an SEM package using multi-group 
analysis to evaluate the relative effectiveness of organizational policies.  Alternatively, 
the survey could be redeployed, with some modification, to procurement officers in the 
private sector.  Such an approach would allow for a broader interpretation of the model 
and would allow for a comparative approach between public- and private-sector sourcing 
of B2B services. 
Finally, future research could address the need to better measure variables that 
were measured in this study using single-item scales—the extent that the contractor 
defined requirements and the extent that PBSA procedures were used.  Future studies 
may either attempt to use a multiple-item scale to account for measurement error or 
assess these extents using objective measures. 
G. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, this study examined the determinants of services sourcing 
performance through a quantitative analysis of survey responses from 240 U.S. Air Force 
contract administrators.  These responses were analyzed using SEM and other statistical 
techniques to test 22 hypothesized relationships.  In brief, the service outcomes of service 
quality and regulatory and statutory compliance were found to be most highly dependent 
on government–contractor communication and on the sufficiency of requirement 
definitions.  Additional analysis revealed effects on the service outcomes from buyer 
experience and the turnover of acquisition personnel.  Significant second-order effects on 
acquisition outcomes were also found that led from the level of commitment to the 
acquisition by internal customers to the sufficiency of procurement lead-time.  
Furthermore, a non-positive relationship was found between the level of compliance with 
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regulations and statutes and service quality.  Finally, this study bridged a literature gap in 
the measurement of service quality in customer-defined B2B services and offered service 
contract practitioners within the U.S. Air Force a comprehensive model to better improve 
the outcomes of service acquisitions. 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
  
 Exploring USAF Services Contracting 
Purpose 
 
Responses to this questionnaire will be used to analyze factors affecting service contract 
outcomes.  Your response is requested no later than 15 June 2010.    
 
This DoD-funded research is being conducted through the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. Participation from professionals, such as you, 
is very important for the success of this research. First, you will be helping a fellow USAF 
Contracting Officer complete a rigorous MBA program.  More importantly, your response will 
help the researchers analyze service contract outcomes. The results of this study will 
generate recommendations for further improvements to how the DoD can better manage 
services acquisitions.   
 
Procedures. Your extent of participation in this research involves only the completion of this 
questionnaire. 
 
Synopsis. This is both an anonymous and voluntary questionnaire. (Please note, in order to 
obtain consistent and usable results, it is important that you answer all questions). It will 
take most respondents approximately 15 to 25 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
 
Risks and Benefits. Your participation in this research poses no known risk. There will be no 
personal benefits beyond having contributed your expertise to this important research.  If 
desired, you may contact the researcher below if you would like to receive a report of the 
results of the study.   
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. All records of this study will be kept confidential and, since 
responses are anonymous, your privacy will not be at risk.  No information will be publicly 
accessible which could identify you as a participant. Responses will be maintained by NPS 
for five years, after which they will be destroyed.   
 
Points of Contact. Should you have any questions or comments regarding this survey, 
please contact the Principal Investigators: Captain William Muir, USAF, (831) 236-1179, 
wamuir@nps.edu, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Hawkins, USAF, (831) 656-7647, DSN 756-7647, 
tghawkin@nps.edu, or Dr. Gregory Hildebrandt, gghildeb@nps.edu.  Any other questions or 
concerns may be addressed to the IRB Chair, Dr. Angela O'Dea, (831) 656-3966, DSN 756-
3966, alodea@nps.edu. This survey was reviewed and approved by the Air Force Survey 
Office (survey control number 10-063, expires 15 June 2010). 
 
Thank you for your time and your participation in this effort.  Individuals such as you help 
researchers to advance both the theory and practice of contract management. 
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 Exploring USAF Services Contracting 
Instructions and Consent  
 
A)  Please answer the questions honestly in your best judgment to the best of your 
knowledge. Answers are nonattributional; no personal information will be asked or recorded 
in the resulting research report.  In your responses, please do not include personal 
identifying information or information restricted under operational security. 
 
B)  Throughout the survey, you will be required to select one answer per row only. Where 
there are exceptions to this rule and multiple answers are acceptable, the questions' 
instructions will include a specific instruction to “select all that apply”. 
 
C)  You can jump back and forth through the questions if you need to change an answer or 
want to review your answers. 
 
D)  Your answers will be saved as soon as you select them, but they will not be locked until 





* 1. By clicking on the “Proceed” button, I am acknowledging that I have read and 
understand this information, that I understand the nature and purpose of this 
study – including its risks and benefits, and that I agree to voluntarily 
participate in this online survey. I also understand that I may discontinue at any 
time simply by exiting this website. 
  
 □  Proceed          □  Exit 
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For the remainder of this survey, please choose a single, specific service contract that you 
currently administer or have administered in the past 12 months and answer all of the 
questions with respect to that contract.  Note: you may choose a contract, blanket purchase 
agreement, purchase order, or delivery/task order (or any other contractual instrument 
excluding the government purchase card or imprest funds) that has been awarded for the 
acquisition of services.  Preferably, choose a multi-year contract, but if your experience is 
limited to another type of instrument (per above), that is sufficient. 
 
* 1.  What type of service is the contractor performing? 
□ Research and Development     □ Architect-Engineering     □ Maintenance / Repair      
□ Modification of Equipment     □ Medical Services     □ Utilities and Housekeeping 
□ Quality Control, Testing, and Inspection       □ Education and Training      
□ Professional, Administrative & Management Support Services     □ Other: 
 
* 2.  What is the contract type? 
□ Fixed Price    □ Cost Reimbursement    □ Time and Materials     □ Labor Hour 
□ Hybrid     □ Other:  
 
* 3.  What letter is in the ninth position of the contract number?  This letter indicates 
the type of contract instrument used.  For example, if the contract number is N00023-90-




* 4.  Do the services being performed meet the definition of a commercial item, as 
defined in FAR Part 2?  Select “Yes” only if your contract included the clause FAR 
52.212-4. 




Page | 4 
 
 Section 2 




* 5.  What type of incentive(s)/disincentives(s) does this contract contain – if 
any?  (Check all that apply) 
□ Award Fee     □ Incentive Fee     □ Award Term     □ Performance-Based Payments 
□ Performance Incentive     □ Delivery Incentive     □ Liquidated Damages clause 
□ This Contract Does Not Contain any Incentives / Disincentives    □ Other:  
 
* 6.  What is the total dollar value of financial incentives available in this contract? 
Enter 0 if you did not identify any incentives in the previous question.  (Examples:  
amount of award fee pool, maximum incentive fee available, potential revenue if an 




* 7.  Please fill in answers to the following questions. 
a. How many acquisition personnel (contracting officers + contract specialists + 
contracting officer representatives + quality assurance evaluators/personnel + 
inspectors + program/project manager or other active representative of the user) 
are currently assigned to this contract?  Include only those individuals who actively, 
routinely help manage the contract. 
 
 
b. Over the life of this contract, how many different times have personnel turned over?  
Consider all Contract Administrators, Contract Specialists, Contracting Officers, 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives, and Quality Assurance Personnel who actively, 
routinely helped manage the contract.  (For example, if the Contract Administrator 
changed twice, the Contracting Officer changed once, and Quality Assurance 
Personnel changed three times hen the answer would be six) 
 
 
c. How long has this contract been in effect?  Please answer in months. 
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* 8.  Please fill in the number of days it took to award this contract – (i.e., from 
the first day that your internal customer requested the service contract to the 
day that you awarded the contract) 
  
     
* 9.  When only considering the period of time during which you were assigned to 
this contract, on average, how many contract actions were you working per day?  
(A contract action  is defined herein as a justification & approval, determination & finding, 
market research report, solicitation, award, modification, meeting with the contractor, 
meeting with internal/Government stakeholder(s), site visit, negotiation, ratification, 
quality deficiency report, award fee determination, consultation with Legal, payment, 
contractor performance assessment report, claim, bid protest, termination, or closeout of 
a contractual instrument) 
  
 
* 10.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “None” and 7 represents 
“substantial,” to what extent, if any, did the contractor help define the 
requirements prior to contract award?  The contractor’s help defining requirements 
includes questions before and after the issuance of the solicitation, participation in 
industry days, responses to requests for information, responses to draft RFQ/RFP, and 
any other dialogue with the contracting officer or specialist.   
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* 11.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Much Worse than I Expected” and 
7 represents “Much Better than I Expected”, rate the following: 
a. The quality of the contractor’s work. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. When the contractor’s management promises to do something by a certain time, it 
does so. 
  □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. How polite the contractor’s employees are. 
  □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. How much you feel safe in your interactions with the contractor’s employees. 
  □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. How much you can trust employees of the contractor. 
  □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. The contractor satisfied our need. 
  □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
g. The contractor’s dependability. 
  □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
h. The contractor performed the work we needed it to do. 
  □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
i. The contractor’s keeping of its records accurately. 
  □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
j. The timeliness of the contractor’s work. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
k. The contractor met the requirements of the contract. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
l. When you have problems, the contractor’s management is sympathetic and 
reassuring. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
m. The contractor provides its services at the time it promises to do so. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
n. The adequacy of the support the contractor’s employees receive from their company 
to do their jobs well. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
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* 12.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 
represents “Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. In our relationship, the government and contractor effectively communicate 
expectations for each other's performance. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. I did not have enough time to award a quality contract. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. The milestones for awarding this contract were too aggressive. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. My leadership or my customer wanted this contract awarded too fast. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. This contract is compliant with all applicable policy letters, the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation and its Supplements, and procurement law. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. In our relationship, the government and the contractor keep each other informed 
of new developments. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
g. There is nothing wrong with this contract. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
h. This contract does not violate applicable requirements of policy letters, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), FAR Supplements, or procurement law. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
i. This contractor listens carefully to my requests. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
j. I was not rushed to award this contract. 
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* 13.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 
represents “Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. The requirement was very well defined in the contract. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. The contract (including the statement of work, performance work statement, 
specification, drawings, etc.) defined the requirement very well. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. If this contract were to be inspected by an independent organization, it would be 
deemed compliant. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. In our relationship, the government and contractor provide each other with 
information that helps both parties. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. There were no flaws or omissions in the definition of the requirement (including the 
statement of work, performance work statement, specification, drawings, etc.). 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. There are aspects of this contract that, if changed, would make it more compliant 
with policy, laws, or regulations. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
g. I am able to communicate my needs effectively to this contractor. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
h. The requirement, as defined in the contract, expressed to the contractor exactly 
what we needed. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
i. There were no ambiguities in the definition of the requirement (including the 
statement of work, performance work statement, specification, drawings, etc.). 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
j. I had sufficient time to get this contract awarded. 
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* 14.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Not at all” and 7 represents “Great 
extent”, rate the extent to which this service contract is performance based.  (In 
Performance Based Services Acquisition, requirements are defined in terms of results to 
be achieved rather than the manner of performing the work.) 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
* 15.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “No Monitoring of Supplier” and 7 
represents “Extensive Monitoring of Supplier”, rate the amount of government 
surveillance of the contractor’s performance in the following areas: 
a. Service Quality 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. Timeliness of Performance 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. Fulfillment of Performance Requirements in the Statement of Work/Performance 
Work Statement 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. Compliance With Contract Terms & Conditions 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
* 16.  The government uses the following method(s) to perform surveillance of the 
contractor’s performance:  (select all that apply) 
□ Customer Complaint     □ Periodic Inspection     □ 100-Percent Inspection 
□ Other:   
 
* 17.  If the means of surveillance involves inspections other than customer 
complaints, what is the total number of inspections that occur on this contract 
per year?  (If surveillance is only accomplished by customer complaint then enter “0” 
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* 18.  Considering all of the quality assurance personnel who are assigned to this 
contract, how many total years of work experience does the government’s 
quality assurance team have in the technical area of performance applicable to 
this contract? (For example, if there are three quality assurance personnel assigned to 
monitor a contract for aircraft maintenance services, and their years of experience of 
inspecting and conducting aircraft maintenance are five, four, and nine years, then the 
total years of experience for the team would be 18) 
 
 
* 19.  Do third-party, contracted personnel perform any function of the 
government’s contract management or quality assurance on this contract? (For 
example, if the government contracted with Contractor A to perform quality assurance on 
a service contract performed by Contractor B then the answer would be “Yes”) 
□ Yes    □ No 
 
* 20.  Please indicate the total number of formal communications to the contractor 
concerning issue(s) with satisfying contract requirements.  Communications 
include:  quality deficiency reports, corrective action requests, requests for 
reperformance, letters of concern, and show cause notices. 
 
 
* 21.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Not at All” and 7 represents “Great 
Extent”, rate the following: 
a. To what extent is your primary internal customer proud to be a member of this 
service acquisition team? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. To what extent does your primary internal customer feel a sense of purpose when 
the team achieves specific acquisition objectives? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. To what extent does your primary internal customer care about the long-term 
success of this acquisition? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. To what extent is your primary internal customer dedicated to ensuring the 
acquisition meets requirements? 
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* 22.  By which agency are you employed? 
□ United States Air Force    □ United States Army     □ United States Navy 
□ Other:   
 
* 23.  At the time you started working on this service contract, what was the 
highest level of Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP) 
certification that you held in the area of Contracting? 
□ APDP Level 1     □ APDP Level 2    □ APDP Level 3     □ No Contracting APDP Certification 
 
* 24.  What is the highest level of education that you have attained? 
□ High School Diploma / GED          □ Associates          □ Bachelors 
□ Masters          □ Doctoral / Professional 
 
* 25.  Besides Acquisition Profession Development Program certifications, do you 
hold any other professional certifications (such as those granted by the National 
Contract Management Association, the Institute for Supply Management, or 
other professional associations)? 
□ Yes     □ No 
 








* 28.  What is your gender? 
□ Male    □ Female 
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Good Afternoon Squadron Commanders, 
 
To support services acquisition research sponsored by Mr. Roger Correll (SAF/AQC) and Brig Gen 
Masiello (AFPEO/CM)—see attached letter, we respectfully request your assistance to complete 
the web-based survey located at the hyperlink below.  The survey uses quantitative methods to 
study the determinants of sourcing performance for services acquisition.  Unit participation is 
voluntary; however, responses are vital to research on the management of service acquisitions 
within the Air Force.  Additionally, this research is part of a student thesis project at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  For your convenience, a hard copy of the survey is attached.    
 
Please take the following steps: 
 
1.  Forward Survey Link:  Exploring DoD Services Contracting to military and civilian personnel in 
your unit who currently administer services contracts or have administered service contracts in the 
recent past.  The desired level of response is ten (10) personnel per unit. 
 
2.  Once forwarded, please reply via e-mail to william.muir@us.af.mil with a count of the number 
of personnel you forwarded the survey to.  This information is critical to determine the total 
response rate for the study.  Without it, the statistical significant of the research could be in 
question.  
 
Please ask personnel to complete the survey no later than 15 June 2010.  The survey should 
take between 15 and 25 minutes to accomplish.  If you have any questions, please contact Capt 
William Muir by email to william.muir@us.af.mil or at (831) 236-1179.  The time and effort of you 






WILLIAM A. MUIR, Capt, USAF 
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APPENDIX D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TESTS OF BIAS 
Variable Group  N  Mean  St. dev. S. E. Min. Max.
1 80.00 40.81 11.92 1.33 38.16 43.46 22.00 65.00
2 80.00 42.01 13.04 1.46 39.11 44.91 20.00 65.00
3 80.00 43.36 11.34 1.27 40.83 45.88 24.00 65.00
Total 240.00 42.06 12.11 0.78 40.52 43.60 20.00 65.00
1 80.00 0.55 0.50 0.06 0.44 0.66 0.00 1.00
2 80.00 0.53 0.50 0.06 0.41 0.64 0.00 1.00
3 80.00 0.48 0.50 0.06 0.36 0.59 0.00 1.00
Total 240.00 0.52 0.50 0.03 0.45 0.58 0.00 1.00
1 80.00 11.80 9.59 1.07 9.67 13.93 0.83 38.00
2 80.00 10.74 9.90 1.11 8.53 12.94 0.00 35.00
3 80.00 12.88 10.32 1.15 10.58 15.18 0.42 41.00
Total 240.00 11.81 9.94 0.64 10.54 13.07 0.00 41.00
1 80.00 2.00 0.90 0.10 1.80 2.20 0.00 3.00
2 80.00 1.95 1.07 0.12 1.71 2.19 0.00 4.00
3 80.00 1.98 0.97 0.11 1.76 2.19 0.00 4.00
Total 240.00 1.98 0.98 0.06 1.85 2.10 0.00 4.00
1 80.00 26.01 6.03 0.67 24.67 27.35 12.00 35.00
2 80.00 25.79 6.00 0.67 24.45 27.12 11.00 35.00
3 80.00 25.41 6.70 0.75 23.92 26.90 8.00 35.00
Total 240.00 25.74 6.23 0.40 24.95 26.53 8.00 35.00
1 80.00 27.58 5.69 0.64 26.31 28.84 7.00 35.00
2 80.00 28.31 4.81 0.54 27.24 29.38 14.00 35.00
3 80.00 28.19 4.88 0.55 27.10 29.27 8.00 35.00
Total 240.00 28.03 5.13 0.33 27.37 28.68 7.00 35.00
1 80.00 80.28 13.64 1.53 77.24 83.31 48.00 98.00
2 80.00 77.60 15.08 1.69 74.24 80.96 39.00 98.00
3 80.00 79.86 14.97 1.67 76.53 83.19 42.00 98.00
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Eingenvalue Cumulative percent of explained variance
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Eingenvalue Cumulative percent of explained variance
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χ2 P value χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR
Measurement model 383.71 < 0.01 1.38 0.98 0.98. 0.040 0.040
Fitness criterion > 0.05 < 3.00 > 0.95 > 0.95. < 0.080 < 0.080
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REa 0.34 0.06 5.29 < 0.01
REb 0.41 0.06 6.40 < 0.01
REd 0.69 0.06 11.65 < 0.01
AT1a 0.24 0.03 7.56 < 0.01
AT1c 0.12 0.02 5.10 < 0.01
AT1d 0.13 0.02 5.35 < 0.01
RBV1c 0.63 0.06 10.95 < 0.01
RBV1d 0.26 0.06 4.57 < 0.01
RBV1e 0.30 0.06 5.28 < 0.01
ICCa 0.17 0.03 5.72 < 0.01
ICCb 0.10 0.03 3.52 < 0.01







ratio P  value
Service quality SQa 0.34 0.04 9.07 < 0.01
SQc 0.13 0.02 7.06 < 0.01
SQd 0.17 0.02 7.55 < 0.01
SQf 0.47 0.05 10.31 < 0.01
SQi 0.34 0.04 9.09 < 0.01
SQj 0.17 0.02 7.66 < 0.01
SQk 0.16 0.02 7.40 < 0.01
SQm 0.18 0.02 7.62 < 0.01
RSCa 0.10 0.07 1.32 0.19
RSCc 0.32 0.06 5.02 < 0.01
RSCe 0.85 0.05 18.13 < 0.01
RD1a 0.24 0.04 5.96 < 0.01
RD1b 0.16 0.04 4.16 < 0.01
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Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)
(1) REa 5.73 1.18 1.00 (1) REa
(2) REb 5.65 1.29 .623
** 1.00 (2) REb
(3) REd 5.88 1.17 .452
**
.451
** 1.00 (3) REd
(4) AT1a 5.29 1.49 .181
** .126 .123 1.00 (4) AT1a







** 1.00 (5) AT1c


























** .036 .084 .042 .517









** .083 .126 .107 .520
**
.725
** 1.00 (9) RBV
1e

















** 1.00 (10) ICCa



















** 1.00 (11) ICCb





















** 1.00 (12) ICCd















** 1.00 (13) SQa



















** 1.00 (14) SQc





















** 1.00 (15) SQd


























** (16) SQf 1.00























** (17) SQi .642
** 1.00







































































































































































** .030 .068 .047 .120 .151




























































































































































(28) RD2 2.57 1.74 .033 .086 -.012 .077 .057 .032 -.083 .019 -.009 .094 .087 .040 .015 .064 .066 (28) RD2 .026 .133




1.22 1.17 -.017 -.091 .031 -.054 -.039 -.044 .077 .002 -.017 -.003 -.077 -.028 .008 .076 .023 (29) RBV
2
.060 .023 .083 .034 .044 -.114 -.163
* -.124 -.024 .007 -.068 -.061 -.073 1.00
(30) CBV
1
11.66 9.88 -.036 .018 .128





**-.014 .007 -.022 .085 .099 .108 (30) CBV
1
.068 .031 .149
* .063 .082 .013 .061 .014 .005 -.034 -.013 .024 -.085 .011 1.00
(31) CBV
2





**-.101 -.079 -.108 .032 .011 .081 (31) CBV
2




1.98 0.98 -.052 .034 -.013 .041 .058 .059 -.050 -.122 -.075 .015 .009 .040 -.054 -.044 -.045 (32) CBV
3
.011 -.035 -.059 -.077 -.012 .015 .030 .020 .016 .030 -.058 -.008 -.035 .037 -.045 .135
* 1.00
Variable
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Variable








































































































































(28) RD2 .026 .133




.060 .023 .083 .034 .044 -.114 -.163




* .063 .082 .013 .061 .014 .005 -.034 -.013 .024 -.085 .011 1.00
(31) CBV
2




.011 -.035 -.059 -.077 -.012 .015 .030 .020 .016 .030 -.058 -.008 -.035 .037 -.045 .135
* 1.00
Variable
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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TITLE:   HYPOTHESIZED MODEL 
DATA:    FILE IS "DATASET.DAT"; 
VARIABLE:  NAMES ARE REa REb REd AT1a AT1c AT1d RBV1c RBV1d RBV1e 
 ICCa ICCb ICCd SQa SQc SQd SQf SQi SQj SQk SQm RSCa RSCc 
 RSCe RD1a RD1b RD1e AT2 RD2 RBV2 CBV1 CBV2 CBV3; 
MODEL: RE BY REa REb REd; 
            RBV1 BY RBV1c RBV1d RBV1e; 
            ICC BY ICCa ICCb ICCd; 
             AT1 BY AT1a AT1c AT1d; 
             SQ BY SQa SQc SQd SQf SQi SQj SQk SQm; 
             RSC BY RSCa RSCc RSCe; 
             RD1 BY RD1a RD1b RD1e; 
             SQ ON RE AT1 AT2 RD2 RD1 RBV1 RBV2 RSC; 
            RSC ON RE RD1 RBV1 RBV2 CBV1 CBV2 CBV3 ICC; 
             RD1 ON RD2 RBV1 CBV1 CBV2 CBV3 ICC; 
  MODEL INDIRECT:  
             SQ IND RE; 
             SQ IND RD1; 
             SQ IND RD2; 
             SQ IND RBV1; 
            SQ IND RBV2; 
            RSC IND RBV1; 
             RSC IND CBV1; 
             RSC IND CBV2; 
             RSC IND CBV3; 
             RSC IND ICC; 
  ANALYSIS: TYPE IS GENERAL; 
             ESTIMATOR IS ML; 
             ITERATIONS = 1000; 
             CONVERGENCE = 0.00005;         
  OUTPUT:    STANDARDIZED; 
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APPENDIX M. MPLUS OUTPUT FOR HYPOTHESIZED MODEL 
Mplus VERSION 6 
MUTHEN & MUTHEN 




SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
 
Number of groups                                                 1 
Number of observations                                         240 
 
Number of dependent variables                                   26 
Number of independent variables                                  6 
Number of continuous latent variables                            7 
 
Observed dependent variables 
 
  Continuous 
   REA         REB         RED         AT1A        AT1C        AT1D 
   RBV1C       RBV1D       RBV1E       ICCA        ICCB        ICCD 
   SQA         SQC         SQD         SQF         SQI         SQJ 
   SQK         SQM         RSCA        RSCC        RSCE        RD1A 
   RD1B        RD1E 
 
Observed independent variables 
   AT2         RD2         RBV2        CBV1        CBV2        CBV3 
 
Continuous latent variables 
   RE          RBV1        ICC         AT1         SQ          RSC 
   RD1 
 
 
Estimator                                                       ML 
Information matrix                                        OBSERVED 
Maximum number of iterations                                  1000 
Convergence criterion                                    0.500D-04 
Maximum number of steepest descent iterations                   20 
 
Input data file(s) 
  DATASET.DAT 
 
Input data format  FREE 
 
THE MODEL ESTIMATION TERMINATED NORMALLY 
180 
 
TESTS OF MODEL FIT 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit 
          Value                            532.257 
          Degrees of Freedom                   403 
          P-Value                           0.0000 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit for the Baseline Model 
          Value                           5395.376 
          Degrees of Freedom                   481 
          P-Value                           0.0000 
 
CFI/TLI 
          CFI                                0.974 
          TLI                                0.969 
 
Loglikelihood 
          H0 Value                      -11221.121 
          H1 Value                      -10954.992 
 
Information Criteria 
          Number of Free Parameters            130 
          Akaike (AIC)                   22702.242 
          Bayesian (BIC)                 23154.725 
          Sample-Size Adjusted BIC       22742.657 
            (n* = (n + 2) / 24) 
 
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation) 
          Estimate                           0.037 
          90 Percent C.I.                    0.028  0.045 
          Probability RMSEA <= .05           0.998 
 
SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual) 







                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 RE       BY 
    REA                1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    REB                1.104      0.087     12.625      0.000 
    RED                0.673      0.081      8.275      0.000 
 
 RBV1     BY 
    RBV1C              1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    RBV1D              1.293      0.135      9.616      0.000 
    RBV1E              1.193      0.124      9.621      0.000 
 
 ICC      BY 
    ICCA               1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    ICCB               0.955      0.042     22.998      0.000 
    ICCD               0.747      0.050     15.058      0.000 
 
 AT1      BY 
    AT1A               1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    AT1C               1.102      0.051     21.588      0.000 
    AT1D               1.056      0.049     21.551      0.000 
 
 SQ       BY 
    SQA                1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    SQC                0.998      0.054     18.550      0.000 
    SQD                0.985      0.055     18.031      0.000 
    SQF                0.782      0.061     12.889      0.000 
    SQI                0.963      0.064     15.046      0.000 
    SQJ                1.025      0.057     17.871      0.000 
    SQK                0.991      0.055     18.147      0.000 
    SQM                1.035      0.058     17.888      0.000 
 
 RSC      BY 
    RSCA               1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    RSCC               0.854      0.066     12.919      0.000 
    RSCE               0.600      0.106      5.688      0.000 
 
 RD1      BY 
    RD1A               1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    RD1B               1.027      0.059     17.410      0.000 
    RD1E               0.892      0.069     12.968      0.000 
 
 SQ       ON 
    RE                 1.066      0.129      8.256      0.000 
    AT1                0.040      0.045      0.885      0.376 
    RD1                0.150      0.055      2.728      0.006 
    RBV1              -0.183      0.063     -2.928      0.003 
    RSC               -0.245      0.074     -3.326      0.001 
 RSC      ON 
    RE                 0.681      0.114      5.959      0.000 
    RD1                0.128      0.066      1.944      0.052 
    RBV1              -0.025      0.073     -0.341      0.733 
    ICC               -0.032      0.065     -0.494      0.621 
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 RD1      ON 
    RBV1               0.343      0.086      3.983      0.000 
    ICC                0.363      0.067      5.395      0.000 
 
 SQ       ON 
    AT2               -0.029      0.035     -0.827      0.408 
    RD2                0.017      0.032      0.527      0.598 
    RBV2               0.071      0.048      1.497      0.134 
 
 RSC      ON 
    RBV2              -0.089      0.055     -1.613      0.107 
    CBV1               0.004      0.008      0.538      0.591 
    CBV2              -0.070      0.076     -0.922      0.356 
    CBV3               0.058      0.064      0.902      0.367 
 
 RD1      ON 
    RD2               -0.082      0.044     -1.874      0.061 
    CBV1               0.001      0.010      0.149      0.882 
    CBV2               0.054      0.091      0.588      0.556 
    CBV3               0.042      0.079      0.531      0.596 
 
 RBV1     WITH 
    RE                 0.477      0.105      4.525      0.000 
 
 ICC      WITH 
    RE                 0.725      0.110      6.608      0.000 
    RBV1               0.645      0.136      4.730      0.000 
 
 AT1      WITH 
    RE                 0.319      0.094      3.403      0.001 
    RBV1               0.162      0.113      1.427      0.154 
    ICC                0.451      0.125      3.598      0.000 
 
 AT2      WITH 
    RE                 0.357      0.107      3.344      0.001 
    RBV1               0.290      0.134      2.158      0.031 
    ICC                0.433      0.141      3.066      0.002 
    AT1                0.535      0.136      3.932      0.000 
 
 RD2      WITH 
    RE                 0.105      0.113      0.932      0.351 
    RBV1              -0.020      0.140     -0.146      0.884 
    ICC                0.215      0.150      1.431      0.152 
    AT1                0.125      0.144      0.870      0.384 
 RBV2     WITH 
    RE                -0.060      0.077     -0.778      0.437 
    RBV1               0.007      0.094      0.071      0.943 
    ICC               -0.079      0.101     -0.778      0.437 
    AT1               -0.072      0.097     -0.746      0.456 
 
 CBV1     WITH 
    RE                 0.363      0.626      0.580      0.562 
    RBV1              -2.342      0.824     -2.842      0.004 
    ICC               -0.053      0.854     -0.062      0.951 




 CBV2     WITH 
    RE                 0.022      0.067      0.324      0.746 
    RBV1              -0.262      0.088     -2.966      0.003 
    ICC               -0.140      0.092     -1.528      0.127 
    AT1                0.092      0.088      1.049      0.294 
 
 CBV3     WITH 
    RE                -0.034      0.062     -0.548      0.584 
    RBV1              -0.126      0.080     -1.590      0.112 
    ICC                0.021      0.085      0.253      0.800 
    AT1                0.075      0.081      0.927      0.354 
 
 Intercepts 
    REA                5.729      0.074     77.242      0.000 
    REB                5.654      0.081     69.559      0.000 
    RED                5.883      0.074     79.160      0.000 
    AT1A               5.292      0.093     56.793      0.000 
    AT1C               5.342      0.095     56.259      0.000 
    AT1D               5.442      0.092     59.376      0.000 
    RBV1C              4.454      0.122     36.496      0.000 
    RBV1D              4.129      0.115     35.957      0.000 
    RBV1E              4.446      0.105     42.267      0.000 
    ICCA               5.250      0.092     57.090      0.000 
    ICCB               5.400      0.085     63.504      0.000 
    ICCD               5.671      0.084     67.610      0.000 
    SQA                5.396      0.257     21.033      0.000 
    SQC                5.791      0.252     22.937      0.000 
    SQD                5.724      0.250     22.939      0.000 
    SQF                5.633      0.203     27.702      0.000 
    SQI                5.512      0.247     22.303      0.000 
    SQJ                5.800      0.260     22.320      0.000 
    SQK                5.783      0.251     23.024      0.000 
    SQM                5.734      0.263     21.835      0.000 
    RSCA               6.255      0.183     34.116      0.000 
    RSCC               6.284      0.162     38.831      0.000 
    RSCE               4.838      0.151     32.044      0.000 
    RD1A               5.333      0.249     21.392      0.000 
    RD1B               5.271      0.254     20.727      0.000 
    RD1E               4.926      0.229     21.484      0.000 
 Variances 
    RE                 0.877      0.125      7.018      0.000 
    RBV1               1.432      0.287      4.992      0.000 
    ICC                1.805      0.200      9.041      0.000 
    AT1                1.695      0.200      8.478      0.000 
 
 Residual Variances 
    REA                0.503      0.063      7.962      0.000 
    REB                0.589      0.076      7.789      0.000 
    RED                0.956      0.093     10.271      0.000 
    AT1A               0.528      0.060      8.793      0.000 
    AT1C               0.275      0.051      5.436      0.000 
    AT1D               0.281      0.048      5.911      0.000 
    RBV1C              2.266      0.232      9.746      0.000 
    RBV1D              0.974      0.164      5.958      0.000 
    RBV1E              0.792      0.137      5.766      0.000 
    ICCA               0.357      0.056      6.344      0.000 
    ICCB               0.209      0.047      4.485      0.000 
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    ICCD               0.756      0.076      9.908      0.000 
    SQA                0.610      0.059     10.275      0.000 
    SQC                0.183      0.021      8.605      0.000 
    SQD                0.229      0.025      9.138      0.000 
    SQF                0.642      0.061     10.563      0.000 
    SQI                0.570      0.056     10.271      0.000 
    SQJ                0.263      0.028      9.318      0.000 
    SQK                0.219      0.024      9.023      0.000 
    SQM                0.270      0.029      9.240      0.000 
    RSCA               0.088      0.076      1.145      0.252 
    RSCC               0.472      0.070      6.723      0.000 
    RSCE               2.592      0.242     10.709      0.000 
    RD1A               0.533      0.080      6.668      0.000 
    RD1B               0.338      0.074      4.585      0.000 
    RD1E               1.187      0.123      9.617      0.000 
    SQ                 0.398      0.074      5.354      0.000 
    RSC                0.746      0.104      7.154      0.000 








                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 RE       BY 
    REA                0.797      0.031     25.975      0.000 
    REB                0.803      0.030     26.436      0.000 
    RED                0.542      0.051     10.689      0.000 
 
 RBV1     BY 
    RBV1C              0.622      0.046     13.601      0.000 
    RBV1D              0.843      0.031     27.643      0.000 
    RBV1E              0.849      0.030     28.030      0.000 
 
 ICC      BY 
    ICCA               0.914      0.016     57.963      0.000 
    ICCB               0.942      0.014     66.622      0.000 
    ICCD               0.756      0.030     24.973      0.000 
 
 AT1      BY 
    AT1A               0.873      0.018     48.857      0.000 
    AT1C               0.939      0.013     74.629      0.000 
    AT1D               0.933      0.013     72.045      0.000 
 
 SQ       BY 
    SQA                0.809      0.023     34.756      0.000 
    SQC                0.929      0.010     90.246      0.000 
    SQD                0.911      0.012     74.245      0.000 
    SQF                0.724      0.032     22.933      0.000 
    SQI                0.808      0.023     34.526      0.000 
    SQJ                0.906      0.013     71.239      0.000 
    SQK                0.915      0.012     77.684      0.000 
    SQM                0.906      0.013     70.654      0.000 
 
 RSC      BY 
    RSCA               0.966      0.030     31.801      0.000 
    RSCC               0.808      0.033     24.168      0.000 
    RSCE               0.381      0.059      6.491      0.000 
 
 RD1      BY 
    RD1A               0.871      0.023     38.322      0.000 
    RD1B               0.916      0.020     45.241      0.000 




SQ       ON 
    RE                 0.930      0.079     11.773      0.000 
    AT1                0.048      0.055      0.887      0.375 
    RD1                0.181      0.066      2.716      0.007 
    RBV1              -0.204      0.068     -2.993      0.003 
    RSC               -0.252      0.074     -3.406      0.001 
 
 RSC      ON 
    RE                 0.578      0.083      6.963      0.000 
    RD1                0.149      0.077      1.937      0.053 
    RBV1              -0.027      0.079     -0.341      0.733 
    ICC               -0.039      0.079     -0.494      0.621 
 
 RD1      ON 
    RBV1               0.317      0.071      4.454      0.000 
    ICC                0.377      0.065      5.780      0.000 
 
 SQ       ON 
    AT2               -0.044      0.053     -0.827      0.408 
    RD2                0.027      0.051      0.527      0.598 
    RBV2               0.077      0.052      1.498      0.134 
 
 RSC      ON 
    RBV2              -0.094      0.059     -1.599      0.110 
    CBV1               0.038      0.071      0.537      0.591 
    CBV2              -0.067      0.073     -0.925      0.355 
    CBV3               0.051      0.057      0.901      0.367 
 
 RD1      ON 
    RD2               -0.110      0.058     -1.884      0.060 
    CBV1               0.011      0.075      0.149      0.882 
    CBV2               0.044      0.074      0.589      0.556 
    CBV3               0.032      0.060      0.531      0.596 
 
 RBV1     WITH 
    RE                 0.425      0.068      6.281      0.000 
 
 ICC      WITH 
    RE                 0.576      0.051     11.247      0.000 
    RBV1               0.401      0.062      6.444      0.000 
 
 AT1      WITH 
    RE                 0.262      0.069      3.779      0.000 
    RBV1               0.104      0.071      1.457      0.145 
    ICC                0.258      0.065      3.996      0.000 
 
 AT2      WITH 
    RE                 0.234      0.068      3.461      0.001 
    RBV1               0.149      0.067      2.218      0.027 
    ICC                0.198      0.063      3.130      0.002 
    AT1                0.253      0.062      4.083      0.000 
 
 RD2      WITH 
    RE                 0.065      0.069      0.934      0.350 
    RBV1              -0.010      0.068     -0.146      0.884 
    ICC                0.092      0.064      1.439      0.150 
    AT1                0.056      0.064      0.872      0.383 
 
 RBV2     WITH 
187 
    RE                -0.055      0.070     -0.778      0.436 
    RBV1               0.005      0.067      0.071      0.943 
    ICC               -0.050      0.065     -0.778      0.436 
    AT1               -0.048      0.064     -0.747      0.455 
 
 CBV1     WITH 
    RE                 0.039      0.068      0.580      0.562 
    RBV1              -0.198      0.066     -2.994      0.003 
    ICC               -0.004      0.064     -0.062      0.951 
    AT1                0.003      0.064      0.045      0.964 
 
 CBV2     WITH 
    RE                 0.022      0.068      0.324      0.746 
    RBV1              -0.207      0.066     -3.130      0.002 
    ICC               -0.099      0.064     -1.537      0.124 
    AT1                0.067      0.064      1.052      0.293 
 
 CBV3     WITH 
    RE                -0.037      0.068     -0.549      0.583 
    RBV1              -0.108      0.067     -1.612      0.107 
    ICC                0.016      0.064      0.253      0.800 
    AT1                0.059      0.064      0.929      0.353 
 
 Intercepts 
    REA                4.876      0.231     21.096      0.000 
    REB                4.389      0.210     20.916      0.000 
    RED                5.058      0.239     21.119      0.000 
    AT1A               3.549      0.173     20.476      0.000 
    AT1C               3.497      0.171     20.462      0.000 
    AT1D               3.693      0.179     20.601      0.000 
    RBV1C              2.316      0.123     18.792      0.000 
    RBV1D              2.249      0.120     18.735      0.000 
    RBV1E              2.643      0.136     19.480      0.000 
    ICCA               3.570      0.174     20.488      0.000 
    ICCB               3.963      0.191     20.751      0.000 
    ICCD               4.272      0.205     20.859      0.000 
    SQA                4.062      0.266     15.284      0.000 
    SQC                5.019      0.315     15.953      0.000 
    SQD                4.931      0.309     15.956      0.000 
    SQF                4.853      0.280     17.332      0.000 
    SQI                4.303      0.273     15.750      0.000 
    SQJ                4.776      0.303     15.746      0.000 
    SQK                4.971      0.311     15.986      0.000 
    SQM                4.671      0.300     15.572      0.000 
    RSCA               5.472      0.294     18.628      0.000 
    RSCC               5.384      0.278     19.351      0.000 
    RSCE               2.779      0.152     18.299      0.000 
    RD1A               3.590      0.234     15.349      0.000 
    RD1B               3.634      0.241     15.098      0.000 
    RD1E               3.105      0.202     15.385      0.000 
 
 Variances 
    RE                 1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    RBV1               1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    ICC                1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    AT1                1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
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 Residual Variances 
    REA                0.365      0.049      7.450      0.000 
    REB                0.355      0.049      7.277      0.000 
    RED                0.707      0.055     12.877      0.000 
    AT1A               0.237      0.031      7.608      0.000 
    AT1C               0.118      0.024      4.990      0.000 
    AT1D               0.130      0.024      5.364      0.000 
    RBV1C              0.613      0.057     10.757      0.000 
    RBV1D              0.289      0.051      5.620      0.000 
    RBV1E              0.280      0.051      5.446      0.000 
    ICCA               0.165      0.029      5.735      0.000 
    ICCB               0.112      0.027      4.221      0.000 
    ICCD               0.429      0.046      9.385      0.000 
    SQA                0.346      0.038      9.193      0.000 
    SQC                0.137      0.019      7.179      0.000 
    SQD                0.170      0.022      7.607      0.000 
    SQF                0.477      0.046     10.438      0.000 
    SQI                0.348      0.038      9.196      0.000 
    SQJ                0.179      0.023      7.742      0.000 
    SQK                0.162      0.022      7.512      0.000 
    SQM                0.179      0.023      7.708      0.000 
    RSCA               0.067      0.059      1.142      0.253 
    RSCC               0.347      0.054      6.417      0.000 
    RSCE               0.855      0.045     19.140      0.000 
    RD1A               0.242      0.040      6.109      0.000 
    RD1B               0.161      0.037      4.335      0.000 
    RD1E               0.472      0.050      9.413      0.000 
    SQ                 0.345      0.058      5.898      0.000 
    RSC                0.612      0.061      9.969      0.000 





                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 RE       BY 
    REA                0.797      0.031     25.975      0.000 
    REB                0.803      0.030     26.436      0.000 
    RED                0.542      0.051     10.689      0.000 
 
 RBV1     BY 
    RBV1C              0.622      0.046     13.601      0.000 
    RBV1D              0.843      0.031     27.643      0.000 
    RBV1E              0.849      0.030     28.030      0.000 
 
 ICC      BY 
    ICCA               0.914      0.016     57.963      0.000 
    ICCB               0.942      0.014     66.622      0.000 
    ICCD               0.756      0.030     24.973      0.000 
 
 AT1      BY 
    AT1A               0.873      0.018     48.857      0.000 
    AT1C               0.939      0.013     74.629      0.000 
    AT1D               0.933      0.013     72.045      0.000 
 
 SQ       BY 
    SQA                0.809      0.023     34.756      0.000 
    SQC                0.929      0.010     90.246      0.000 
    SQD                0.911      0.012     74.245      0.000 
    SQF                0.724      0.032     22.933      0.000 
    SQI                0.808      0.023     34.526      0.000 
    SQJ                0.906      0.013     71.239      0.000 
    SQK                0.915      0.012     77.684      0.000 
    SQM                0.906      0.013     70.654      0.000 
 
 RSC      BY 
    RSCA               0.966      0.030     31.801      0.000 
    RSCC               0.808      0.033     24.168      0.000 
    RSCE               0.381      0.059      6.491      0.000 
 
 RD1      BY 
    RD1A               0.871      0.023     38.322      0.000 
    RD1B               0.916      0.020     45.241      0.000 
    RD1E               0.727      0.034     21.094      0.000 
 
 SQ       ON 
    RE                 0.930      0.079     11.773      0.000 
    AT1                0.048      0.055      0.887      0.375 
    RD1                0.181      0.066      2.716      0.007 
    RBV1              -0.204      0.068     -2.993      0.003 
    RSC               -0.252      0.074     -3.406      0.001 
 RSC      ON 
    RE                 0.578      0.083      6.963      0.000 
    RD1                0.149      0.077      1.937      0.053 
    RBV1              -0.027      0.079     -0.341      0.733 




 RD1      ON 
    RBV1               0.317      0.071      4.454      0.000 
    ICC                0.377      0.065      5.780      0.000 
 
 SQ       ON 
    AT2               -0.027      0.033     -0.828      0.408 
    RD2                0.016      0.029      0.527      0.598 
    RBV2               0.066      0.044      1.502      0.133 
 
 RSC      ON 
    RBV2              -0.081      0.050     -1.603      0.109 
    CBV1               0.004      0.007      0.537      0.591 
    CBV2              -0.064      0.069     -0.926      0.354 
    CBV3               0.053      0.058      0.902      0.367 
 
 RD1      ON 
    RD2               -0.063      0.033     -1.891      0.059 
    CBV1               0.001      0.008      0.149      0.882 
    CBV2               0.042      0.070      0.589      0.556 
    CBV3               0.032      0.061      0.531      0.595 
 
 RBV1     WITH 
    RE                 0.425      0.068      6.281      0.000 
 
 ICC      WITH 
    RE                 0.576      0.051     11.247      0.000 
    RBV1               0.401      0.062      6.444      0.000 
 
 AT1      WITH 
    RE                 0.262      0.069      3.779      0.000 
    RBV1               0.104      0.071      1.457      0.145 
    ICC                0.258      0.065      3.996      0.000 
 
 AT2      WITH 
    RE                 0.234      0.068      3.461      0.001 
    RBV1               0.149      0.067      2.218      0.027 
    ICC                0.198      0.063      3.130      0.002 
    AT1                0.253      0.062      4.083      0.000 
 
 RD2      WITH 
    RE                 0.065      0.069      0.934      0.350 
    RBV1              -0.010      0.068     -0.146      0.884 
    ICC                0.092      0.064      1.439      0.150 
    AT1                0.056      0.064      0.872      0.383 
 RBV2     WITH 
    RE                -0.055      0.070     -0.778      0.436 
    RBV1               0.005      0.067      0.071      0.943 
    ICC               -0.050      0.065     -0.778      0.436 
    AT1               -0.048      0.064     -0.747      0.455 
 
 CBV1     WITH 
    RE                 0.039      0.068      0.580      0.562 
    RBV1              -0.198      0.066     -2.994      0.003 
    ICC               -0.004      0.064     -0.062      0.951 




 CBV2     WITH 
    RE                 0.022      0.068      0.324      0.746 
    RBV1              -0.207      0.066     -3.130      0.002 
    ICC               -0.099      0.064     -1.537      0.124 
    AT1                0.067      0.064      1.052      0.293 
 
 CBV3     WITH 
    RE                -0.037      0.068     -0.549      0.583 
    RBV1              -0.108      0.067     -1.612      0.107 
    ICC                0.016      0.064      0.253      0.800 
    AT1                0.059      0.064      0.929      0.353 
 
 Intercepts 
    REA                4.876      0.231     21.096      0.000 
    REB                4.389      0.210     20.916      0.000 
    RED                5.058      0.239     21.119      0.000 
    AT1A               3.549      0.173     20.476      0.000 
    AT1C               3.497      0.171     20.462      0.000 
    AT1D               3.693      0.179     20.601      0.000 
    RBV1C              2.316      0.123     18.792      0.000 
    RBV1D              2.249      0.120     18.735      0.000 
    RBV1E              2.643      0.136     19.480      0.000 
    ICCA               3.570      0.174     20.488      0.000 
    ICCB               3.963      0.191     20.751      0.000 
    ICCD               4.272      0.205     20.859      0.000 
    SQA                4.062      0.266     15.284      0.000 
    SQC                5.019      0.315     15.953      0.000 
    SQD                4.931      0.309     15.956      0.000 
    SQF                4.853      0.280     17.332      0.000 
    SQI                4.303      0.273     15.750      0.000 
    SQJ                4.776      0.303     15.746      0.000 
    SQK                4.971      0.311     15.986      0.000 
    SQM                4.671      0.300     15.572      0.000 
    RSCA               5.472      0.294     18.628      0.000 
    RSCC               5.384      0.278     19.351      0.000 
    RSCE               2.779      0.152     18.299      0.000 
    RD1A               3.590      0.234     15.349      0.000 
    RD1B               3.634      0.241     15.098      0.000 
    RD1E               3.105      0.202     15.385      0.000 
 Variances 
    RE                 1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    RBV1               1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    ICC                1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    AT1                1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 Residual Variances 
    REA                0.365      0.049      7.450      0.000 
    REB                0.355      0.049      7.277      0.000 
    RED                0.707      0.055     12.877      0.000 
    AT1A               0.237      0.031      7.608      0.000 
    AT1C               0.118      0.024      4.990      0.000 
    AT1D               0.130      0.024      5.364      0.000 
    RBV1C              0.613      0.057     10.757      0.000 
    RBV1D              0.289      0.051      5.620      0.000 
    RBV1E              0.280      0.051      5.446      0.000 
    ICCA               0.165      0.029      5.735      0.000 
    ICCB               0.112      0.027      4.221      0.000 
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    ICCD               0.429      0.046      9.385      0.000 
    SQA                0.346      0.038      9.193      0.000 
    SQC                0.137      0.019      7.179      0.000 
    SQD                0.170      0.022      7.607      0.000 
    SQF                0.477      0.046     10.438      0.000 
    SQI                0.348      0.038      9.196      0.000 
    SQJ                0.179      0.023      7.742      0.000 
    SQK                0.162      0.022      7.512      0.000 
    SQM                0.179      0.023      7.708      0.000 
    RSCA               0.067      0.059      1.142      0.253 
    RSCC               0.347      0.054      6.417      0.000 
    RSCE               0.855      0.045     19.140      0.000 
    RD1A               0.242      0.040      6.109      0.000 
    RD1B               0.161      0.037      4.335      0.000 
    RD1E               0.472      0.050      9.413      0.000 
    SQ                 0.345      0.058      5.898      0.000 
    RSC                0.612      0.061      9.969      0.000 





                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 RE       BY 
    REA                0.937      0.067     14.036      0.000 
    REB                1.035      0.073     14.163      0.000 
    RED                0.630      0.074      8.520      0.000 
 
 RBV1     BY 
    RBV1C              1.197      0.120      9.984      0.000 
    RBV1D              1.548      0.105     14.772      0.000 
    RBV1E              1.428      0.096     14.894      0.000 
 
 ICC      BY 
    ICCA               1.344      0.074     18.082      0.000 
    ICCB               1.284      0.068     19.014      0.000 
    ICCD               1.003      0.074     13.526      0.000 
 
 AT1      BY 
    AT1A               1.302      0.077     16.955      0.000 
    AT1C               1.435      0.075     19.103      0.000 
    AT1D               1.375      0.073     18.891      0.000 
 
 SQ       BY 
    SQA                1.074      0.070     15.320      0.000 
    SQC                1.072      0.056     19.146      0.000 
    SQD                1.058      0.057     18.519      0.000 
    SQF                0.840      0.064     13.071      0.000 
    SQI                1.035      0.068     15.286      0.000 
    SQJ                1.101      0.060     18.363      0.000 
    SQK                1.065      0.057     18.672      0.000 
    SQM                1.112      0.061     18.352      0.000 
 
 RSC      BY 
    RSCA               1.104      0.063     17.522      0.000 
    RSCC               0.943      0.068     13.969      0.000 
    RSCE               0.663      0.113      5.854      0.000 
 
 RD1      BY 
    RD1A               1.293      0.079     16.285      0.000 
    RD1B               1.329      0.076     17.565      0.000 
    RD1E               1.153      0.091     12.604      0.000 
 
 SQ       ON 
    RE                 0.930      0.079     11.773      0.000 
    AT1                0.048      0.055      0.887      0.375 
    RD1                0.181      0.066      2.716      0.007 
    RBV1              -0.204      0.068     -2.993      0.003 
    RSC               -0.252      0.074     -3.406      0.001 
 RSC      ON 
    RE                 0.578      0.083      6.963      0.000 
    RD1                0.149      0.077      1.937      0.053 
    RBV1              -0.027      0.079     -0.341      0.733 




 RD1      ON 
    RBV1               0.317      0.071      4.454      0.000 
    ICC                0.377      0.065      5.780      0.000 
 
 SQ       ON 
    AT2               -0.027      0.033     -0.828      0.408 
    RD2                0.016      0.029      0.527      0.598 
    RBV2               0.066      0.044      1.502      0.133 
 
 RSC      ON 
    RBV2              -0.081      0.050     -1.603      0.109 
    CBV1               0.004      0.007      0.537      0.591 
    CBV2              -0.064      0.069     -0.926      0.354 
    CBV3               0.053      0.058      0.902      0.367 
 
 RD1      ON 
    RD2               -0.063      0.033     -1.891      0.059 
    CBV1               0.001      0.008      0.149      0.882 
    CBV2               0.042      0.070      0.589      0.556 
    CBV3               0.032      0.061      0.531      0.595 
 
 RBV1     WITH 
    RE                 0.425      0.068      6.281      0.000 
 
 ICC      WITH 
    RE                 0.576      0.051     11.247      0.000 
    RBV1               0.401      0.062      6.444      0.000 
 
 AT1      WITH 
    RE                 0.262      0.069      3.779      0.000 
    RBV1               0.104      0.071      1.457      0.145 
    ICC                0.258      0.065      3.996      0.000 
 
 AT2      WITH 
    RE                 0.381      0.109      3.505      0.000 
    RBV1               0.243      0.109      2.229      0.026 
    ICC                0.322      0.102      3.163      0.002 
    AT1                0.411      0.099      4.156      0.000 
 
 RD2      WITH 
    RE                 0.112      0.120      0.935      0.350 
    RBV1              -0.017      0.117     -0.146      0.884 
    ICC                0.160      0.111      1.442      0.149 
    AT1                0.096      0.110      0.872      0.383 
 RBV2     WITH 
    RE                -0.064      0.082     -0.779      0.436 
    RBV1               0.006      0.078      0.071      0.943 
    ICC               -0.059      0.075     -0.779      0.436 
    AT1               -0.055      0.074     -0.747      0.455 
 
 CBV1     WITH 
    RE                 0.388      0.668      0.580      0.562 
    RBV1              -1.957      0.647     -3.022      0.003 
    ICC               -0.039      0.636     -0.062      0.951 




 CBV2     WITH 
    RE                 0.023      0.072      0.324      0.746 
    RBV1              -0.219      0.069     -3.163      0.002 
    ICC               -0.104      0.068     -1.540      0.123 
    AT1                0.071      0.067      1.053      0.292 
 
 CBV3     WITH 
    RE                -0.036      0.066     -0.549      0.583 
    RBV1              -0.106      0.065     -1.616      0.106 
    ICC                0.016      0.063      0.253      0.800 
    AT1                0.058      0.062      0.930      0.353 
 
 Intercepts 
    REA                5.729      0.074     77.242      0.000 
    REB                5.654      0.081     69.559      0.000 
    RED                5.883      0.074     79.160      0.000 
    AT1A               5.292      0.093     56.793      0.000 
    AT1C               5.342      0.095     56.259      0.000 
    AT1D               5.442      0.092     59.376      0.000 
    RBV1C              4.454      0.122     36.496      0.000 
    RBV1D              4.129      0.115     35.957      0.000 
    RBV1E              4.446      0.105     42.267      0.000 
    ICCA               5.250      0.092     57.090      0.000 
    ICCB               5.400      0.085     63.504      0.000 
    ICCD               5.671      0.084     67.610      0.000 
    SQA                5.396      0.257     21.033      0.000 
    SQC                5.791      0.252     22.937      0.000 
    SQD                5.724      0.250     22.939      0.000 
    SQF                5.633      0.203     27.702      0.000 
    SQI                5.512      0.247     22.303      0.000 
    SQJ                5.800      0.260     22.320      0.000 
    SQK                5.783      0.251     23.024      0.000 
    SQM                5.734      0.263     21.835      0.000 
    RSCA               6.255      0.183     34.116      0.000 
    RSCC               6.284      0.162     38.831      0.000 
    RSCE               4.838      0.151     32.044      0.000 
    RD1A               5.333      0.249     21.392      0.000 
    RD1B               5.271      0.254     20.727      0.000 
    RD1E               4.926      0.229     21.484      0.000 
 Variances 
    RE                 1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    RBV1               1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    ICC                1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    AT1                1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 Residual Variances 
    REA                0.503      0.063      7.962      0.000 
    REB                0.589      0.076      7.789      0.000 
    RED                0.956      0.093     10.271      0.000 
    AT1A               0.528      0.060      8.793      0.000 
    AT1C               0.275      0.051      5.436      0.000 
    AT1D               0.281      0.048      5.911      0.000 
    RBV1C              2.266      0.232      9.746      0.000 
    RBV1D              0.974      0.164      5.958      0.000 
    RBV1E              0.792      0.137      5.766      0.000 
    ICCA               0.357      0.056      6.344      0.000 
    ICCB               0.209      0.047      4.485      0.000 
196 
    ICCD               0.756      0.076      9.908      0.000 
    SQA                0.610      0.059     10.275      0.000 
    SQC                0.183      0.021      8.605      0.000 
    SQD                0.229      0.025      9.138      0.000 
    SQF                0.642      0.061     10.563      0.000 
    SQI                0.570      0.056     10.271      0.000 
    SQJ                0.263      0.028      9.318      0.000 
    SQK                0.219      0.024      9.023      0.000 
    SQM                0.270      0.029      9.240      0.000 
    RSCA               0.088      0.076      1.145      0.252 
    RSCC               0.472      0.070      6.723      0.000 
    RSCE               2.592      0.242     10.709      0.000 
    RD1A               0.533      0.080      6.668      0.000 
    RD1B               0.338      0.074      4.585      0.000 
    RD1E               1.187      0.123      9.617      0.000 
    SQ                 0.345      0.058      5.898      0.000 
    RSC                0.612      0.061      9.969      0.000 




    Observed                                        Two-Tailed 
    Variable        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
    REA                0.635      0.049     12.987      0.000 
    REB                0.645      0.049     13.218      0.000 
    RED                0.293      0.055      5.344      0.000 
    AT1A               0.763      0.031     24.429      0.000 
    AT1C               0.882      0.024     37.314      0.000 
    AT1D               0.870      0.024     36.022      0.000 
    RBV1C              0.387      0.057      6.800      0.000 
    RBV1D              0.711      0.051     13.821      0.000 
    RBV1E              0.720      0.051     14.015      0.000 
    ICCA               0.835      0.029     28.981      0.000 
    ICCB               0.888      0.027     33.311      0.000 
    ICCD               0.571      0.046     12.486      0.000 
    SQA                0.654      0.038     17.378      0.000 
    SQC                0.863      0.019     45.123      0.000 
    SQD                0.830      0.022     37.123      0.000 
    SQF                0.523      0.046     11.466      0.000 
    SQI                0.652      0.038     17.263      0.000 
    SQJ                0.821      0.023     35.619      0.000 
    SQK                0.838      0.022     38.842      0.000 
    SQM                0.821      0.023     35.327      0.000 
    RSCA               0.933      0.059     15.900      0.000 
    RSCC               0.653      0.054     12.084      0.000 
    RSCE               0.145      0.045      3.245      0.001 
    RD1A               0.758      0.040     19.161      0.000 
    RD1B               0.839      0.037     22.621      0.000 
    RD1E               0.528      0.050     10.547      0.000 
 
     Latent                                         Two-Tailed 
    Variable        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
    SQ                 0.655      0.058     11.218      0.000 
    RSC                0.388      0.061      6.322      0.000 




QUALITY OF NUMERICAL RESULTS 
 
     Condition Number for the Information Matrix              0.136E-04 
       (ratio of smallest to largest eigenvalue) 
 
 
TOTAL, TOTAL INDIRECT, SPECIFIC INDIRECT, AND DIRECT EFFECTS 
 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
Effects from RE to SQ 
 
  Total                0.899      0.103      8.735      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.167      0.064     -2.592      0.010 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RE                -0.167      0.064     -2.592      0.010 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RE                 1.066      0.129      8.256      0.000 
 
 
Effects from RD1 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.119      0.054      2.194      0.028 
  Total indirect      -0.031      0.018     -1.732      0.083 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1               -0.031      0.018     -1.732      0.083 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RD1                0.150      0.055      2.728      0.006 
 
 
Effects from RD2 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.007      0.032      0.220      0.826 
  Total indirect      -0.010      0.007     -1.433      0.152 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RD1 




    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RD2                0.003      0.002      1.277      0.202 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RD2                0.017      0.032      0.527      0.598 
 
 
Effects from RBV1 to SQ 
 
  Total               -0.136      0.058     -2.355      0.019 
  Total indirect       0.047      0.028      1.676      0.094 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RBV1               0.006      0.018      0.335      0.738 
 
    SQ 
    RD1 
    RBV1               0.051      0.023      2.223      0.026 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RBV1              -0.011      0.007     -1.592      0.111 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RBV1              -0.183      0.063     -2.928      0.003 
 
 
Effects from RBV2 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.093      0.046      2.022      0.043 
  Total indirect       0.022      0.015      1.445      0.148 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RBV2               0.022      0.015      1.445      0.148 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RBV2               0.071      0.048      1.497      0.134 
 
Effects from RBV1 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.019      0.070      0.268      0.789 




  Specific indirect 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RBV1               0.044      0.025      1.753      0.080 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    RBV1              -0.025      0.073     -0.341      0.733 
 
 
Effects from CBV1 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.004      0.008      0.555      0.579 
  Total indirect       0.000      0.001      0.148      0.882 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV1               0.000      0.001      0.148      0.882 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV1               0.004      0.008      0.538      0.591 
 
 
Effects from CBV2 to RSC 
 
  Total               -0.063      0.077     -0.824      0.410 
  Total indirect       0.007      0.012      0.564      0.573 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV2               0.007      0.012      0.564      0.573 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV2              -0.070      0.076     -0.922      0.356 
 
Effects from CBV3 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.064      0.065      0.977      0.328 
  Total indirect       0.005      0.010      0.513      0.608 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV3               0.005      0.010      0.513      0.608 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 




Effects from ICC to RSC 
 
  Total                0.014      0.065      0.217      0.828 
  Total indirect       0.046      0.025      1.836      0.066 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    ICC                0.046      0.025      1.836      0.066 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    ICC               -0.032      0.065     -0.494      0.621 
 
 






                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
Effects from RE to SQ 
 
  Total                0.784      0.060     12.978      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.145      0.054     -2.674      0.007 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RE                -0.145      0.054     -2.674      0.007 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RE                 0.930      0.079     11.773      0.000 
 
 
Effects from RD1 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.143      0.066      2.181      0.029 
  Total indirect      -0.038      0.022     -1.741      0.082 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1               -0.038      0.022     -1.741      0.082 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 




Effects from RD2 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.011      0.051      0.220      0.826 
  Total indirect      -0.016      0.011     -1.428      0.153 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RD1 
    RD2               -0.020      0.013     -1.550      0.121 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RD2                0.004      0.003      1.278      0.201 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RD2                0.027      0.051      0.527      0.598 
 
 
Effects from RBV1 to SQ 
 
  Total               -0.152      0.064     -2.394      0.017 
  Total indirect       0.052      0.031      1.682      0.093 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RBV1               0.007      0.020      0.335      0.738 
 
    SQ 
    RD1 
    RBV1               0.057      0.025      2.249      0.025 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RBV1              -0.012      0.007     -1.611      0.107 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RBV1              -0.204      0.068     -2.993      0.003 
 
 
Effects from RBV2 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.101      0.050      2.027      0.043 
  Total indirect       0.024      0.016      1.449      0.147 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RBV2               0.024      0.016      1.449      0.147 
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  Direct 
    SQ 
    RBV2               0.077      0.052      1.498      0.134 
 
 
Effects from RBV1 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.020      0.076      0.268      0.789 
  Total indirect       0.047      0.027      1.766      0.077 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RBV1               0.047      0.027      1.766      0.077 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    RBV1              -0.027      0.079     -0.341      0.733 
 
 
Effects from CBV1 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.040      0.072      0.555      0.579 
  Total indirect       0.002      0.011      0.148      0.882 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV1               0.002      0.011      0.148      0.882 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV1               0.038      0.071      0.537      0.591 
 
 
Effects from CBV2 to RSC 
 
  Total               -0.061      0.073     -0.827      0.408 
  Total indirect       0.007      0.012      0.563      0.573 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV2               0.007      0.012      0.563      0.573 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV2              -0.067      0.073     -0.925      0.355 
 
 
Effects from CBV3 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.056      0.058      0.976      0.329 
  Total indirect       0.005      0.009      0.512      0.608 
203 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV3               0.005      0.009      0.512      0.608 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV3               0.051      0.057      0.901      0.367 
 
 
Effects from ICC to RSC 
 
  Total                0.017      0.079      0.217      0.828 
  Total indirect       0.056      0.031      1.830      0.067 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    ICC                0.056      0.031      1.830      0.067 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 





                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
Effects from RE to SQ 
 
  Total                0.784      0.060     12.978      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.145      0.054     -2.674      0.007 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 




  Direct 
    SQ 
    RE                 0.930      0.079     11.773      0.000 
 
 
Effects from RD1 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.143      0.066      2.181      0.029 





  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1               -0.038      0.022     -1.741      0.082 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RD1                0.181      0.066      2.716      0.007 
 
 
Effects from RD2 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.006      0.029      0.220      0.826 
  Total indirect      -0.009      0.006     -1.404      0.160 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RD1 
    RD2               -0.011      0.008     -1.519      0.129 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RD2                0.002      0.002      1.261      0.207 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RD2                0.016      0.029      0.526      0.599 
 
 
Effects from RBV1 to SQ 
 
  Total               -0.152      0.064     -2.394      0.017 
  Total indirect       0.052      0.031      1.682      0.093 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RBV1               0.007      0.020      0.335      0.738 
 
    SQ 
    RD1 
    RBV1               0.057      0.025      2.249      0.025 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RBV1              -0.012      0.007     -1.611      0.107 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 




Effects from RBV2 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.087      0.043      2.020      0.043 
  Total indirect       0.020      0.014      1.446      0.148 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RBV2               0.020      0.014      1.446      0.148 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RBV2               0.066      0.044      1.496      0.135 
 
 
Effects from RBV1 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.020      0.076      0.268      0.789 
  Total indirect       0.047      0.027      1.766      0.077 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RBV1               0.047      0.027      1.766      0.077 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    RBV1              -0.027      0.079     -0.341      0.733 
 
 
Effects from CBV1 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.004      0.019      0.209      0.835 
  Total indirect       0.000      0.001      0.124      0.901 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV1               0.000      0.001      0.124      0.901 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV1               0.004      0.019      0.208      0.835 
 
 
Effects from CBV2 to RSC 
 
  Total               -0.057      0.069     -0.826      0.409 







  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV2               0.006      0.011      0.563      0.573 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV2              -0.064      0.069     -0.925      0.355 
 
 
Effects from CBV3 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.058      0.059      0.976      0.329 
  Total indirect       0.005      0.009      0.512      0.608 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV3               0.005      0.009      0.512      0.608 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV3               0.053      0.058      0.901      0.367 
 
 
Effects from ICC to RSC 
 
  Total                0.017      0.079      0.217      0.828 
  Total indirect       0.056      0.031      1.830      0.067 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    ICC                0.056      0.031      1.830      0.067 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 





                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
Effects from RE to SQ 
 
  Total                0.784      0.060     12.978      0.000 







  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RE                -0.145      0.054     -2.674      0.007 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RE                 0.930      0.079     11.773      0.000 
 
 
Effects from RD1 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.143      0.066      2.181      0.029 
  Total indirect      -0.038      0.022     -1.741      0.082 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 




  Direct 
    SQ 
    RD1                0.181      0.066      2.716      0.007 
 
 
Effects from RD2 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.006      0.029      0.220      0.826 
  Total indirect      -0.009      0.006     -1.431      0.153 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RD1 
    RD2               -0.011      0.007     -1.553      0.120 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RD2                0.002      0.002      1.280      0.200 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RD2                0.016      0.029      0.527      0.598 
 
 
Effects from RBV1 to SQ 
 
  Total               -0.152      0.064     -2.394      0.017 





  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RBV1               0.007      0.020      0.335      0.738 
 
    SQ 
    RD1 
    RBV1               0.057      0.025      2.249      0.025 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RBV1              -0.012      0.007     -1.611      0.107 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RBV1              -0.204      0.068     -2.993      0.003 
 
 
Effects from RBV2 to SQ 
 
  Total                0.087      0.043      2.036      0.042 
  Total indirect       0.020      0.014      1.452      0.146 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SQ 
    RSC 
    RBV2               0.020      0.014      1.452      0.146 
 
  Direct 
    SQ 
    RBV2               0.066      0.044      1.502      0.133 
 
 
Effects from RBV1 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.020      0.076      0.268      0.789 
  Total indirect       0.047      0.027      1.766      0.077 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    RBV1               0.047      0.027      1.766      0.077 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    RBV1              -0.027      0.079     -0.341      0.733 
 
 
Effects from CBV1 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.004      0.007      0.555      0.579 
  Total indirect       0.000      0.001      0.148      0.882 
 
209 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV1               0.000      0.001      0.148      0.882 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 




Effects from CBV2 to RSC 
 
  Total               -0.057      0.069     -0.827      0.408 
  Total indirect       0.006      0.011      0.563      0.573 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV2               0.006      0.011      0.563      0.573 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV2              -0.064      0.069     -0.926      0.354 
 
 
Effects from CBV3 to RSC 
 
  Total                0.058      0.059      0.977      0.328 
  Total indirect       0.005      0.009      0.513      0.608 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 
    CBV3               0.005      0.009      0.513      0.608 
 
  Direct 
    RSC 
    CBV3               0.053      0.058      0.902      0.367 
 
 
Effects from ICC to RSC 
 
  Total                0.017      0.079      0.217      0.828 
  Total indirect       0.056      0.031      1.830      0.067 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    RSC 
    RD1 





  Direct 
    RSC 
    ICC               -0.039      0.079     -0.494      0.621 
 
 
     Beginning Time:  17:05:40 
        Ending Time:  17:05:42 




MUTHEN & MUTHEN 
3463 Stoner Ave. 
Los Angeles, CA  90066 
 
Tel: (310) 391-9971 






























































































































APPENDIX O. HYPOTHESIZED MODEL MODIFICATION 
INDICES 
Minimum M.I. value for printing the modification index    15.000 
 




RE       ON RD1      / 
RD1      BY RE             22.174     0.273      0.377        0.377 
RBV1     ON RD1      / 
RD1      BY RBV1           20.913    -1.278     -1.382       -1.382 
ICC      ON RD1      / 
RD1      BY ICC            18.222    -0.685     -0.659       -0.659 
RD1      ON RE       / 
RE       BY RD1            22.371     0.578      0.418        0.418 
RD1      ON SQ       / 
SQ       BY RD1            20.238     0.559      0.464        0.464 
RD1      ON RSC      / 




RE       ON RD1A           19.308     0.191      0.204        0.303 
RE       ON RD1B           18.729     0.198      0.212        0.307 
RBV1     ON RD1B           16.196    -0.610     -0.510       -0.739 
ICC      ON RD1A           16.416    -0.387     -0.288       -0.428 
RD1      ON REA            20.017     0.331      0.256        0.301 
RD1      ON SQM            18.276     0.405      0.313        0.384 
RD1      ON RSCA           19.559     0.706      0.546        0.624 
SQC      ON SQK            27.761     0.414      0.414        0.417 
SQD      ON SQM            18.361     0.317      0.317        0.335 
SQK      ON SQC            27.761     0.497      0.497        0.493 




RD1      WITH RE           22.174     0.303      0.307        0.307 
RD1      WITH RBV1         20.913    -1.419     -1.125       -1.125 
RD1      WITH ICC          18.222    -0.760     -0.537       -0.537 
SQK      WITH SQC          27.761     0.091      0.091        0.453 
SQM      WITH SQD          18.360     0.086      0.086        0.344 
214 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
215 



























































































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
217 
APPENDIX Q. TRIMMED MODEL MODIFICATION INDICES 
Minimum M.I. value for printing the modification index    15.000 
 




RE       ON RD1      / 
RD1      BY RE             23.206     0.282      0.389        0.389 
RBV1     ON RD1      / 
RD1      BY RBV1           22.807    -1.548     -1.679       -1.679 
ICC      ON RD1      / 
RD1      BY ICC            23.047    -0.834     -0.805       -0.805 
RD1      ON RE       / 
RE       BY RD1            23.211     0.576      0.417        0.417 
RD1      ON SQ       / 




RE       ON RD1A           20.798     0.202      0.215        0.320 
RE       ON RD1B           19.480     0.205      0.219        0.318 
ICC      ON RD1A           19.886    -0.448     -0.334       -0.497 
RD1      ON REA            20.382     0.332      0.257        0.302 
RD1      ON SQD            15.180     0.381      0.295        0.342 
RD1      ON SQM            18.535     0.396      0.306        0.375 
SQC      ON SQK            27.743     0.414      0.414        0.417 
SQD      ON SQM            18.317     0.317      0.317        0.336 
SQK      ON SQC            27.742     0.497      0.497        0.493 




RD1      WITH RE           23.205     0.316      0.319        0.319 
RD1      WITH RBV1         22.805    -1.732     -1.374       -1.374 
RD1      WITH ICC          23.047    -0.934     -0.659       -0.659 
SQK      WITH SQC          27.743     0.091      0.091        0.453 
SQM      WITH SQD          18.317     0.086      0.086        0.344 
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